An EPITOME OF ETHICS OR A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL VIRTUES

For the Use of SCHOOLS.



Cicero Tusc. Quæst.

O *Vitæ Philosophia* **Dux**! O *Virtutum Indagatrix, Expultrixq; Vitiorum*! *Unus Dies bene, & ex Præceptis tuis, actus, peccanti* **Immortalitati** *est anteponendus.*

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

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AN ACCOUNT OF VIRTUE.

CHAP. I.

What Ethicks or Morals are.

ETHICKS *are defined to be the Art of Living well and happily.*

I. WE understand in this place, by *Art*, a methodical Knowledge of such Precepts as are consentaneous one to another. And therefore, since *Ethicks* are that *Art* we design to treat of, our Precepts must all partake thereof, and all conduce thereunto; for else they would not be *consentaneous*. So that you are not to expect Precepts how to *dispute*, but how to live, and how to be *happy*.

The Reason why, in the Definition above, we call it, *The Art of Living both well and happily*,

Latin Teſtament.
Synopſis Græcæ Linguæ.
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ETHICKS *are defined to be the Art of Living well and happily.*

I. WE underſtand in this place, by *Art*, a methodical Knowledge of ſuch Precepts as are conſentaneous one to another. And therefore, ſince *Ethicks* are that *Art* we deſign to treat of, our Precepts muſt all partake thereof, and all conduce thereunto; for elſe they would not be *conſentaneous*. So that you are not to expect Precepts how to *diſpute*, but how to live, and how to be *happy*.

The Reaſon why, in the Definition above, we call it, *The Art of Living both well and happily*,

pily, is, becauſe a Man may live *well*, and yet not altogether ſo *happily*; which two differing kinds of Life the *Pythagoreans* did rightly diſtinguiſh; for by their Doctrin, it is one thing to be *perfect according to Nature*, another *according to Life*.

II. Now ſuch men *are by nature perfect*, who are adorned with Virtue. For, by the Definition of thoſe Philoſophers, *Virtue is the top and perfection of every Nature*. They term theſe men *good only*, and not happy or bleſt. *But ſuch men are ſaid to be perfect according to life, who are not only good, but alſo happy*. For they define *happineſs* to be the Perfection of human Life; and they define human life to be a Collection or *Chronicle of humane Actions*. Wherefore, ſeeing the Event and Succeſs of ſuch Actions depend on Fortune, no man can, without the Benefits of Fortune, enjoy a perfect State. The wiſe *Hippodamus Thurius* obſerved, *That it was virtue and Fortune together that made Actions perfect; Virtue as to the Practice, and Fortune as to the Succeſs*.

III. The Definition of *Felicity* given by *Archytas*, is conſonant to what we have ſaid, namely, *That it was the practice of Virtue joyned with good Fortune*. And laſt of all, *Euthephemus* hath well illuſtrated the matter in this threefold Similitude: *Juſt as a General* (ſaith he) *overcomes by Valour and good Succeſs; and as the Pilot gains his Port by true ſteering, and a favourable Gale; and as the Eye beholds by the Power of Viſion, and Help of Light:*

ſo

is our Life then beſt, when accompanied with irtue and good Fortune. We might add unto l, the Authority of *Ariſtotle* himſelf, who equires *external Goods* to the completing of appineſs. Now altho the good Things of ortune, which we here recommend, cannot bſolutely be ſaid to be within our Power; yet e preſume to ſay, that foraſmuch as the Pre-pts, laid down by *Ethicks*, do admirably ſteer man to their acquiſition (as in due place it ll appear) we muſt conclude, that ſuch Ex-rnals are by good title referable to *Ethicks*. r altho they are ſometimes miſſed of, and t always attained: yet this is only as it hap-ns with *Phyſicians* and *Pilots*; who, tho they en miſcarry, yet no man infers from thence, that there are ſuch *Arts* in the World, as *ſick* and *Navigation* too.

Vide in this Book, *L.* 3. *c.* 10. § 13.

Chap. II.

f the Parts of Ethicks, and of Happineſs.

Thicks are divided into two Parts, *The Knowledge of Happineſs, and the Ac-ſition of it.* The *Knowledge* contains the ctrine of its Nature, and of ſuch things as Nature of Happineſs does, in ſome ſort, er comprehend, or elſe refer unto. Whence his Part we ſhall principally treat of the *Vir-*, and of the *Paſſions*: and in the laſt Part

add ſomewhat about the *external Supports* of lif

II. HAPPINESS *is that pleaſure which t mind takes in from a Senſe of Virtue, and a Co ſcience of Well-doing; and of conforming in all thin to the Rules of both.* Wherefore we ſay, that e *ternal Comforts*, or ſome moderate proportio of them, do much conduce to the maki happineſs complete. Here we call *Happin* a *Pleaſure* of the Mind rather than an O *tion* of it, ſince all men allow it to be the *b and greateſt of human Fruitions.* But as that ca not be the greateſt which is ſubſervient to an ther, ſo the *Operation* of the mind cannot ſaid to be its *greateſt good*, ſince it is but in ord to *Pleaſure.* And it is upon this Account, *Ariſtotle* obſerves, that we often heighten a raiſe our *Operations*; not that we are pleaſ with the Operation itſelf, but becauſe we exp a pleaſure from it, which we highly value, a which we look upon as an effect thereof.

Ethic. Eud. lib. 1. *cap.* 7.

III. FURTHERMORE, to come cloſer to t Mark, this *Pleaſure* by which we define *Happ neſs*, is there conſidered as the Flower and M ſter-piece of that very Operation, in the wa of Virtue, which makes up the Excellency Life. For, in every Action we go about, is Pleaſure that makes the Operation comple it is as the Soul of the Work which cannot wanting. And ſo *Ariſtotle* ſays, *That it gi Perfection to all our Works, and even to Life itſel*

Eth. Nic. lib. 10. *c.* 4.

It is plain, that each Creature hath its ov particular Pleaſure, which is conſtrued to its ſupreme Happineſs. Whence we may

fer, That human Happineſs does alſo conſiſt in human Pleaſure; but ſuch, I mean, as ariſeth from the Senſe of Virtue.

IV. Next we ſay, that all ſorts of Men, not the Fools only, but the Philoſophers, have placed *Happineſs* in *Pleaſure*. *Ariſtotle* hath noted in the following Words: *That all People accounted Happineſs to be a Pleaſure, and deſired to live therein, or at leaſt not without it.* And again elſewhere he ſays: *That no man can rationally think, but he that is truly happy lives very pleaſantly.* And again in his Rhetorick: *That Happineſs is that way of Life which is moſt pleaſant with Security.* So even our own Divines are wont to deſcribe the Celeſtial Happineſs, by an uninterrupted Joy. *Magn. Moral l. 2. c. 7.* *Eud. l. 7. c. 5.* *Rhet. l. 1. c. 15.*

V. In the fifth place it appears, by *Ariſtotle*'s own Definition of *Pleaſure*, that *Happineſs* is of the ſame Affinity. For he defines Pleaſure to be, *A Reſtitution of every Creature from a ſtate imperfect, or preternatural, unto its own proper Nature.* Now a true Feeling and Poſſeſſion of Virtue, is alſo the converſion or bringing a man about, from what is contrary to his Nature, to that which is conformable to it. For tho all Depravity be, according to *Triſmegiſtus*, inbred, and connatural to Brutes, yet in Reality the ſame is quite contrary to human Nature. *For* (as the Emperor *Marcus Aurelius* obſerves) *to act according to Nature or according to Reaſon, is in a rational Creature the ſame thing.* Wherefore all pravity is repugnant to human Nature. But, that Virtue is natural to human *Magn. Moral. l. 2. c. 7.* *Marcus Imperator, lib. 7. cap. 11.*

Nature, and born as a Twin therewith, is manifeſt, as well becauſe Man's Soul is a rational Being, as becauſe Righteouſneſs or perfect Virtue (as we are told *by Divine Revelation*) is immortal; and that it was Sin only that brought Death into the World. For ſince the State of Innocence was to have been eternal, this plainly ſhews, that ſuch a ſtate was moſt perfect and moſt natural. And therefore that Reſtitution unto ſuch a State muſt be the moſt intrinſick and peculiar Pleaſure.

V. LASTLY, it muſt be agreed, that the Deſires of the Soul fly not to their Object, as it is intelligible, but as it is good or congruous, or grateful, or at leaſt tending to theſe ends; and ſo filling the mind with all the Joys and Pleaſure it can comprehend. Hence it is plain, that ſupreme Happineſs is not barely to be placed in the Intellect; but her proper Seat muſt be called the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul:* namely, a Faculty of that divine Compoſition, and ſupernatural Texture, as enables us to diſtinguiſh not only what is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt, but to reliſh it, and to have pleaſure in that alone. Which Faculty much reſembles that part of the Will which moves towards what we judge to be abſolutely the beſt, when, as it were with an unquenchable thirſt and affection it is hurried on towards ſo pleaſing an Object; and being in poſſeſſion of it, is ſwallowed up in ſatisfaction that cannot be expreſt.

Vide in this Book *l.* 3. *c.* 9. *s.* 14, 15, 16.

VI. HE therefore who acts according to this Faculty,

Faculty, conforms to *the beſt and divineſt thing that is in us.* And this, as *Ariſtotle* notes, is neceſſary unto Happineſs. *For whether* (ſaith he) *it be the very mind of man, or ſomething elſe that, according to Nature, ſeems to govern and preſide within us, as having knowledge of what is moſt Lovely and Divine; or whether it be God himſelf that immediately operates; or elſe thoſe Gifts which we derive from above: this is plain, that ſuch inward Working and Conformity to Virtue's Law, is that which denominates true Happineſs.* Here the Philoſopher ſeems doubtful whether it be *Intellect*, or any other Faculty (which yet bears Impreſſion of things *lovely* and *divine*) in whoſe Operation true Happineſs does conſiſt. Yet afterwards he takes part with the *Intellect*, and placeth Happineſs in Contemplation. But we preſume to ſay, this can be no *moral* Happineſs; ſince it would be confined to a few ſpeculative Men and Philoſophers, and ſo ſhut out the Bulk of mankind, who could never be partakers thereof. *Ethic. Ni. com l.* 10. *c.* 7.

VII. WHEREFORE, we think, Happineſs ſhould be ſeated rather in that *Boniform Faculty* we have ſpoke of; ſince 'tis the moſt elevated and moſt divine Faculty of the Soul, and ſeems to ſupply the ſame place in it, as the eſſential Good of the *Platonicks*, is ſaid to do in the Deity. As alſo becauſe the Study and Improvement of it is common to all men. For it is not above the Talent of the meaneſt, to love God, and his Neighbour very

heartily. And, if this be done with Prudence and Purity of Life, it is the Completion of this Happineſs, and the very natural Fruit of this *exalted Faculty*.

And let no man think meanly thereof, ſince we are free to aver, that nothing of greater Benediction can betide us, either in the preſent, or in the future life, than ſuch a teſtimony of the *Divine Love*. But we ſhall elſewhere ſpeak more freely thereof.

VIII. We do therefore mention in our Definition of Happineſs, *the pleaſure which the mind enjoys from a ſenſe of Virtue*; becauſe there are ſome kinds of allowable pleaſure, ſuch as *Ariſtotle* calls *pure* and *generous*, and laughs at thoſe who think otherwiſe. *For ſuch* (ſays he) *as will not allow that any Pleaſure can be honeſt, are like thoſe Companions, who, not comprehending what Nectar is, do fanſie that the Gods drink Wine; inaſmuch as they themſelves know nothing better:*

Nicom. lib. 10. *c.* 6. *Magn. Moral. lib.* 2. *c.* 7.

IX. Now I affirm this pleaſure to ariſe from a *Senſe of Virtue*; and it is erroneous to think the Fruit of Virtue ſhould conſiſt in ſuch imaginary knowledge as is gotten by bare Definitions of Virtue: for this amounts to no more, than if a man would pretend to know the Nature of Fire from the bare Picture of Fire, which can afford no Heat. All kind of Vital Goods (as I may take the liberty to call them) are by our Life and Senſes to be judged of, and enjoyed. And Virtue is in itſelf an inward life, not an outward ſhape, or to be diſcovered

diſcovered by the Eye. According to that memorable ſaying of *Plotinus*: *If you ever were the thing itſelf, you may then be ſaid to have ſeen it.* But being once transformed into this life of Virtue, then indeed you behold the Beauties, and taſte the Pleaſures thereof; then you grow enamoured, and your Soul is taken up with Joys that cannot be uttered. However till you ſhall attain this State, and while this *Bleſſed Diſpoſition of the Soul* is not as yet awakened in you, 'tis fit you credit thoſe who are in the Fruition of it. Nor can that Saying of *Ariſtotle* be ever more opportunely urged than in this Caſe, *That Learners muſt believe.* For ſhould you venture to make judgement of the Pleaſure that is in Virtue, being as yet void of all Experience, it were to be feared, you would proſecute it ſo faintly, as never to obtain it, but be left to expiate your incredulity in this Life, by a too laſting puniſhment in the other.

Vide in this Book, *L.* 2. *c.* 2. § 5. *&c.* 3. § 1. *L.* 1. *c.* 3. § 7.

X. As to the preceding Words that are annexed to the Definition of Happineſs; Namely, *That it was made perfect by external Comforts:* How could this otherwiſe be? For ſince *Happineſs* conſiſts in that *Pleaſure*, which good men take in the Senſe of Virtue, and a Conſcience of Well-doing; no man can poſſeſs this *Happineſs*, if any pain be ſo intenſe upon him, as to diſtract the Mind, and extinguiſh all preſent Senſe of Pleaſure. Whence it plainly follows, that we muſt not lie under acute Diſeaſes, or want the Food that is needful.

ful. For the want of a Sufficiency for Nature; or a State of Captivity; or any Degree of Vaſſalage; are able to depreſs, as well as diſtract, the Mind by Cares and Anxiety. They hinder Happineſs from being in its Perfection, nor can Heroical Virtue produce ſo full a Crop.

Haud facilè emergunt, quorum virtutibus obſtat
Res anguſta domi ——— ———

Magn. Moral. lib. 2. c. 9.

XI. WHEREFORE (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith) while we are Men, and carry about us the Frailties we are born to, we ſhall ever be wanting of *external Proſperity*. For complete Happineſs cannot be without thoſe two Ingredients, which the *Pythagoreans* termed *Praiſe* and *Comfort*; meaning *Praiſe that reſults from Virtue, and Comfort from good Fortune*. This we ſufficiently noted before to be the *Pythagoreans* Doctrine. And *Ariſtotle*, in his great Morals, ſtrikes again upon the ſame Note; affirming, *That without external Comforts, it was impoſſible to be happy.*

Moral Nicom. lib. 10. c. 8.

Magn. Moral.

XII. HOWEVER he inclines much to a *Mediocrity* herein, and quotes *Solon* for it: *That a Man may do all things that are fit for him, out of a moderate Eſtate.* For as to *Exceſs of Wealth*, it rather choaks up the Way to Virtue than mends the Path. *Archytas* compares Wealth unto *Wine*, and to *Light*; ſaying, that one blinded the *Eyes*, and the other turned the *Brains* of very good Men, when they

they were in exceſs. Whence *Ariſtotle*, when he interprets the Anſwer of *Anaxagoras*, does not make his happy Man to be either a Potentate, or a Man of overgrown Riches; *But the Man that was full of Innocence, free from Pain, and who had ſome ſhare of Divine Contemplation.* This was his happy Man. *Moral. Eudem. lib. 1. c. 4.*

Chap. III.

Of Virtue in general: and of Right Reaſon.

I. Virtue *is an intellectual Power of the Soul, by which it over rules the animal Impreſſions or bodily Paſſions; ſo as in every Action it eaſily purſues what is abſolutely and ſimply the beſt.*

Here it ſeems fit, in the Definition, to call Virtue rather a *Power* than an *Habit*. Firſt, becauſe the word *Virtue* implies as much, and ſignifies the ſame thing as Fortitude. And next becauſe an *Habit* is not eſſential to Virtue. For if a Man had this *intellectual Power* born in him, he would doubtleſs be virtuous, tho it came not to him in the way of repeated Actions, ſuch as conſtitute a Habit. For it is not the external Cauſes, but the internal, which make the eſſence of a thing. Beſides it is this Idea of Virtue which elevates and inclines the mind to love her, and tread in her ways, and which argues Virtue to be a quick and vigorous heat, by which the mind is eaſily and *L. 3. c. 1. § 3.*

and irreſiſtibly moved to do things which are good and honorable. So that we eſteem this very Notion of Virtue as able to rowze up men from Sloth and Lethargy, and make thoſe aſhamed, who on a few moderate Performances think to ſet up for Men of Virtue.

II. We term this a *Power intellectual*, not only becauſe of its ſituation, which is in the *intellectual* part of the Soul (and not in the *animal* part of it, where that Power reſides which governs the Members) but alſo becauſe it is always excited by ſome Principle which is *intellectual* or rational. By animal *Impreſſions* we underſtand every motion of the Body, which being obtruded with any ſort of Violence on the Soul, brings danger of Sin and Error, if not carefully watched.

Therefore all ſuch Deluſions and Imaginations, as ſtrongly aſſault the Mind, may fitly be referred to this Head. By *Actions*, I mean all Motions made by the Soul upon deliberation, which is to ſay, all ſuch as may properly be termed human Actions; whether they be ſuch as the School-men call *Elicitæ* or *Imperatæ*: that is, whether they do immediately proceed from the Soul it ſelf; or whether they are occaſioned from any outward Impreſſions made upon the Soul. Under which Heads we may rightly comprehend the accepting or refuſing any Philoſophical Opinion, whether Phyſical or Metaphyſical. And ſo of any thing elſe.

III. As

III. As to the *Purſuit of the Soul*, we ſpake of; this was to ſet off, and more openly expreſs the *intellectual Power*: for if it had not that force to purſue, it would not be Virtue, but only a Diſpoſition towards it. So *Theages* the *Pythagorean* hath it: *That Reaſon doth not beget in us a Continency and Forbearance, but by putting a forcible Reſtraint upon Luſt and Anger. And that when the Paſſions do overcome, and put the ſame forcible reſtraint upon Reaſon, ſhe then gives place to Incontinency and a ſoftneſs of mind which receives all Impreſſions; when as bare Diſpoſition, without ſuch a forcible reſtraint, can only produce imperfect Virtues, and imperfect Vices.*

Wherefore the Philoſopher makes theſe interchangeable Conflicts, and Diſpoſitions of the Soul, to be but Virtues half perfect, as alſo the Vices but half inveterate.

And whereas we ſay, the Soul purſues what was *abſolutely and ſimply the beſt*; this was to manifeſt that famous diſtinction of a twofold Good; one *General*, which was *abſolutely good* or *abſolutely better*. The other *Particular*, and which in reſpect of ſome *ſingle Inclination of any particular perſon, was good or better:* that is to ſay, either grateful, or more grateful. But what we hold to be the *abſolute Good, or better thing*, is that which proves grateful, or more grateful, to the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul*, which we have already pronounced to be a *Thing Divine*.

IV.

Moral. Nicom. l. 6. c. b3.

IV. ARISTOTLE ſeems to me, in his Ethicks to *Nicomachus*, to point at this very Faculty, ſaying, *That what is beſt, in whatever Subject it be, is not apparent, but to a good Man.* By which he means, that men do diſcover that which is beſt in every Subject (I mean really and ſimply beſt) not as they are *knowing*, but as they are *Good.* So that methinks he had ſpoken more correctly had he ſtyled this Faculty, *The very Eye of the Soul*, than to call it that ſort of Natural *Induſtry*, which ſeems to ſo much bordering upon *Craft.* But foraſmuch as no man can feel the Motives and Dictates of this Divine Faculty, but one who hath attained to it by diligent application, we muſt have recourſe to ſome middle Principle to ſerve as *Mercury* did of old, and be an Interpreter between God and Man. And for this we ſhall conſtitute that which we call *Right Reaſon.* Wherefore that certainly is *abſolutely and ſimply the beſt*, which according to the Circumſtances of the Caſe in queſtion, comes up cloſeſt to *Right Reaſon*, or is rather conſentaneous with it.

V. FOR *Right Reaſon, which is in Man, is a ſort of Copy or Tranſcript of that Reaſon or Law eternal which is regiſtred in the Mind Divine.* However this Law is not by Nature made otherwiſe known unto us, than as 'tis communicated and reflected on our Minds by the ſame Right Reaſon, and ſo ſhines forth. But by how much it ſhines forth, by ſo much doth it oblige the Conſcience, even as a Law Divine

Divine inſcribed in our Hearts. To this very Senſe the *Pythagoreans* pronounced of Virtue: *That it was the Habit of doing what ought to be done.* They did not bearly intend, *The doing what was equal, and in a Mean, or doing what needed neither Addition nor Subſtraction, as being already what it ought to be*: But the doing that which was *obligatory*, and of Duty, and according to a Law which was immutable. And ſo alſo did *Epictetus* famouſly pronounce, *What ever appears to be beſt, let that be your inviolable Law.*

VI. The heighth of Virtue is this, conſtantly to purſue that which to Right Reaſon ſeems beſt. For indeed ſhe her ſelf is even abſolutely and ſimply that beſt, not only as ſhe is ſo conſonant to *Divine* Reaſon, which does nothing partially for the ſake of this or that particular: but as ſhe generouſly dictates, like to a common *Parent*, ſuch Laws as tend, in their own Nature, to the Happineſs of all Mankind. Hence *Ariſtotle* calls God, *the Law eternal, as regarding every way with equal Benignity.* So alſo, as well among the *Pythagoreans* as the *Stoicks*, it was held, *That to follow God*, or *to follow Nature*, was juſt the ſame thing as to follow *Right Reaſon.* For this alone is that which conſtitutes our Nature, and diſtinguiſhes a Man from a Beaſt. *De mundo cap. 6.*

VII. Yet after all, as *Ariſtotle* himſelf is fain often to confeſs, tho it be eaſie to agree this Beſt to be that which to Right Reaſon is conſonant; yet what this Right Reaſon is, or what

what is the meaſure of it, ſeems a moſt difficult matter truly to reſolve. The Philoſopher having (in his great Morals) brought in one who demands, what Right Reaſon was, and where to be found? The Anſwer is but darkly thus, *That unleſs a Man have within himſelf a Senſe of things of this Nature, there is nothing to be done.* It was indeed the Anſwer which a Phyſician gave to one who asked him how he ſhould diſtinguiſh, which was the paleneſs that argued a man to be ill of an Ague. But the ſame Philoſopher preſently ſubjoins, *That it was the like Caſe, as to make a Judgement of the Paſſions; namely, That by ſome Senſe and Feeling of them, the Conjecture was to be made.* So that in ſhort the final Judgement upon this matter, is all referred to *inward Senſe*, which I confeſs, I ſhould rather have called, *The Boniform Faculty of the Soul.* However, as *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere notes, of Men who by a ſort of Violence, and without Reaſon, are hurried on to good, I muſt own, that whoever is ſo affected, differs but little from them who are inſpired. And certainly this Principle which I call the *Boniform Faculty*, is the moſt divine thing within us, but hath nothing in it that ſo much as ſavours of *Fanaticiſm.*

Magn. Moral. lib. 2. c. 10.

L. 1. c. 2. § 9.

Magn. Moral. lib. 2. c. 8.

L. 3. c. 1. § 2.

VIII. The Philoſopher, in another place, defines *Right Reaſon* thus, *That ſuch Reaſon was right, as was conformable to Prudence.* Now whereas *Prudence* it ſelf is nothing but that natural *Sagacity*, or well cultivated *Diligence* of

Moral. Eudem. l. 5. c. 13.

of the Mind; which he elſewhere calls, *The very Eye of the Soul*: This only brings back the ſame anſwer as before; reſolving right Reaſon rather into an *inward Senſe*, or an *inward Faculty* of *Divination*; than into any certain and diſtinct Principles, by which a Man might judge of that which in every thing were the beſt.

IX. HOWEVER, the ſame Philoſopher is at laſt, towards the end of his *Eudemicks*, very clear and very appoſite in this Matter. For when he brings the ſame queſtion on the ſtage, the Reſolution is as follows, '*That we are in this, as in other Occaſions, to regulate our Lives by the Dictates of our internal Regent; that we muſt aſpire to ſuch habits, as may enable us to imitate the high Character of ſuch a Regent, and to conform thereto in all things.* Which amounts to this, that our Conſciences muſt be kept pure and immaculate. For he adds, *That as human Nature does conſiſt of two parts, the one to command, the other to obey: ſo by inſtitution in all Governments, the inferiors are ty'd to be ſubject to the Rulers. That alſo this Government is of a double ſort. For juſt as Phyſick requires one thing, and Health another, and that the firſt is but in order to the latter; even ſo it fares in contemplating the Ways of God. He, as the high and ſupreme Governour, firſt ſends his Edicts forth; but the end and deſignation of them is to beget prudence in the heart of Man: and then the work of prudence is to diſtinguiſh what in human affairs is beſt. Now as to God, he already is all-ſufficient,* *Moral. Eudem. l. 7. c. 15.*

and wants nothing; wherefore we may infer, that whatever choice, or whatever acquiſition of natural Gifts we have, which may moſt contribute to annex the Soul to God by contemplation; this ſurely is the beſt, and this the nobleſt Meaſure for all our Deliberations. As on the other ſide, whatever is ſo deficient, or redundant as to interrupt our Contemplation of God, or of the Homage we owe him, this of all things is the vileſt.

This was the Anſwer given, which, for Truth and Divinity, ſavours not ſo much of the Philoſopher, as of an Oracle.

X. YET let us add what he writes, to the ſame effect, unto *Nicomachus*. He ſays, *That as to the Gods, their whole Being was a continued Series of happineſs; but as to Man, that he had nothing of it farther, than as he held reſemblance with his Divine Original.* Now he ſhould have remembred, that the Divine Life was not a matter of Sapience only, but was principally to conſiſt in Love, Benignity, and in Beneficence or Well doing. For theſe are the Fruits of that Celeſtial Particle of the Soul, which we term the *Boniform*; and by which, above any other Acceſſions, we are made moſt like unto Almighty God.

Lib. 10. *c.* 8.

XI. PYTHAGORAS, according to what *Elian* ſaid of him, made a happy Conjunction of theſe two things, ſaying, *The Gods had been bountiful to Mortals in two eminent Bleſſings, namely, to ſpeak the truth, and to act righteouſly: for that both of theſe bore reſemblance unto the Works of the immortal Gods.* Which is to ſay, that

Var. Hiſt. l. 12 *c.* 50.

that the Perfection of Divine Life is made up of *Truth* and *Well doing*. Wherefore, if men will abide by the Judgement of *Ariſtotle* or *Pythagoras*, or others of the moſt celebrated, they muſt own that the Meaſure of *Right Reaſon* is to imitate the Divine Wiſdom, and the Divine Goodneſs, with all our Might. To which alſo we may refer, and ſo expound, that ſaying of *Theages* the *Pythagorean*: *That the ſource, cauſe and meaſure of human Felicity, does conſiſt in the knowledge of ſuch things as are moſt excellent, and moſt divine.*

CHAP. IV.

Certain Axioms or intellectual Principles; into which almoſt all the Reaſons of Mortality may be reduced.

I. BUT ſince there is a Race of Men in the World, who are quite ſeared up as to God, and all that is Divine; who allow no ſuch thing as Superiority in the Faculties, but aſſert Obedience to that Paſſion in particular, which ſhall happen to uſurp above the reſt, and make it the top of human Felicity to fullfil the deſires thereof. To ſuch as theſe, who would injuriouſly paſs for men,

which they are not; we muſt proceed by other ſteps than what are already ſet down. For we muſt not talk of our *Boniform Faculty*, as the meaſure of Right Reaſon, and flowing from the Divine part of the Soul, but meerly inſiſt with them upon what refers to the Intellect: ſince, as *Ariſtotle* notes, *ſome things are intelligible, tho men know not the reaſon why.*

Moral. Eudem. lib. 5. c. 8.

II. FROM this Magazine therefore let us draw forth a ſtock of ſuch Principles, as being immediately and irreſiſtibly true, need no proof; ſuch, I mean, as all Moral Reaſon may in a ſort have reference unto; even as all Mathematical Demonſtrations are found in ſome *firſt undeniable Axioms*. And becauſe theſe Principles ariſe out of that Faculty, which the *Greeks* call Νῦς, that ſignifies the Mind or intellect; and that the Words *Noema* and *Noemata* derive therefrom, and properly ſignifie Rules intellectual: we do not therefore improperly ſtile the Rules that hereafter follow, *Moral Noema's*. But, leſt any ſhould fanſie them to be moroſe and unpracticable, I muſt here affirm, they propoſe nothing for good, which at the ſame time is not grateful alſo, and attended with delight.

NOEMA I.

Good is that which is grateful, pleaſant, and congruous to any Being, which hath Life and Perception, or that contributes in any degree to the preſervation of it.

NOEMA

NOEMA II.

But, on the other ſide, whatever is ungrateful, unpleaſant, or any ways incongruous to any Being which hath Life and Perception, is evil. And if it finally tend to the deſtruction of that being, it is the worſt of evils.

As for example-ſake, if any thing ſhould not only offend your Eyes or Ears, but bring alſo blindneſs and deafneſs upon you; this were the worſt that could happen. But if the ſight and hearing were but only impaired thereby, this were but an inferior Evil. And the Reaſon holds the ſame in the other Faculties.

NOEMA III.

Among the ſeveral kinds or degrees of ſenſible Beings which are in the world, ſome are better and more excellent than others.

NOEMA IV.

One Good may excel another in Quality, or Duration, or in both.

This is ſelf-evident: yet it may be illuſtrated from this abſurdity, that otherwiſe one Life would not be better, nor one ſort of Happineſs greater than another: ſo as Gods, Angels, Men, Horſes, and the vileſt Worm, would be happy alike; which none but a mad

man can fancy. And as to duration there is no ſcruple thereof.

NOEMA V.

What is good is to be choſen; what is evil to be avoided, but the more excellent Good is preferable to the leſs excellent: and a leſs Evil is to be born, that we may avoid a greater.

NOEMA VI.

In things of which we have no experience, we muſt believe thoſe who profeſs themſelves to have experience. Provided always that there be no ſuſpicion of fraud or worldly contrivance, but that there be a Conformity between their Profeſſions and their Lives.

NOEMA VII.

'Tis more eligible to want a Good, which for weight and duration is very great, than to bear an Evil of the ſame proportion. And by how much any Evil ſhall in weight and duration exceed the Good, by ſo much the more willingly can we be without ſuch Good.

NOEMA VIII.

That which muſt certainly come to paſs, ought to be reputed as preſent; inaſmuch as the future will one day come upon us. And herein ſome

proportion

proportion of Reaſon holds in things future, which are very probable.

NOEMA IX.

Good things, which excel leſs, are diſtinguiſhed by Weight and Duration, from thoſe things which excel more.

NOEMA X.

A preſent Food is to be rejected or moderated, if there be a future Good of infinite mroe value, as to weight and duration to be but probably expected: and much more therefore if ſuch expectation be certain.

NOEMA XI.

A preſent Evil is to be born, if there be a probable future Evil infinitely mote dangerous, as to weight and duration, to be avoided thereby; and this is much more ſtrongly incumbent, if the future evil be certain.

NOEMA XII.

A mind which is free from the prejudices that attend paſſion, judges more uprightly than a mind which by ſuch paſſions, or any other corporeal Impreſſions is ſolicited or diſturbed. For even as a cloudy Sky, and turbulent Sea will neither tranſmit or reflect any Light; ſo a diſturbed

mind admits no Reaſon, tho it come never ſo plain and clear.

Boethius ſets this forth in very elegant Verſe, which thus begins,

Nubibus atris Fundere poſſunt
Condita nullum Sydera Lumen, &c.

The Stars, tho of themſelves ſo bright,
When hid in Clouds can give no light.

III. And theſe are thoſe Rules or *Noemata*, which almoſt ſuffice to engender in the Soul that *Prudence*, *Temperance*, and *Fortitude* which regard the Duties *we owe our ſelves*. Thoſe which follow regard what we owe *unto others*; as to *God*, to *Man*, and to *Virtue* it ſelf. And therefore they are the Rules and Principles of *Sincerity*, *Juſtice*, *Gratitude*, *Mercy* and *Piety*. For I account *Piety* among the Moral Virtues, inaſmuch as God may by the Light of Nature be known.

NOEMA XIII.

We muſt purſue the greateſt and moſt perfect Good with the greateſt zeal, and leſſer Goods with a zeal proportionably leſs. Nor muſt we ſubordinate greater Goods to leſs, but leſs to greater.

NOEMA

NOEMA XIV.

The Good, which in any caſe in queſtion, you would have another man do unto you; the ſame you are bound in the like caſe, to do unto him; So far forth as it may be done without prejudice to a Third.

NOEMA XV.

The Evil you would not have done to your ſelf, you muſt abſtain from doing the ſame to another, as far as may be done without prejudice to a Third.

NOEMA XVI.

Return good for good, and not evil for good.

NOEMA XVII.

'Tis good for a man to have wherewithal to live well and happily.

NOEMA XVIII.

If it be good for one man to have wherewithal to be happy; it evidently follows, 'tis twice as good for two men to be happy, thrice for three, a thouſand times for a thouſand; and ſo of the reſt.

NOEMA

NOEMA XIX.

'Tis better that one man be disabled from living voluptuously, than that another should live in want and calamity.

NOEMA XX.

'Tis good to obey the Magistrate in things indifferent, even where there is no penalty to disobey.

NOEMA XXI.

'Tis better to obey God than Men, or even our own Appetites.

NOEMA XXII.

'Tis good and just to give every man what is his due, as also the use and possession thereof without any trouble.

NOEMA XXIII.

However 'tis manifest, that a man may so behave himself, as that what was his own by acquisition or donation, may of right cease to be his own.

IV. These and such like *Sayings* may justly be called *Moral Axioms* or *Noema's*: for they

they are ſo clear and evident of themſelves, that, if men conſider impartially, they need no manner of Deduction or Argument, but are agreed to as ſoon as heard. And thus we are prepared, as with ſo many Touch-ſtones, to let the inquiſitive know what *Right Reaſon* is. For in ſhort, *it is that which by certain and neceſſary Conſequences, is at length reſolved into ſome intellectual Principle which is immediately true.*

And if any ask after Examples in this kind, that are ſuited to Morality, they may have recourſe to ſuch as are above recited.

CHAP. V.

To ſhew which are the Faculties whereby we do find and underſtand what is ſimply, and in its own nature good.

I. IT is now manifeſt, there is ſomething which is ſimply and abſolutely good, which in all human Actions is to be ſought for. That it's Nature, Eſſence, and Truth are to be judged of by *Right Reaſon*; but that the reliſh and delectation thereof, is to be taken in by the *Boniform Faculty.* Alſo that all Moral Good, properly ſo called, is *Intellectual* and

and *Divine*: *Intellectual*, as the Truth and Eſſence of it is defined and comprehended by the Intellect: and *Divine*, as the Savour and Complacency thereof, is moſt effectually taſted through that high Faculty, by which we are lifted up and cleave unto God, (that Almighty One, who is the moſt pure and abſolute Good, and who never wills any thing but what is tranſcendently the Beſt.) So that for a man thus to know, and thus to aſcend, is not only the higheſt Wiſdom, but the higheſt Felicity. And it is by this Gradation toward things divine, or by this Flower and Perfection of the Soul, that we attain to a ſort of Coalition with what is perfectly the Beſt. So it was ſaid of old;

Objectum quoddam eſt quod mentis flore prehendas.

II. Now as to thoſe men who ſhall either raſhly or adviſedly reject the Truth of our *Noema's*, 'tis eaſie to gueſs by ſuch diſreliſh, what are the Faculties they conſult. Nay, it is plain they ſet up for the *animal Appetite*; and openly declare, that what pleaſes them moſt, is only the beſt. But tho we may here venture to call this a poor brutal deluſion, yet theſe things are moſt properly referred unto, in the Chapter of *Temperance*.

III. In the mean time, for what relates even to *Juſtice*, the Sentiments of thoſe Gentlemen are nothing better. They will not allow for the

the chiefeſt Good that which is abſolutely and in its own nature juſt; but that which to *themſelves* looks well without any regard to their Neighbours. And if you enquire into the ſtate of this *Good* they ſo indulge, and ſo purſue, they make it no ſecret to tell you plainly, it is what affords beſt entertainment to their *Senſes*. Alas, how deplorable is it, that man ſhould ever value himſelf upon ſuch an affinity with the Beaſt! Nay, in human ſhape to become the very Beaſt! Whereas he has Title to think higher of himſelf, and to be one and the ſame with what is moſt eminent whithin him; or what in Dignity ſtands next thereto: which is doubtleſs his *Intellect* and *Right Reaſon*.

IV. For as in Numeration the Sum Total is accounted from the laſt Unite, ſo is it in other matters; the laſt and moſt perfect eſſential difference makes a Thing to be what it is, and doth diſtinguiſh it from all Things elſe. Wherefore, if any man ſhall make his *ſole good* to be that, which to himſelf is grateful, as inſiſting wholly on the delectation of his *animal Appetite*, he plainly publiſhes himſelf for a Brute. But if he means and intends ſuch grateful thing, as to the Intellect, or Right Reaſon, or to the *Boniform Faculty*, is ſuitable: this indeed (as *Plotinus* ſaith) is the Object of a *perfect Man*, I mean of an *intellectual Man*, and for ſuch you may pronounce him.

V.

V. For this is the plain Character of the intellectual Life, that as in the ſearch of Truth, it is not inquired what may ſeem true to any one Body of Men, tho ever ſo numerous, much leſs to any man in particular, but what is ſimply and abſolutely the Truth: ſo neither doth it ſet up that for good, which to any one man, or to any number of men, appears for ſuch; but that which really and abſolutely is ſo; and which, in like Circumſtances every intellectual Cretaure is bound to elect, be the animal Nature never ſo averſe. Now as it happens in *ſpecious Arithmetick*, that every ſignal Operation ſtands afterwards for a Theorem or Concluſion: ſo in Morals let ſuch preference and election, as we have mentioned, ſtand for an eternal Preſident, to guide our actions in all like caſes, when circumſtances are the ſame. And let us acquieſce therein, and acknowledge the Truth thereof, tho it prove never ſo ungrateful to our Appetites, and ſeem quite contrary to our external ſenſe.

VI. Wherefore as it is an Error in the Intellect, to reſign itſelf ſo far to the Imagination, or to the Senſe, as but to waver in the purſuit of *Truth*: So doubtleſs is it an error in the Will, to be ſo captivated, as to reſign it ſelf to the animal Appetite, and to forſake what is abſolutely good. For if the Will may want at ſome ſeaſons that reliſh of good which it ought to have; this is meerly the Will's neglect, in not exciting that divine Faculty

culty, by which we not only know what is beſt, but are elevated, and even raviſhed when we enjoy it. For it is plain, that when we open our Eyes, ſuch are the Charms of this Joy, that a man would rather venture a thouſand deaths, than by any baſe prevarication hazard his portion in a ſtate of life, which is ſo deſirable and ſo divine.

VII. WHEREFORE as it is now plain, that ſomething there is, which of its own nature, and inconteſtably is *true*: ſo is there ſomewhat which of its own nature is ſimply *good*. Alſo that as the former is comprehended by the Intellect, ſo the ſweetneſs and delight of the latter is reliſhed by the *Boniform Faculty*. And therefore as to thoſe who pronounce every thing good, ſo far as at any rate it can be grateful, and ſo eſtabliſh it for the ſtandard of human Actions: this is Madneſs itſelf, inaſmuch as hereby they rank the Wiſe, the Fools, and the Mad-men, all in the ſame ſtate. Nay, perhaps they herein prefer the Fools and Mad-men before the Wiſe; ſince theſe are the moſt likely to perſiſt againſt all Senſe and Reaſon, and to ſtick by that which is *grateful*, let it be never ſo deſtructive, ridiculous, or vile.

VIII. SOME there are, I confeſs, who ſpeak a little more cautiouſly in this Matter, and would have the man they call *wiſe*, have *Self-preſervation* ſtill in his eye, how inordinate ſoever they allow him in all the reſt. By which they ſhew, that if their Fool or Mad man can but

but here be ſhot-free; they little conſider of Immortality, or the Fruits of ſolid Wiſdom. And yet is it plain to every man of Senſe, that a bare ſelf-preſervation is not a deſirable thing; for ſuch may be the Scorns and Scourges of this Life, that none but a ſtupid Creature would in ſuch Circumſtances deſire to live.

Noema. 18. But laſtly, if according to them, Life and Conſervation be ſo valuable, it muſt alſo follow, that the more durable theſe are, they are ſo much the better, and that the moſt durable is beſt of all. Furthermore, if ſuch ſelf-conſervation of one man be really good, it is doubly ſo to preſerve two men, and thrice as much to ſave three, and ſo forward. Whence by the Light of Nature, it is manifeſt, that every intellectual Creature ſtands bound to provide, both in preſent and in future, for his own, and his Neighbour's Preſervation, ſo far forth as in him lies, and as it may conſiſt without doing prejudice to a third. This is what certainly fulfils not only a great part of *Juſtice*, but of Temperance, and indeed of every other Virtue.

CHAP.

Chap. VI.

Of the Paſſions in general, and of the Helps they afford.

I. What *Virtue* is in the general we have already fixed. And now before we deſcend to ſeveral ſorts or Species thereof, it will not be amiſs to premiſe ſomewhat of the *Paſſions*, about which ſuch Virtues are converſant; ſo as to explain their Nature, their Uſe, or their Diſadvantage: and thereby prepare the Mind to take in ſuch an Idea of *Virtue*, as may be *full and adequate*.

II. But by *Paſſions* I do not barely underſtand ſuch as are commonly handled in Moral Philoſophy, but every other corporeal Impreſſion, which hath force enough to blind the Mind, or abuſe the Judgment, in diſcerning what in every caſe were the beſt. Wherefore I add hereunto all ſorts of fantaſtick Notions and falſe Impreſſions that are grown pertinacious, and which either by ill cuſtom, or the Power of Education, or by *internal Proclivity*, ſo ſeiſe upon the Mind, as to lead us into any apparent Error. For Virtue ought to reach out her Authority to the weeding up even of theſe remote Evils, leſt the Mind be ſhaken, when it ſhould judge; or perverted in the Proſecution of that which is ſimply the beſt.

However we ſhall firſt treat of thoſe Paſſions which are properly ſo called; ſuch as are *Love*, *Hatred*, *Anger*, and the reſt of that kind. Concerning all which, we muſt maintain it againſt the *Stoicks*, that of their own Nature they are good; and that the Intendments of Divine Providence are not leſs underſtood by their Uſe, than by the Structure of thoſe Organs, which compoſe every animal Body.

Vide In this Book L. 1. c. 6. § 2.

III. The Uſe and Utility of them may in the general be even illuſtrated thus; that when Paſſions happen to be joined with a more vehement agitation of the Spirits, they ſeem to perform in a Man (whom ſome call *the little World*) what the Winds do in the greater. For as theſe purge and purifie the Air, ſo thoſe cleanſe and defecate the Blood, and ſuffer it not by ſtagnation to corrupt.

IV. Also theſe Paſſions play upon the Soul in a thouſand ſhapes, and the Scenes of Fancy are ſo charming, and ſo variouſly obtruded, that they often tempt, and even combate with the Underſtanding. Yet as we get experience, and are made ſtronger by this Warfare; ſo is there a new Joy excited in us to ſee, that notwithſtanding all ſuch aſſaults or the inſolence of thoſe Deluſions, yet we are ſenſible of a divine Principle within us, which we call the *Mind*, (that Heavenly Spark, which holds ſteady in the midſt of all ſuch Commotions) by which we bear up and maintain the ſame ſenſe, ſtability and judgment we had; and finally and inſeparably adhere

L. 1. c. 6. § 8.

adhere to that which is ſimply the beſt.

V. BESIDES, from ſuch Conflict and ſuch Victory, it is plain, there is a certain Government or Empire acknowledged to be in the Soul; and that the intellectual part hath ſomething which it doth teach and inſtruct, as a Father doth his Son; or which it breeds and trains up, as in a lower inſtance, a Huntſman doth his Dogs. *Ariſtotle* intimates ſomething to this purpoſe, when he makes two parts in the Soul, which do in a manner both partake of Reaſon: *The one properly of itſelf, and in its own right; the other as it were a Son obeying his Father.* And here he underſtands that part of the Soul which exciteth towards Concupiſcence and Appetite. For he ſaith, *That the Vegetative part partakes not at all of Reaſon; but that the Concupiſcible part, and (more univerſally) the Appetitive part of the Soul, does in a ſort partake of Reaſon: inaſmuch as it hearkens to what Reaſon inculcates, and is ſubjected to the Commands thereof.* And yet, with favour from ſo great a Man, it is not plain, but that the very *Plaſtic Part* of the Soul (I mean the *ſeminal*, or *formative* part) which he here calls the *Vegetative*, does alſo in ſome degree ſubmit to Reaſon. For that all thoſe natural Appetites and Eruptions, which we obſerve, are not ſo much the Fruits and Effects of the *Perceptive Part*, as of the *Plaſtic*.

Ethic. Nicom. lib. 1. c. 13

VI. DOUBTLESS the Source and Fountain of theſe is in the *Plaſtic Part*, whoſe chief Seat is in the *Heart*; but the ſenſe and

feeling of them is in the *Perceptive Part*, whoſe Seat is in the *Brain*. And whereas both theſe Parts are eſſentially, vitally, and inſeparably the ſame; it is no wonder if the *Preceptive Part* be ſolicited and wrought upon, and even hurried away by the Paſſions. It is true theſe Paſſions, are of themſelves, but as blind Inſtincts of Nature, ſuch as perhaps are found in the very Plants; unto whom Youth and and Old-Age do alſo agree. But they are conſpicious in living Creatures, as in Birds, when they build their Neſts, or hatch their young Ones. Alſo in Men theſe Inſtincts are not only ſeen, but are, by diſtinct and reflex Operation of the Mind, known to proceed from ſome other Cauſe: as either from
L. 1. c. 3. § 1. the *Plaſtic Part* of the Soul alone; or elſe as it is in conjunction with that univerſal Plaſtic
L. 1. c. 1. § 2. Principle, which by us is termed *the Spirit of Nature*. And perhaps the ſame is pointed at by *Ariſtotle* himſelf in that Axiom which he ſo often repeats, *That Nature does nothing in vain.*

VII. FOR as there is a *formative* or *ſeminal* Principle of all Plants, and the like of all Animal Bodies; into which Nature hath infuſed, and then excited, ſuch Operations and Inſtincts, as tend to the continuance of every individual production; ſo more eſpecially are thoſe Inſtincts fixed, which tend to the ſupport and preſervation of the Species; as (namely) the Act of Generating, and that alſo of a paſſionate Concern in every Creature towards their young. The power of this latter

latter is wonderfully ſeen in the diſſection of a living Bitch with Whelps: for if you but hurt any of the young ones in her ſight, ſhe barks, and is greatly diſquieted; but if you reach them towards her mouth, ſhe forgets her own condition, and falls with a tender kindneſs to the licking of them in the midſt of all her Torments. This ſtrange ſight is reported by *Realdus Columbus*, to have been often expoſed by him in the publick Theatre at his Anatomical Diſſections. *De re anatomicâ, lib.* 14.

VIII. HENCE it appears, that all the animal Inſtincts and Impulſes do belong to the *Region of Nature*, and are but imperfect Shadows and Footſteps of the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, which vouchſafes as in this manner to glimmer in the dark. And theſe are thoſe Rudiments and Primordials, againſt which, by the help of a more pure and Celeſtial Light, we do contend, as often as they invade the Limits of the ſuperior Law. That is to ſay, the *Intellectual* Part of the Soul ſtrives with the *Plaſtic*; which, tho fiercely abetted and incited by the *Spirit of Nature* in ſome certain Deſires and Appetites; yet, on the other ſide, a Divine Power is at hand, urging reſiſtance againſt all ſuch Incantations, and ſtill aſſerting a preference to what is moſt honorable, and ſimply the beſt. L. 1. c. 12. § 8.

IX. THERE is a witty conceit, tho inſufficiently grounded, as if the Soul ſhould be faſt penn'd up in a certain glandulous part of the Brain, called the *Conarion*. That this glandu-

lous part being thus animated and defended by the Soul on the one hand (as in its proper Garriſon) ſhould on the other be attacked by the darts and aſſaults of the Spirits (even as it were ſome Pigmy that with a Feather or a Twig were employed in beating of the Winds) and that herein ſhould conſiſt that hoſtility of the inferior part of the Soul with the ſuperior: which the Divines call, *The War between the Fleſh and the Spirit.*

X. HOWEVER, thus much is manifeſt, that there is within us a certain Principality or Empire, and that our mind is not a meer ſolitary Gazer; but is rather as a Regent, attended and fortified with numerous Guards; and does not barely command over its own Paſſions, but over the *Spirit* of *Nature*; ſo as by a diviner Magick not only to repel, but even vanquiſh the Temptations and Sorceries thereof.

L. 1. c. 8. § 2.

XI. FROM all which it is further plain, that by the ſervice of the Paſſions, our Life and our Senſes are more dilated, and alſo quickned: even as *Plato* noted in his *Phædrus, That the Affections were as the Wings and the Chariots of the Mind.*

L. 1. c. 8. § 3.

L. 1. c. 12. § 11.

XII. DES CARTES alſo ſays very happily, that the Paſſions ſeem to be a moſt certain and ſolid Treaſure of the Soul. For altho (ſays he) we are apt to be deceived by the many other ways of Perceptions, and cannot be certain if things be the ſame as they are repreſented; yet as to the Paſſions, there is not

not room for Deception in them, ſince they are ſo annexed to the Soul, that it were impoſſible to feel them, if they were not; and that they muſt needs have a Being, inaſmuch as they are felt. Hence, by a ſenſe of Virtue ariſeth a wonderful Peace and Tranquillity to the Mind; a permanent ſweetneſs and complacency which is never to be repented of. It ſurmounts not only all thoſe Pleaſures which conclude with Repentance, and Bitterneſs of the Soul; but excels all Opinions and Philoſophical Speculations whatſoever. This certainly upon many other accounts is ſo, beſides that main one, that in thoſe matters a man may almoſt ever be doubting. But in this, which is Paſſion, and not Opinion, there can be no room for doubt. L. 2. c. 9. § 12.

XIII. LAST of all, beſides this Uſe of the Paſſions (which is almoſt common to all of them) that they ſtrike, or rather ingrave the Soul with a more lively Impreſſion of the Object; there is another uſe of them deſerving notice; as namely, the rating of things that are laudable and juſt according as we find our Paſſions excited by them, or as they are felt and reliſhed by a ſort of Connexion with our Souls. For Paſſionate affecting is the moſt intimate and immediate Fruit of Life; and tho we may adorn the beſt of things with a ſuperficial and imaginary approbation, yet our Souls are not able, without ſuch Paſſions, to wed the Object, and, as it were, to intermix it with our Senſe and Life. Nay, we know

not how by any other ways to diſcover the Union there is between our Souls and thoſe Objects, unleſs we have an equal antipathy againſt things vile and ignoble, whether in our ſelves or others. For this is the Nature of true Virtue, to love the beſt things, and hate the worſt, even to abhorrence, in whomſoever they appear. Evil in one man is Evil in another, and is deteſtable as being ſuch. And it is the moſt perfect ſtate of Life, to love good things, and to hate the bad; at leaſt, to bear them with indignation, whenever they are obtruded upon us. For this gives Teſtimony, that the inferior part of the Soul ſubmits, and is overawed by the ſuperior; and that the whole man is as it were in the fiery Chariot of his Affections, *Elias* like, carried up towasds God and Heaven.

XIV. But if any man ſhall, under a pretended affectation of *Peace*, and *Prudence*, or *Tranquillity*, ſet up for ſubmitting to any lewd uſurpation over the common Rights of Mankind, and the eternal Laws of Virtue; and yet, upon every trivial affront to himſelf, flie out and even burn with indignation and wrath; this were Hypocriſie in ſuch a degree, as not barely to deſerve Scorn, but Deteſtation.

XV. Passions therefore are not only good, but ſingularly needful to the perfecting of human life. Yet muſt they be with theſe two Conditions. Firſt, that our Deſires ſteer towards a proper Object, which may be called,

ed, *The true Impulſe*: For thoſe who offend herein are the worſt of ſinners; ſuch as are the malicious, and thoſe that delight in Blood and Tortures, and others of that ſtrain.

The ſecond Rule is, That the Deſires be adequate to the Objects, or the End; and that (according to the thirteenth *Noema*) the beſt and greateſt things be purſued with our chiefeſt Paſſion; the middle things with leſs; and the loweſt with the leaſt. But this alſo in ſuch ſort, as never to allow any ſuch violence in the Deſire, as may either eclipſe the Light of Reaſon, or obſtruct that end to which Nature aſpires, by the help of thoſe Affections wherewith ſhe has endowed our Souls. So that this Rule we may call, *A Moderate Impulſe of the Paſſions.*

XVI. But if any man ſhould propoſe the rooting up of all Deſires, in order to free the Soul from Diſcord; and to end all ſtrife and combuſtion, which the Paſſions maintain againſt the Soul, or among themſelves: This to me would ſound no better, than as if one, to prevent Diſcord on the Harp, ſhould let down all the Strings; or, than as if another ſhould with Drugs ſet all the Humors of his Body in a Ferment, for fear of falling ſick. Wherefore *Theages* the *Pythagorean* ſaid very Elegantly; *That it was not the part of Virtue to diſcharge the Paſſions of the Soul, ſuch as Pleaſure and Pain; but to Temper them aright.* He alſo after this extends himſelf in that double ſimilitude we have mentioned, about a due mixture L. 1 c. 12. § 9

mixture in the Humors of the Body, and a right Harmony in the Tuning of the Strings, which we need not here repeat.

XVII. So that what is now to be the Rule and Meaſure by which the Deſires are to be temper'd and rectified, the two Conditions afore-mentioned do ſet forth. And to one of theſe, that-famous Declaration of the Orator may be referred. *He therefore* (ſays *Tully*) *whoever it be, that by Conſtancy and Moderation is of a quiet Mind, and at Peace with himſelf; who is neither waſted with Troubles, or diſtracted with Fears, nor burnt up with Thirſt of any inordinate Paſſion, or undoing himſelf with vain and trivial Delights: This is the Wiſe man whom we long to behold. And he alſo is the happy Man to whom nothing can arrive in human Affairs ſo intolerable, as to depreſs his mind, or yet ſo joyful as to tranſport him. But on the other ſide, when we ſee a Man inflamed with Luſt, and mad with Ambition, catching at all things with inſatiable Avarice, and that the more his Wealth pours in, or his Pleaſures abounded, the more ravenous he became: This* (ſaith *Tully*) *is he whom a wiſe Man would not ſcruple to pronounce the moſt unhappy, and the moſt perverted of all Men.*

Quæſt. Tuſcul. lib. 4.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Paſſions properly ſo called, according to their kinds.

I. FORASMUCH as no Man has, in my Opinion, more accurately ſummed up, or diſtinctly defined, the ſeveral Kinds or Species of Paſſions, than the renowned Philoſopher *Des Cartes*; I will tread, for the moſt part, in his Footſteps, unleſs upon great Motives to the contrary. But it is not amiſs, in the firſt place, to lay down a large Definition of Paſſions, and to apply the ſame to the kinds thereof, which follow.

II. PASSION, *then, is a vehement Senſation of the Soul, which refers eſpecially to the Soul itſelf, and is accompanied with an unwonted motion of the Spirits.*

Here I ſay, *Paſſion* is rightly called *Senſation*, ſince in Paſſion the Soul is ſenſible that it ſuffers; and with *Vehemence*, becauſe it vehemently ſuffers. That *the Soul itſelf* is ſaid, in this Senſation, *eſpecially to ſuffer*, is to diſtinguiſh it from other Senſations; whether of Odors, Sounds and Colors, *&c.* which refer to external Objects; or of Hunger, Thirſt, and Pain, *&c.* which regard our Bodies. Next, I ſay, that this Senſation is accompanied *with the Motions of the Spirit*, rather than to ſay that it reſults therefrom; inaſmuch as the

the former evermore happens; but this not always, or very ſeldom, if you but exclude ſuch Motion as reſults from Eating, Drinking, or the Change of Air. For in external Objects, which agitate the Senſe or Imagination, it is the Soul moves the Spirits, and not the Spirits the Soul.

De Paſſion. animæ, part. 2. Art. 69.

III. DesCartes brings all the Paſſions of the Soul under ſix principal and primitive kinds: Namely, *Admiration*, *Love*, *Hatred*, *Cupidity*, *Joy*, and *Grief*. And that they fall naturally into this Order and Diſtinction does thus appear; For as ſoon as a new Object, or an old one under new Circumſtances, occurs unto us, it ſtops and entertains our Faculty of Conſidering: it ſtrains up the Attention beyond its wonted pitch, and this is called *Admiration*. Now becauſe this may ſo happen, before we comprehend whether ſuch Object will prove grateful or ungrateful to us, it may deſervedly be called the very firſt Paſſion.

IV. Yet after this, when the Soul comes to conſider the *Object* as *grateful* or *ungrateful*, (which is the ſame almoſt as *good* or *evil*) then one of them excites *Love*, and the other *Hatred*. But if this *Good* or *Evil* be conſidered by us as remote and *future*, they kindle in us *Cupidity*; namely, to join with, and enjoy the *firſt*, and to avoid or repel the *latter*. Both which are by the Schools very properly called *Deſiderium* and *Fuga*. But laſtly, if this Good and Evil be looked upon as *preſent*, the firſt begets *Joy*, and the other *Grief*.

V.

V. I WILL not deny but that *Des Cartes* had his Reaſons thus to Enumerate the Paſſions; however I think I have as ſufficient Motives to contract them; and that into the three firſt, of *Admiration*, *Love*, and *Hatred*. For what is *Deſire* but Love, extending itſelf towards future Good? And what is *Flight* but *Hatred*, in turning away from the evil at hand, or at leaſt in fortifying againſt it? What is *Joy* but *Love*, which triumphs in poſſeſſing the thing beloved? And what is *Grief* but *Hatred*, to be involv'd and haraſſed by the preſent Evil? So that in all theſe Caſes, it is manifeſt, that either *Love* or *Hatred* lies ſtill at the Root. L. 2. c. 1. § 1.

VI. HENCE it is plain, that the Scholaſtick Reduction of the Paſſions to the two Heads, of *Iraſcible* and *Concupiſcible*, which the very beſt of the old Philoſophers made uſe of, deſerves not to be ſo contemptuouſly exploded, if but interpreted aright. Yet here I ſpeak but of thoſe Paſſions which are properly ſeated in the *Heart*, and not in the *Brain*; where *Admiration* only (as *Des Cartes* hath it) does reſide. As to the reſt they may, in my opinion, be juſtly enough referred to thoſe words of *Pythagoras*, which anſwer to the Schoolmens *Iraſcible* and *Concupiſcible*; which in proper Terms are *Concupiſcence* and *Indignation*. And this latter *is that Emotion of the Soul, by which it teſtifies wrath againſt every appearance of what is either evil or ungrateful.* Now if herein there be no conſideration either of

of *preſent* or *future*, then it is *ſimple Hatred*; if the Evil be impending it is *Flight*, or elſe a Cupidity either to reſiſt, or by any expedient to evade it: But if it be actually *preſent*, then it is *Sorrow*, *Grief*, or *Sickneſs of the Mind*; which is nothing elſe but Indignation to ſuffer, and to ſtoop under the Tyranny of an Evil, which cannot be ſhaken off.

VII. THE Reaſon of *Concupiſence* is the ſame: which if it be fairly accompanied with the appearance of what is good or grateful, and nothing of Time reſpected, it is called pure and *ſimple Love*. If the Good be looked on as *future*, it is *Cupidity*, or elſe *Concupiſcence* properly ſo called; but if it be *preſent*, then it is *Joy* or *Gladneſs*.

Yet we muſt not think that it ceaſed to be *Concupiſcence*. For unleſs ſomewhat that is nauſeous and over-cloying ſupervenes, the Love we mention is naturally prone to a continuation in its own Eſtate; ſo as ſome Ingredient of Concupiſcence will ſtill remain.

VIII. WHEREFORE it is poſſible there may only be two principal and primitive Paſſions, which have their proper Reſidence in the *Heart*. They are called by *Des Cartes* *Love* and *Hatred*, by the Schools *Iraſcible* and *Concupiſcible*: and by *Pythagoras*, *Luſt* and *Anger*; which is ſomewhat remarkable, as from the Uſe thereof we may have cauſe to note.

IX. HOWEVER, at preſent, and for a more extended Notion of the Paſſions, I will follow *Des Cartes* in his own Order and Diſtinction

Diſtinction, as to the ſix general kinds above-mentioned. I will therefore firſt define them, and then ſubjoin the reſpective Species unto each.

Admiration is the firſt; *And it is a Paſſion of the Soul, which is ſtruck with the Novelty of any Object, and attentively ingaged in the Contemplation thereof.* The firſt Rank of the Paſſions.

Admiration is twofold; the one of *Eſteem*, the other of *Deſpiſing*. *Eſteem is the admiring of the Magnitude or Value of any Object. But Deſpiſing is a contrary Admiration at the Littleneſs or Deſpicableneſs of any Object.*

Hence 'tis underſtood what is *Eſteem*, or *Diſeſteem of a Man's ſelf*; Namely, *when a Man dwells affectedly in the Contemplation of his own Dignity, or is fixed with ſome Reſentment on his own Meanneſs or Diſgrace.* The *Reaſon* is the ſame either as to *Diſeſteem*, or elſe *Regard*, for others: The firſt of which is called *Scorning*, and the laſt *Veneration*. Now *Veneration* is the Value we ſet upon a free Agent, that can, as we believe, do us either good or harm; and joined with a deſire we have of putting our ſelves in ſubjection to it. But *Scorn* is a diſeſteem we put upon a free Agent, which tho capable of doing us either good or hurt, yet we judge ſo meanly of ſuch Agent, as not to be able to put in execution either the one or the other.

X. In the ſecond Rank come *Love* and *Hatred*.

Love

The ſecond Rank of the Paſſions.

Love is a Paſſion of the Soul, by which it is excited willingly to join itſelf unto Objects which ſeem grateful thereunto. Yet hereby theſe words, *To join itſelf willingly*, is not meant to *covet* its being joined; for that appertains to *Luſt*: but it is meant with ſome emotion to acknowledge the thing to be either good or grateful.

Hatred is a Paſſion of the Soul, whereby it is incited willingly to ſeparate itſelf from Objects which ſeem ingrateful or hurtful thereunto. When he that loves, eſteems the Object leſſer than himſelf, it is called ſimple Inclination, or *good Will*; where equal to himſelf, then it is *Friendſhip*; and where greater, then *Devotion*. *Love* which tends ſingly towards good things, is called *Love*; when towards beautiful things, then *Complacency*.

Alſo *Hatred*, which refers ſimply to evil things, is called *Hatred*; if to deformed things then *Averſion* or *Horror*.

Nor ought we here to forget that noble and natural ſort of *Love*, which the *Greeks* termed *Storge*, and which we may call *natural Affection*; or that of *Hatred*, called *Antipathy*.

The third Rank of the Paſſions.

XI. THE third Claſſis is *Cupidity*, with all its Tribe or Off-ſpring.

Cupidity is a Paſſion of the Soul, by which it is carried towards good as it is future. And therefore as the Abſence of Evil, and the Preſence of Good, are both of them good, *Cupidity* may ſo far extend to either as they are future. But if any man thinks it more proper, that

that *Cupidity* about the laſt Object ſhould be called *Deſire*, and about the firſt *Flight*, I am indifferent. Only this is plain, from what is gone before, that among the ſorts of *Cupidity*, thoſe of them excel which ſpring up either from *Horror*, or from *Complacency*. For nothing kindles Deſire ſo much as *Beauty*; and nothing puts ſooner to flight, than any horrid *Deformity*. And the thing which commonly is thought moſt horrible, is *Death*.

XII. To this Paſſion of *Cupidity*, there may firſt be reduced *Hope*, *Fear*, *Jealouſie*, *Security* and *Deſpair*. Then in the next place, *Irreſolution*, *Animoſity*, *Boldneſs*, *Emulation*, *Cowardiſe*, and *Conſternation*. The firſt Sett of theſe agree in this, that the Object of them all preſents itſelf in the ſhape of what is *eaſie* or *difficult*; yet without any Dependency of the Event upon our ſelves.

The later Sett agree in this, that the Object of all ſeems to depend upon our ſelves; yet either with difficulty in the choice of Means, whence comes *Irreſolution*; or elſe in the execution, unto which all the reſt refer.

XIII. Hope *is a Paſſion of the Soul, by which it is diſpoſed to believe the Event which it deſires:*

And *Fear is a Paſſion, by which it is diſpoſed to believe, that what it deſires will not happen.*

When *Hope* excludes all *Fear*, it is called *Security*, or *Preſumption*; and *Fear*, when it ſhuts out all *Hope*, *Deſpair*. *Jealouſie*, is *Fear* of loſing a Good we highly eſteem, but grounded upon trivial Cauſes.

XIV. IRRESOLUTION *is a Fear of erring in the choice of those Means, which are proper to any certain end.*

Animosity is a Passion which disposes the Mind to act manfully, in the Execution of whatever it sets about. And if this happen in things that are attended with much danger, it is called *Boldness* or *Daring*; if it spring from the Example of what success others have had, then *Emulation*. But *Cowardise* is opposed to *Animosity*, as *Consternation* is to *Daring* or *Boldness*. For *Cowardise* is a certain feeble cold Passion of the Soul, that hinders her from doing those things, which it were otherwise in her Power to do. *Consternation* is *Cowardise*, or *Timorousness*, accompanied with Trouble and Amazement, which disables the Soul from resisting an impending Evil.

The 4th. Rank of the Passions.

XV. THE Fourth Classis is *Joy* and *Grief*, which have respect to the *Good* or *Evil* that is present.

The Passions, which refer to this Head, are chiefly distinguished by these Circumstances. First barely, in respect to our selves, or unto others: For present *Good*, as it regards our selves, begets *Joy*, even as present *Evil* does *Grief*. And if Evil betides another, who has deserved it, it causes *Laughter*; but, if he hath not deserved it, then *Commiseration*. If *Good* happens to any unworthy Man, there follows *Envy*; but *Good* happening to another, and which rebounds any way to our Benefit, produceth *Congratulation*.

XVI.

XVI. MOREOVER *Good* and *Evil* are conſidered, in the firſt place, in reſpect of the Cauſe, whether as to our ſelves, or unto others: For *Good*, done by our ſelves, begets Satisfaction or Tranquility of Mind; *Evil* begets Repentance; but the doing a thing which we doubt whether it be good or evil, begets Remorſe of Conſcience. However Good, performed by others, begets *Favor*, altho not done to our ſelves; but if to our ſelves, then *Gratitude*. So *Evil*, committed by others, if not done againſt our ſelves, begets *Indignation* only, but if it touches us, then *Anger*.

Again, in reſpect of the Opinion of others; as the *Good*, which we enjoy, exciteth *Glory* in us; ſo doth *Evil*, *Shame*.

Laſtly, in reſpect of Time. As the Duration of *Good* begets *Satiety*, or a *Loathing*; ſo the Duration of Evil leſſens *Grief*: but from *Good* that is paſt, there ariſes what is properly called *Deſire*, viz. to enjoy it again; as from *Evil* that is paſt, *Mirth*.

XVII. JOY *is a pleaſant Commotion of the Soul; or, a Paſſion, in which does conſiſt the Fruition of Good; which ſhe regards as her own.*

Grief is an ungrateful Paſſion of the Soul, in which does conſiſt the Inconvenience of Evil, or of ſome Deficiency, which ſhe ſenſibly regards as her own.

Deriſion is a Joy, begotten on any ſlight Miſchief happening to one, who is thought to have deſerved it. If this be upon very great Grounds, and accompanied with Inten-

tions of open Contempt, it is called *Inſulting*.

Envy is Grief which ariſeth, when Good happens to any that are unworthy of it.

Commiſeration is Grief, when Evil happens to any one who has not deſerved it.

Congratulation is Joy, ariſing by Good that happens to another, in which we think we are ſome way concerned.

Acquieſcing, or *Self-Satisfaction*, is of all Joys the moſt pleaſing: and it ariſeth from the Opinion of ſome good Work we have lately performed.

Repentance is Grief, and the bittereſt that can happen, as riſing from the Conviction of ſome Evil committed by us.

Remorſe of Conſcience is Grief that ariſeth upon doubting, whether what we have done be good or not: For 'tis the effect of Raſhneſs, to attempt any Work, before all Heſitation, or Wavering of the Mind, be quieted.

XVIII. FAVOR is a ſort of chearful Good-Will or Benevolence toward thoſe, with whoſe Well-doing we are delighted.

Gratitude is a kind of pleaſing deſire to do good to them, who have done good unto us.

Indignation is Grief, that is kindled againſt thoſe who have done ſome ill thing.

Anger is Indignation againſt thoſe who have done us hurt, and for which we have purpoſe of Revenge.

Glory is Joy, which ariſeth from Opinion, or from Hope of Praiſe among Men.

Shame

Shame is Grief that ariſeth from the Opinion, or Fear, of Reproach.

Satiety is Grief that ariſeth from the ſame Cauſe, from whence Joy did before proceed.

Deſire, properly ſo called, is Grief upon the Loſs of Good, that is never to be recovered.

Mirth is Joy from the Repentance of paſt Evil.

XIX. THIS is almoſt the ſame Enumeration of the Paſſions that *Des Cartes* has given us; as well of thoſe which are the primitive ones, as of ſuch as are derivative from them, or elſe complicated with them: together with the Definitions of all, as near as we could approach unto that Eminent Philoſopher.

As to the Complication itſelf of thoſe Paſſions that Iſſue from the Primitive, I here omit it for Brevity's ſake; as intending elſewhere, and more opportunely, to ſpeak very ſoon thereunto.

But for thoſe deep and *Natural Cauſes* of ſuch *Paſſions*, which lie abſtruſe and remote; as relating either to the *Conarion* (before ſpoken of) or to the Brain; or to certain Motions of the Blood or Spirits; or to the Orifices of the Heart (which are ſometimes more dilated, or more contracted;) or elſe to the Nerves of the Bowels and Stomach; or to the Spleen and Liver; or, finally, to the Heart itſelf. I do willingly and knowingly paſs them all by; as well for other Reaſons, as chiefly, that they rather belong to *Natural Philoſophy*, than to *Moral*. Yet far be it from

me to ſay, that the *Effects*, the *Uſes*, and the *Ends* of *Paſſions* do not appertain to *Ethicks*: For I ſhould rather affirm, that the knowledge of thoſe things is a very choice and eſtimable part thereof.

CHAP. VIII.

The Uſe and Interpretation of the Paſſions; and firſt of Admiration, with all in that Claſſis: and of the other five Primitive Paſſions.

I. AS to what concerns the *Ends* and *Uſes* of the *Paſſions*, it will not be amiſs to purſue them a little larger, and faithfully to interpret the Voice of Nature in them all, as far as we are able. For it is not of ſmall moment towards knowing how Paſſions are rightly to be moderated and uſed (which ſurely in Virtue is the greateſt part) if we obſerve the end unto which Nature, or rather God, who is the Parent of Nature, has deſtined each of them: as alſo at what Rate he himſelf eſteems his Works, or would have them eſteemed by others. For theſe Natural and Radical Affections, are not from our ſelves, as the reſult of free Thinking or Speculation; nor are they to be acquired by Methods, but are really in us antecedent to all

L. 1. c. 6. § 6.

L. 1. c. 12. § 12.

all Notion and Cogitation whatever. For they are, by God, whom we call Nature's Parent, given and implanted in us, as early as Life itſelf: ſuch I mean, as are in particular the pleaſure of Eating and Drinking; which Nature, doubtleſs, beſtowed upon all living Creatures, not only for the Converſation of Life, and Continuance of Health, but as a grateful Exerciſe of the Faculties of Life. Whence it clearly follows, that nothing ſhould raſhly or cauſelеſly be killed; nor ſhould we ſo far indulge the Pleaſure of Eating and Drinking, as to loſe the end of that Pleaſure, and bring upon our ſelves Diſeaſes and Death. *L.* 1. *c.* 6. § 6.

II. And this is the very thing the *Pythagoreans* adviſed; Namely, *To terminate what is undetermined.* For what they called *undetermined* or *unbounded*, they placed in the Paſſions; and it was in Virtue and Reaſon that they placed their *Foundaries* or *Determination.* Thus Nature has been the more liberal in beſtowing ſuch ſort of Affections on us, that Reaſon might be truſted with a Power to leſſen, moderate, and circumſcribe, all that is ſuperfluous. And perhaps the Soul, itſelf, is not ſo wholly intent on her proper intellectual Pleaſure, as totally to neglect the animal Life. From whence we ſee, it is a kind of ſerious and ſettled deſign of Nature, that this animal Station ſhould never be abandoned by the Mind of Man. However theſe Touches are but here by the By, as to thoſe Affections *L.* 1. *c.* 6. § 10.

which relate to the Body. Wherefore we ſhall turn back to the Paſſions properly ſo called, and conſider their *Ends* and *Uſes*, in that order which we before propoſed.

III. FIRST then as to *Admiration*, 'tis plain, that it more vigorouſly imprints in our Memories the obſervation of new things and *Idea's*; whereby, the Soul being enriched by ſuch Acquiſition, we may attain the Knowledge of moſt Beneficial Truths. And hence it follows, that if any Man be taken up with the Contemplation of new Things, for no other end than for Admiration-ſake; he plainly loſes the end of this Paſſion, and becomes a meer *Admirer*. For ſeeing Nature has given us the Power and Inclination to *eſteem*, or to *deſpiſe*; it appears thereby, that all things are not to be placed by us in the ſame *Rank*. And as in the kinds of every thing, there is a *better* and a *worſe*: ſo certainly is there ſomething which is the very *beſt* of all; and which is the Dictates of Nature, we are bound to *aſpire* unto.

l. 1. *c.* 6. § 11.

IV. THE *Eſteem of a Man's ſelf is a Paſſion, mixed of Admiration, Joy, and Love, of his own Condition*: But *the Diſeſteem of a Man's ſelf is from Admiration, Grief, and Self-love, which is mixed with Hatred for his own Defects*. Each of theſe Paſſions make out, that every Man either is, or ought to be, of ſome Conſideration; nay, ſo to be reputed of, as to be above all Injury and Contempt. For ſeeing we are ſo eaſily led to think well of our ſelves, when

when perhaps we have very ſmall *Advantage* of our *Neighbours*; certainly it is but juſt that we carry ſome Eſteem alſo towards others, ſo as to treat them with all Officiouſneſs and Candor. Wherefore even *Nature* points out, by theſe Paſſions of *Eſteem* and *Diſeſteem*, how we are to exerciſe Humanity and *good Breeding* towards others; as well as Diligence and Application in getting what is moſt Beneficial to our ſelves.

V. As to that ſort of valuing a Man's ſelf, which *Des Cartes* calls *Generoſity*, whereby a Man does, in the Freedom and Sincerity of his Judgment, ſo account of himſelf as, while he ſteadily aims at vertuous things, and wants no Courage to enterprize what Reaſon dictates, he will endure no ſort of Contempt. Doubtleſs the Uſe of this Paſſion (ſo implanted by Nature) is of higheſt Preheminence, as it proves a Spur to the procurement of the higheſt Felicity. For who can be more corroborated againſt the Scorns of Men, or the Shocks of Fortune, than he who has Conſcience on his ſide, that his Actions have been ſincere? *L.1.c.11. § 10.*

VI. Veneration is a Paſſion complicated of *Admiration* and *Fear*. The Utility thereof is referable to Politick Bodies and Religious Societies: it implies that Obedience is due to Magiſtrates; and that there is ſuch a Being as God, and ſuch a Government as the Divine Providence.

Diſdaining is made up of *Admiration*, and of *Security*, or *Confidence*. This Paſſion is not altogether

altogether unprofitable to the Peace and Acquieſcence of the Mind, inaſmuch as it ſuffers not Virtue or Truth to be abandoned, either on the Threats, or on the Temptations of impotent Men. Such was the Contempt of *Socrates* towards *Anytus* and *Melitus*, when he let them know, *That altho' they had Power to kill, they had not the Power to hurt him.*

VII. For what concerns the five following *Primitive Paſſions*, as *Love*, *Hatred*, *Joy*, *Grief*, and *Cupidity*. The Uſe of theſe is moſt manifeſt. And the firſt Four end always in the Fifth; for whatever falls out grateful, excites Joy or Pleaſure; and Pleaſure, when felt, draws Love towards that which excited it: And, laſt of all, *Love* makes *Cupidity*, for the increaſing, continuing, and ſometimes repeating, of the ſame Delight.

'Tis in like ſort, when any thing happens that is ungrateful, it begets *Sadneſs* and *Grief*; and this *Grief* again begets *Hatred* for that which was the Cauſe thereof; and that *Hatred* a *Cupidity* to get free from ſuch Cauſe. And 'tis in theſe things alone, that the Safety and Preſervation of all Living Creatures does in a manner conſiſt. Alſo 'tis worthy of Note, that theſe Paſſions which are the moſt ungrateful, ſuch as *Grief* and *Hatred*, do not perform leſs of this Duty than the moſt *grateful*: for that our Life is no leſs haraſſed by the Evils that lie upon us, than from the Want of thoſe Benefits which ſhould advantage us.

VIII.

VIII. It is plain, that Nature ſeems more ſolicitous to drive away Evil, than to partake of Pleaſure. And this appears in thoſe efficacious ſorts of Eloquence, ſhe has beſtowed on ſo many of the Creatures when they are oppreſſed, for the drawing of Compaſſion towards them. Such is the querulous and lamenting Tone of the Voice, the dejection of the Eyes and Countenance, Groaning, Howling, Sighs, and Tears, and the like. For all theſe have Power to incline the Mind to Compaſſion, whether it be to quicken our Help, or to retard the Miſchiefs we intended.

IX. Nor is Nature wanting altogether in that part, which concerns the procuring of Pleaſure. For every motion of the Eyes and Countenance, when we are pleaſed, is much more welcome and agreeable to the Lookers on: And even this ſmall Effect of our Joy is by Nature inſtituted, as a Bait of Allurement, to draw on mutual Complacency, and to create a deſire towards the Contentation of each other. Juſt as thoſe former Effects of Sorrow were to dehort us from afflicting any, who deſerved it not, but rather to melt us, and puſh us on, to a timely ſuccour of all who are oppreſs'd.

But foraſmuch as exceſſive Joy does ſometimes bring on what they call *Extaſie*, and even ſwooning away: I know not if Nature does not hint hereby, that our Souls are capable of greater Pleaſure, as well as Felicity, than our preſent corporeal and terreſtrial State can bear, or is able to ſupport. Where-

Wherefore as to *Love* and *Hatred*, *Grief* and *Joy*, the *Interpretation* of them is this, That we do, as much as in us lies, purchaſe Good to our ſelves and others; Next, that we hurt no Man, but on the contrary drive away Evil moſt induſtriouſly and affectionately from others as well as our ſelves.

X. All Diligence is animated by *Cupidity*, which is the moſt *Mercurial* and awakened Paſſion, and which agitates the Heart with more violence than any other Affection. It ſends up a greater quantity of Spirits to the Brain, which diffuſing themſelves again into the Members of the Body; not only render it more active and more vigorous, but the Soul alſo is hereby drawn in, and concurs in a grateful and chearful Vivacity. For the Soul, if it want ſuitable Entertainment or Objects that are worthy of it, is but too apt to ruſt, and grow *Lethargick*; even as the Lord *Bacon* has ſomewhere truly admoniſhed, *That the Life of Man, without a propoſed End, is altogether looſe or languiſhing.*

However, if we would rightly govern, and make uſe of, this *Cupidity* to good purpoſe; let us beware, that it fly not to Objects that are without our reach, or more impetuouſly to thoſe within it, than our Health and the Frailty of our Condition can bear. For to make more haſt after things within our Power, than will conſiſt with our Strength or Ability, is but attempting things that are plainly impoſſible. So that ſuch unadviſed *Cupidity* would

would end rather in Sorrow and Vexation, than in Contentment.

Laſtly, ſince 'tis ſo manifeſt, what the end of *Cupidity* is; Namely, to excite Vigor in the Execution of our Purpoſes: this Paſſion muſt wholly be laid by, till we are juſt on the Borders of acting what by Counſel we have reſolved. For elſe this Ardor (and eſpecially in weak Conſtitutions) would not only be uſeleſs, but by inflaming the Spirits, would exhauſt our ſtrength, dry the whole Body, and overthrow our Health.

CHAP. IX.

The Uſe and Interpretation of Love and Hatred; which are in the Second Claſſis.

I. AMONG the Sorts of Species of *Love*, there is principally to be conſidered; not only *Devotion* and *Complacency*, but what the *Greeks* call *Storge* (which is that ſtrong Intercourſe of Filial Parental Sympathy, that is found in the Bowels of Nature.) So likewiſe, in the ſorts of *Hatred*, there is to be obſerved *Horror* and *Antipathy*.

By *Devotion* we are taught, as by a loud Exhortation of Nature, to believe that there is ſomething which ought to be more dear to us than our ſelves, and for which we ſhould not

not ſcruple to lay down our Lives. The Uſe therefore of this Paſſion refers chiefly to *Policy* and *Religion*; neither of which can be without Virtue. So that for the true Uſe of this Paſſion we are accountable to our Prince, our Country, and to our Religion: That is to ſay, unto God and true Virtue. Whence it follows, that thoſe, who place the higheſt Wiſdom in Self-preſervation, and as preferable at all times to all other things, do *ſin* againſt the Light of Nature.

II. By *Complacency*, and by *Horror*, we are admoniſhed, that there are ſome things *Beautiful*, and ſome *Deformed*; much contrary to the ſordid Opinion of thoſe, who laugh at all Diſtinction. Nay, their Raillery extends to the placing of this Indifferency, even in Vice and Virtue: Whereas Virtue, for the moſt part, is but a meer Symmetry of the Paſſions, in reference to their Degree and Objects. Juſt as Beauty itſelf is made up, firſt from a due proportion in the external Parts; and then animated by a Decorum in the Motion and Direction of the whole. Which, in a manner, is the ſame thing that *Tully* noted in the Fourth Book of his *Tuſculane Queſtion*. *For as in the Body*, (ſays he) *there is a certain apt Figuration of the Members, with a ſweetneſs of Colour, All which we call Beauty: ſo in the Mind, an equability and conſtancy in our Opinions and Judgments, joined to ſuch a firmity and ſettledneſs in them, as we make to the conſequence of, or, even the ſubſtance of Virtue, this alſo is declared beautiful.*

Lib. 4.

Wherefore

Wherefore this Natural Complacency, and Natural Horror, ought to ſpur us on to the Love of Virtue, and an Averſation to Vice: For one is the moſt charming, as the other the moſt deformed thing in the World.

III. But the more peculiar Intent of that Complacency, which is commonly called Love, refers to the Propagation of Children. Which Paſſion, if it be more importunate than the reſt, it ſhews the Care and Anxiety of Nature to preſerve and continue the Race of Mankind. And Nature is herein ſo ſolicitous, ſo artificial, and uſeth ſuch clandeſtine Feats of Negromancy and Prevarication, as if ſhe would rather paſs for an Inchantreſs, or even a Mountebank, than want ſufficient Allurements to that end. But foraſmuch as the Intention of this Ardor is made ſo conſpicuous (*as before*) we are thereby admoniſhed how far to reſtrain it, and with what Circumſpection to put all due Boundaries thereunto.

IV. Wherefore as this Love has reference to Propagation; ſo *Storge*, or *Natural Tenderneſs*, referreth chiefly to Children that are begot. And if more of the *Storge* appear in Parents, than what is reciprocal; it ſhews, this Paſſion is implanted by Nature, as others, to a greater Degree, or a leſs, ſuitable to the Uſe or Want there may happen to be thereof. For there is greater Utility and Need of the Parents Affection towards their Children, than of the Childrens towards the Parent; for

for theſe excel the other in good Counſel and other Aids: and it more rarely happens that Parents ſtand in need of their Children, than Children of their Parents. From hence alſo we may take Inſtruction how to govern and attemperate this Paſſion; ſo as neither by exceſs of Indulgence to hurt the Living, or by unprofitable Lamentations to over-bewail the Dead.

V. In the laſt place, *Antipathy* (which is a ſort of *Hatred*, tho from Cauſes more occult) is thus far of Uſe, that we are, by ſome private Sentinel, admoniſhed to ſtand off, where Nature has Planted between us and any other, an unaccountable Diſſention. But if this happen to be exerciſe againſt a good Man, we are then to ſuſpect our ſelves, and that the Evil lies at our own Door. In which Caſe, we are to contend, if poſſible, to make him our Friend, as venturing or loſing nothing by it, unleſs ſome defect or infirmity of our own.

Chap. X.

The Uſe and Interpretation of the Paſſions of the Third Claſſis, which fall under the Head of Cupidity.

I. The Kinds and Species of *Cupidity* are, in the Firſt Rank, *Hope*, *Fear*, *Jealouſie*, *Security*, and *Deſpair*: In the next are *Irreſolution*,

Irreſolution, *Animoſity*, *Courage*, *Emulation*, *Cowardiſe*, and *Conſternation*.

II. HOPE is Compounded of Joy and Cupidity; *Fear* of Cupidity, and ſomewhat of Grief: For Imagination is, according to *Ariſtotle*, a ſort of a feeble Senſe; but 'tis a Senſe of things preſent, even as *Grief* and *Joy*. For Events are preſent to the Mind, altho really not yet happened: And therefore they are both preſent and abſent, and may be as well the Objects of *Joy*, or of *Grief*, as of *Cupidity*.

The Uſe of *Hope* is to have Delight in acting, and of *Fear* to proceed with Circumſpection and Diligence.

III. BUT there is a more eſpecial Uſe of this laſt Paſſion, which referreth to Political Matters: For, ſeeing the greateſt part of Men are wicked; ſcarce any City could ſtand, if, by the Dread of Puniſhment, they were not kept in awe.

IV. JEALOUSIE is Compounded of *Cupidity*, *Sorrow*, and *Eſtimation*. It's proper Uſe is found in the Care and Defence of Things, which are of greateſt Account. Wherefore to make ſhew of it upon trivial Occaſions, is but mean and ridiculous.

V. IT appears plain, from what has been ſaid, which are the Paſſions that enter into the Compoſition of *Security* and *Deſpair*: ſince *Security* is nothing elſe but Hope diſcharged of all Fear, and *Deſpair* is Fear deſtitute of all Hope. The Uſe of the Firſt is a-

gainſt all Care and Diligence that is ſuperfluous. And the Uſe of the latter to withdraw the Mind from Deſigns unlikely to ſucceed, unto thoſe which are more Auſpicious, and of eaſie ſucceſs.

VI. IRRESOLUTION is Compounded of *Cupidity* and *Grief*: The Uſe whereof is to avoid Error in our Choice. For the Vexation, which Naturally attends it, does plainly prove, how one thing is much preferable to another; how we are to be extreme watchful in diſcovering what is the beſt, and what tends moſt to the obtaining, and the retaining thereof: and finally, that we propoſe ſome ſuch ſettled Rules and Determinations for the Conduct of Life, as are never to be departed from.

VII. ANIMOSITY, and *Courage* are both of them Compounded out of Cupidity, Joy and Grief: yet herein the Joy does much exceed the Grief; for that Grief, which ariſeth from danger in the Object, is trampled down by ſome excellency in the Object, which outweighs the Danger; and Joy takes place, from an aſſurance of gaining the end. The principal Uſe of this Paſſion is, in defending our Prince and Country from their Enemies; or in bearing Teſtimony to Truth with the utmoſt hazard of this mortal State: that ſo we may reap either immortal Glory, or Life eternal.

VIII. EMULATION is Compounded of Cupidity, Joy and Eſteem. The uſe and Force

Force hereof is ſeen in famous Examples of Virtue, unto whoſe Imitation Nature does by this Paſſion invite us.

Cowardiſe, or Puſillanimity, ſeems to be a Compound of Cupidity, Hope, Fear and Eſteem; but of theſe a very low degree. The principal uſe of this refers to Objects which are in truth but a poor Account, whatever ſome others may think to the contrary.

Conſternation is made up from a vaſt Admiration, Cupidity and Sorrow. And it ſeems to be a ſort of Schooling or Reprehenſion caſt on us by Nature, for abandoning that preſence of Mind, with which we ought always to be girded, againſt the Surprizes and Incurſions of ill Fortune. The uſe and ſignification hereof is much the ſame with that of *Irreſolution*; that, by well caſting of all things before-hand, we may be in full account what is to be done, and what to be ſuffered, in every caſe, and how to maintain our ſelves within the juſt limits of both.

IX. It ſeems furthermore to intimate and admoniſh us, that there is in Nature ſome horrid and ſtupendous danger, lying hid, and to be expected; which is the proper Object of this Paſſion, and againſt which we ought always to be provided. But whether this may be every Man's particular Death, or the ſolution of the Univerſe (of which the wiſeſt Men and Philoſophers have ſpoken, as well as Poets,)

Si fractus illabatur Orbis
Impavidos feriant ruinæ.

Were the World's Frame in Ruines laid,
They'd be oppreſs'd, but not afraid.

'Tis probable, that none will be ſo well prepared againſt theſe Shocks, as thoſe, unto whom Nature herſelf owes a reward for their true Sincerity and Innocence.

And thus much for the Paſſions of the Third Claſſis.

CHAP. XI.

The Interpretation and Uſe of Joy and Grief, which conſtitute the Fourth Claſſis.

I. THE Paſſions of this Rank are firſt, *Deriſion*, *Commiſeration*, *Envy*, *Congratulation*; Next, *Satisfaction*, *Repentance*, *Remorſe of Conſcience*; as alſo, *Favour*, *Gratitude*, *Indignation*, *Anger*: Thirdly, *Glory*, and *Shame*: Laſtly, *Loathing*, *Deſire*, and *Mirth*.

II. THE Uſe of *Deriſion* is chiefly applied to the Correction of ſmaller Faults in the ill Manners and Abſurdities of human Life.

From this Fountain ſprung up *Satyrical Poetry*, even as from the Effects of Love and Courage, came the *Epic* and the *Tragic*. Nor does *Satyr* ſo much purſue Vice itſelf, as it does

does the Circumſtances thereof, which are the moſt ridiculous.

Deriſion is compounded of Joy and Hatred; and if the Evil, which is the Object of it, happen on a ſudden, it produces *Laughter*. But the Object of *Laughter*, as *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere obſerves, muſt be ſuch a kind of Evil as is not deadly, or deſtructive. And therefore this may frequently happen where there is no intention of Hatred: For it may fall out to be only a Congratulation, or ſort of Gladneſs, that the Evil was not great; and that it alſo was quickly, as well as dexterouſly overcome.

III. In ſuch Caſes the Object of *Deriſion* does good; and in ſome meaſure even where the Evil is not overcome. That is to ſay, where the thing cannot be put into the ſame ſtate again, and provided that the damage be not very conſiderable; *For a light Evil may paſs for a Good.* For ſeeing there is ſuch frailty and mutability in matter, ſuch a propenſity thereby to great and unfortunate mutations: *Laughter* ſeems but as the Voice of Nature, congratulating with itſelf, that Evils which might have been ſo heavy, have, by the Providence of God, proved to be but light and tolerable Inconveniences. So this being judged a Deliverance, it cannot but end in Mirth. However as to ſome ſad Objects; ſuch as thoſe of Fools and mad Folks; if there be any Man that can pleaſe himſelf with their Abſurdities and Ravings, 'tis to be doubted, (and it draws

Jealouſie on him) he has not reverence enough for a ſound Mind. For elſe ſuch a Spectacle ſhould diſquiet him no leſs, than if he ſaw the Carcaſs of any dead Man miſerably rent in pieces before him.

IV. COMMISERATION is made up of Love and Sorrow. The Uſe hereof is in ſuccouring the diſtreſſed, and defending him that has right. For to take away the Life of an innocent Man, is ſo monſtrous a Crime, as tears the very Bowels of Nature, and forces ſighs from the Breaſts of all Men.

Envy is Compounded of Sorrow and Hatred. And the Uſe thereof refers chiefly to a right Diſtribution of Rewards and of Honors. For this Paſſion is not that ill Vice, which all Men ſo juſtly reprove; but an excellent Diſpoſition of the Mind given by God. And *Ariſtotle* calls it *Nemeſis*, on the account of a *Juſt Diſtribution to every Man.* And in his *Rhetorick* he ſays, As 'tis the proper Offices of a good Man to compaſſionate thoſe who ſuffer unjuſtly; ſo is he to envy, and to diſdain ſuch as proſper without a cauſe. He adds *Whatever exceeds Merit, is unjuſt: whence Indignation, in this behalf, is even attributed to the Gods.* But this, and that *Envy* which we ſpeak of, is but the ſame Paſſion. So that from theſe two of *Commiſeration* and *Envy*, we are admoniſhed, as by the Voice of Nature, that there is a juſt and an unjuſt, a right and a wrong; and that the firſt is to be taken, and the other left.

Lib. 2. c. 9.

V.

V. CONGRATULATION is compoſed of Love and Joy. And it may ſerve as a Spur unto common Beneficence. For to him, who is frequent in this Virtue, there is due from all Men a Congratulation of his Proſperity.

Satisfaction, or *Self-contentedneſs*, as alſo *Repentance*, and *Remorſe of Conſcience*, do all plainly contribute to the preſerving a good Conſcience. They alſo manifeſtly ſhew, that there is difference between the Works of good and evil Doers, and that Men are endowed with Free-Will. For this *Satisfaction* and *Acquieſcing*, is tantamount to a joyful Applauſe, or Acclamation of the Soul, from a Conſcience of Well-doing. And certainly ſuch Paſſion would be altogether vain, and miſplaced, if there were not really a right way and a wrong. Tho we muſt confeſs, that moſt Men are moſt groſly miſtaken about the Object of this Paſſion; and in valuing themſelves upon thoſe very Works, for which in Juſtice they deſerve to be defamed.

VI. OF this Madneſs there is not a greater inſtance than what *Des Cartes* himſelf lays in our view, of certain ſuperſtitious Hypocrites, who, becauſe they go often to Church, repeat many Prayers, ſhave their Head, abſtain from ſome Meats, give Alms, and the like; take themſelves to be ſo very perfect, that whatever is ſuggeſted to them by their Paſſion, ſounds like the Voice of Heaven. So that if this Paſſion ſuggeſt the betraying of Towns, killing of Princes, and rooting out

De Paſſ. Anim. part. 3. Art. 119.

whole Nations; they think they have Call enough for it, and even Ground ſufficient for ſuch *Executions* and ſuch *Paſſions*, if other Men but differ from them in Matters of meer Opinion.

Lib. 3. *c.* 1. § 12. VII. Now for what relates to *Repentance*. If it were ſo, that all things are done by *Neceſſity*, then all Grief upon inward conviction of Sin, would look as ridiculous, as if a Clown ſhould repent that he was not born Noble; or if a Woman ſhould be afflicted that ſhe was not born a Man. The ſame Reaſon holds as to *Remorſe of Conſcience*, which plainly ſhews, that, if we err in our Election, 'tis our own fault, and that it was in our power to have choſen better.

Favour alſo, and *Indignation*, ſignifie almoſt the ſame: For theſe Paſſions grow up in us, as we regard the Actions of Men, ſome doing right, and ſome doing wrong.

VIII. But *Gratitude* ſeems to be a natural or eſſential part of commutative Juſtice; even as *Commiſeration*, *Envy*, *Favour* and *Indignation*, may be reputed the natural parts of diſtributive Juſtice: But *Anger* may take place in this Rank above the reſt. For *Revenge* is a high part of that Juſtice, which calls for Chaſtiſement: and *Ariſtotle* ſays, that the *Pythagoreans* did chiefly place this in *Retaliation*. For *Anger* contributes as much towards *Fortitude*, as either *Boldneſs* or *Animoſity*. And it was the ſaying of *Theages*, *That Anger, and covetous Deſire, were ſo intended for the ſervice*

of

of the Soul, as if the firſt were to be it's Guard, and a ſort of Sentinel to the Body; the other a fit Caterer or Steward for things that were of uſe. He alſo compares this latter to a Providore, and the other to a Soldier. For that *Anger* is a Paſſion compos'd of *Hatred*, of *Cupidity*, and of *Self-love*; and ſo is directly oppoſite to *Gratitude*, juſt as *Indignation* unto *Favour*. And *Des Cartes* obſerves, that *Anger* exceeds the other three; as the Deſire of Repelling what is noxious, and the taking of Revenge, is more vehement upon us than any other thing.

IX. NOR ought we to dread this Paſſion the more, becauſe it is mixed with Hatred: For all the Paſſions which belong to the *Iraſcible* Faculty of the Soul are very uſeful and neceſſary; ſeeing it doth more concern us to reſiſt Evil, than to enjoy unneceſſary Good. Wherefore he who diſpoſeth himſelf to obey the Motions of the *concupiſcible* part of his Mind, out of a ſpecious pretence of Peace and of a charitable ſweetneſs which we owe to others, let him have a care, leſt at the ſame time he betrays not the Piety which he owes to God, to his Country, and to the reſt of Mankind. For he who altogether lays aſide this *Iraſcibility*, is either falſe or effeminate, and can never deſerve the Character of being what *Theages* calls *An able Guard, and a faithful Champion of Virtue.* L 1. c. 6. §. 8.

As to *Glory*, and *Modeſty*, or *Shame*, they are things of excellent uſe: For the firſt ſpurs on to high Attempts, and the latter ſo deters

us

us from what is vile, that it may paſs as it were for a Cittadel or Bulwark to Virtue. *Glory* is made up of Joy, and Self-eſtimation; *Modeſty*, or *Shame*, of Sorrow, and Self-love, yet alſo mixed with Self-diſtruſt: ſo as this Paſſion does not belong either to the beſt or worſt ſort of Men. For whoever is conſcious that he does, with a generous Free-Will, devote himſelf to laudable things, knows alſo that he deſerves not for ſo doing to fall into Contempt: And therefore if the Revilers ſhoot at him, he has Fortitude of Mind to ſcorn at them again. But, on the other ſide, when wicked Men grow ſhameleſs, and become ſcandal-proof, then are they perfectly dangerous: For *Tully* obſerved, *That to bear Ignominy without ſorrow, was even to arrogate a Commiſſion to do evil.*

L. 1. c. 8. § 5.

Tuſcul. Quæſt. lib. 4.

XI. WHEREFORE theſe two Paſſions of *Shame* and *Glory* are eaſily underſtood: For both of them make out, that we muſt rather abide by the common Opinion of others, than by our own. And this contributes not a little, as well to good Manners, as to our Civil obedience: for we are inſtructed this Inſtinct of Nature, that no particular Man is to violate the Laws, or oppoſe his ſingle Judgment to the publick. *Ariſtotle* ſays, in his *Rhetorick*; *That Law is the publick Senſe, and Opinion of the whole People, and made for inſtruction in all Caſes and Events.* And *Cicero*, ſpeaking alſo of *Modeſty*, appeals to that very Shame, which ſome Pleaſures are

are naturally attended withal: Which, plainly deteſting their Vileneſs, ſhews that they ſhould be rejected and contemned by Men, who are born to nobler things.

XII. But ſeeing we are ſtill thus governed by theſe two Inſtincts of *Shame* and *Glory*; and yet behold the whole Bulk of the World, how they magnifie that which is debauched and vile: we may from thence preſume a time will come, in which Mankind ſhall live to better purpoſes, that is, more regularly and correct. The *Millennium.*

However, as things now go, let us contend, that neither *Shame* on the one hand, or *popular Fame* on the other, ſeduce or drive us from what is ſubſtantially juſt: For this would utterly ſubvert the Intention of thoſe Gifts. And therefore in all Actions, let your Appeal be to the Judgment-Seat of a good Conſcience; and if we are but well atteſted from thence, let the Sparks of the World rally on, and the whole Crowd reproach us: For, in ſuch caſe, 'tis perfect Heroiſm to deſpiſe them both. Furthermore let thoſe take Shame upon them that deſerve it; not the Well-doers, nor ſuch as are even content to ſuffer for doing well. *For Virtue* (as *Tully* ſaith) *and even Philoſophy her ſelf, muſt be contented with a few Judges. The Rabble was ever ſpiteful and invidious to both, and therefore both have induſtriouſly declin'd all Appeals unto them.* Let us therefore, as he adviſes us, deſpiſe all the Follies of Men, and place the force of living well, in the *Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 2. Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 4.*

the ſtrength and greatneſs of our Minds, and in the Contempt of this World: and in a word, let us believe it to conſiſt in Truth and Virtue, notwithſtanding the vain and miſtaken Opinions of a great part of Mankind.

XIII. LASTLY, as to what concerns *Loathing*, *Mirth* and *Deſire*. The Benefit of Loathing has Reference unto Temperance; for we uſually loath that which we take in exceſs: And we take notice how much a repeated Uſe of all corporeal things, turns unto loathing at laſt. Hence we may be admoniſhed to raiſe up our Minds to things intellectual, and to place our thoughts upon God.

As for *Mirth*, the Uſe thereof refers to Patience: For we ought to ſuffer Hardſhips the more willingly, as they will at length be compenſated with greater Joy. So *Æneas* cheared up his Friends in Diſtreſs,

Durate, & voſmet rebus ſervate ſecundis.

—— *Bear up, and patiently endure,*
In time our better Fate will bring the Cure.

XIV. DESIRE is compounded of Sorrow, Love, Deſpair, and Cupidity. The Uſe and Benefit hereof is, to give an edge to our Diligence, in ſerving what we have, ſince the loſs thereof would turn to our Vexation. The Force of this Paſſion is chiefly felt in the loſs of Friends; the Death of thoſe who excel in Beauty, or in the Talents of the Mind, or who have eminently ſerv'd in their Generation. So *Horace*, *Quis*

Quis deſiderio ſit Pudor aut Modus
Tam chari Capitis? Præcipe lugubres
Cantus, Melpomene, *cui liquidam Pater*
Vocem cum Cithara dedit.

Horat. l. 1. Ode 24.

——— *Sound out,* Melpomene,
And tune thy doleful Melody.
Come, let our Sorrows boundleſs be,
'Twere ſhame to think of Modeſty,
When we muſt weep, great Man, for thee.

XV. It was this Paſſion that, working upon mournful and tender Minds, inſtructed them in the ways of Funeral Pomp; and by Songs of Lamentation, Elegies, and Orations, to pepetuate the Memory of the Dead. Nay, it brought things to that Pitch of Madneſs at laſt (worſe than Mortality itſelf) that Temples, Altars, and even Prayers, were conſecrated to the Dead: As if thoſe, who but juſt now ceas'd to be Men, we preſently transform'd into Gods. Thus have they branded, by vile Superſtition and Idolatry, our mortal State; which was the utmoſt Abuſe this Paſſion was capable of, or could be imployed unto.

Chap. XII.

That all Paſſions (properly ſo call'd) are in themſelves Good; and that, from a right Interpretation of them, 'tis manifeſt, there is ſomething Good and Bad in its own Nature: And laſtly, to ſhew what ſuch Nature or Eſſence of Good and Bad can be.

I. IT appears by what has been ſaid, that not only the Paſſions we have ſpoken of, but all the reſt of them, which are properly ſo call'd, are Good. Alſo that inward Propenſity, and ſtrong Inclinations, are not things of Deliberation and Choice; *But,* (as *Theages* ſays) *the very Stroaks and Prints of Nature, where Vertue is implanted in us by a ſort of Impulſe or Enthuſiaſm.* And *Ariſtotle* notes, *That the way of Enthuſiaſm is to be hurried on to action, without any motives of Reaſon.* Wherefore ſeeing ſuch Propenſities are antecedent to all Choice or Deliberation, 'tis manifeſt they are from Nature and from God; and that therefore whatever they dictate as Good and Juſt, is really Good and Juſt: and we are bound to embrace and proſecute the ſame, not only towards our ſelves, but towards others; I mean as far as may conſiſt without any injury to a third.

Magn. Moral. l. 1. cap. 8.

II. FOR this Law of Nature, which bears ſway

ſway in the animal Region, is a ſort of confuſed Muttering, or Whiſper of a Divine Law: but indeed the Voice of it is more clear and audible in the intellectual State. And whereas in that inferior Region, the Caſe is often ſo uncertain, and ſo undecided, as to reſemble what the *Civilians* call *Caſus omiſſus*; therefore are we obliged frequently to appeal to the Tribunal of Reaſon, and to conſult about Time, Place, and Proportion, and ſuch other Circumſtances as our Actions are ſubjected unto. For Reaſon has this preheminence, that it does not only more *diſtinctly* judge, but more *abſtractedly*, than what the Animal Light, or any Law of the Paſſions, can pretend to. 'Tis more diſtinct, as it can penetrate and examine into the Original and Circumſtances of Things; whereas Paſſion is only a blind and determinate Impulſe, to do ſo or ſo, without knowing any Motive for it. Alſo 'tis more *abſtracted*, and by Nature *ſeparate*: For Reaſon does not Dictate what may be Good for this or that particular Perſon, but what ſimply is good or better; and what in ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances ought to be more or leſs preferable. *L. 1. c. 6. § 6, 8.*

III. For this is the true Character of every intellectual Faculty (as was noted before) that it cannot ſtoop, and as it were cringe, to particular Caſes; but ſpeaks boldly and definitively what is true and good unto all. And hence 'tis plain, that whatever is Intellectual and truly Moral, is alſo Divine, and partakes

partakes of God. And this made *Ariſtotle* ſtyle the Divinity, *A Law that look'd round, and had the ſame uniform Aſpect towards every ſide.*

IV. How unadviſed therefore have ſome been to ſay, *every thing was lawful, that Paſſion did perſuade*; and to ſtyle this a ſort of Divine and Intellectual Document, and, while taken abſtractedly, and in the general, to contend for it, as a very principal Rule of human Actions: whereas none, but ſuch as are meer Slaves unto Paſſion, can ever think at this Rate. This has been hatch'd under the Wings of Appetite, not of Reaſon: For to eſtabliſh ſuch a Doctrine of human Actions, as muſt ſubvert all Actions, is quite irrational.

V. Would it not from ſuch a Principle follow, that every Man might, at his Pleaſure, not only fire his own Houſe in the Night, but the Town alſo? Might he not poiſon the common Well, or maim and deſtroy his Wife and Children, if it were lawful to ſacrifice to his own Paſſion? So that this Foundation being againſt Nature, and utterly pernicious, it plainly follows, that no Man's private Inclinations are the Meaſures of Good and Evil; but that the Inclinations themſelves are to be circumſcribed by ſome Principle which is ſuperior to them.

VI. Now the next Principle, unto which Paſſion is ſubjected, and which knows what in every Caſe is good and bad, is *right Reaſon:* And

And therefore that which to Right Reaſon appears good or bad, ought certainly to be reputed as ſuch in its own Nature. For what a rectified Mind takes in, is really the Eſſence of the thing itſelf, painted in the Underſtanding: and ſo a Triangle, in its own Nature, is nothing elſe but what Right Reaſon conceives to be ſuch.

VII. HENCE it plainly follows, that there are ſome unchangeable Ideas or Impreſſions of Good and Evil, even as of Figures in the Mathematicks; and that the Mind judges of thoſe, as much as Senſe does of theſe: Yet Reaſon and the Intellect have Juriſdiction over both. For as thoſe are made up by the Concurrence of ſeveral Lines; ſo are theſe made up of various and often contrary Circumſtances; which therefore denominate ſome things to be Good, and ſome things to be Evil. And this confirms what has been ſaid, that the Principle, whereby to judge what is either morally good or evil, is an Intellectual Principle, and in ſome ſort Divine.

VIII. THIS hinders not, but that we muſt allow there is ſomething alſo, little leſs than Divine, which preſides in the Animal Law (for this Law has alſo its Source from Nature, and from God the Parent of Nature) ſo that we may evermore follow the Indications and Dictates of that Law, unleſs in ſuch Caſes, where Reaſon adminiſheth that ſomething may be done, that is better and more advantageous. And if this one point L. 2. c. 6. § 8.

be but granted (which no reaſonable Man will deny) you will preſently find numberleſs Inſtances of thoſe things, which in their own Nature may be termed juſt, or unjuſt, vile or honeſt; which, by reflecting on thoſe principal ſigns of the Paſſions already mention'd, will occur unto you. For ſurely thoſe things are, in their own Nature juſt, or unjuſt, vile or honeſt, which the Voice of God in Nature has declared to be ſuch. And this Corollary is of high value in human Life; and able to trample upon the Impudence of thoſe, who cry up all things for lawful, which they themſelves think fit.

L. 1. c. 6. § 2. L. 1. c. 6. § 16. IX. NEVERTHELESS we do not pretend, in the leaſt, to have the Paſſions of the Mind exterminated. We rather account of them (which before was noted) as of the very Organs of the Body, and as diſtinctly uſeful: ſince they are not only the occaſion of ſeveral Virtues, but the true Characters and Images of Virtue are made the more reſplendent by them. Wherefore if we can but skill our Paſſions a-

L. 1. c. 6. § 11. right, *They are as Lamps or Beacons, to conduct and excite us to our Journey's end.* For tho Reaſon may cry aloud; yet we walk without Legs, and fly without Wings, if we are not quickened by their Inſtigations. Hence we may reflect, that *Theages* was not ſo much out of the way, in ſaying, *That Virtue had its original from the Paſſions, and did aſſociate with them, and was preſerved by them.* For the principal part of Virtue is placed in their due Commixture; *So*

as

as no man (he ſays) *ought either to be void of Paſſion, or too highly excited by it. For as Inſenſibility lays a damp on that Torrent and Enthuſiaſm of the Soul, by which 'tis puſh'd forward towards things which are noble and great: ſo too much emotion diſcompoſes the Mind; and the Underſtanding is damnified by it.*

X. WHEREFORE let us cloſe all with the Counſel of *Archytas* the *Pythagorean*. *Contend* (ſays he) *to procure the Uſe of your Paſſions in ſuch Moderation, as you may equally ſhun to appear inſenſible, or in too high an Agitation: for this often leads to prouder Attempts than our weak Nature can ſupport.* Surely this Temperament ſounds better than what the *Stoicks*, and even ſome *Platoniſts*, do preſent us with. And let it never be forgot, that we are no longer to retain our Paſſions, than as they adminiſter to thoſe ends, for which by Nature they are intended.

And thus much of our Paſſions, which are properly ſtyled ſuch.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other Paſſions, or Bodily Impreſſions.

FOR what concerns the Reſidue of *Corporeal Impreſſions*, the kinds thereof may, in a manner, be referred to theſe two claſſes. Namely, to

1. *Senſation, Imagination, the particular Temperament of the Body, and to Cuſtom.* 2.

2. *Or to Education, to a ſingular Genius, or to a particular Fancy.*

The Impreſſions of the *firſt Claſſis* agree in this, that they appear without any *Appetite* properly ſo called. But thoſe of the ſecond are attended with ſome *proper Appetite.*

By *Senſation* is here meant, not the very *Act of Feeling*, which is the true meaning of the Word; but rather a *Stain*, or that *perverſe Byaſs* and *Propenſity to error*, which it imprints on the Soul. And ſo almoſt of all the reſt.

II. WHEREFORE, *Senſation* is defin'd, *To be a certain corporeal Impreſſion, by which the Soul is prevailed on to believe, that things are ſuch in their own Natures, as they appear to our external Senſes.* As if a man, finding ſomewhat that was grateful to his own Taſte, ſhould ſtreight conclude, that the ſame Pleaſure and Sweetneſs were in the thing itſelf; and therefore that muſt equally gratifie the Taſte of all other Creatures. We ſee the ſame Fallacy obtruded in the Objects of Sight; when a Man ſhall conclude, that the Light and Colour which are taken in by the Eye, are alſo in the things themſelves: which is no more true than that Stones feel pain, which wounded the bare Feet of thoſe that run over them; or that when a Man's Hand is burnt by a Coal, that the Coal alſo ſhould have ſenſe of ſuch Burning. For 'tis plain, that *Heat* is no more in the Coal, or in any ſuch Subject, than is the very Pain; but both ariſe from the *Agitation* and *Concuſſion of Particles*: So as if this be ve-

moder-

moderate, we feel Heat without any Pain; whereas if our Senſes are immoderately ſtruck, then follows Perception both of *Heat* and *Pain* together. Wherefore Heat and Pain are things which differ only in degree; and we our ſelves are the Subject in which they meet, and wherein their Force and Vigor is exerted. And the like we may pronounce of other the Objects of our external Senſes.

III. IMAGINATION *is a corporeal Impreſſion, which inclines the Soul to believe, that ſuch things are, or elſe may be; which yet never are, nor can ever be.*

As *Senſation* is apt to miſguide the Soul, touching the Nature of Things, unleſs care be taken: ſo *Imagination* does the like as to their *Exiſtence,* whether preſent, or to come. For as the vigour of our Senſe throws us into Security, as to the real preſence and exiſtence of any thing; ſo the torrent of *Imagination,* which ſeems to equal, or at leaſt to imitate, Senſe itſelf, does eaſily impoſe a falſe Aſſurance on the Soul, that ſuch thing is true, or may be true; tho there be no other Foundation for it, but that it has been vehemently ſo imagined. How theſe inſolent *Phantaſms,* and ſuch idle Dreams, of Men who ſleep not, may be detected and diſpelled, we have taught at large in our Book of *Enthuſiaſm*: to which the Reader is referr'd. *Sect.* 51, 52, 53, *&c.*

IV. As to the peculiar *Temperament* and *Conſtitution*; we define it to be, *A corporeal Impreſſion that reſults from the whole natural Maſs;*

by which the Soul is obſtructed and perverted from the Contemplation of ſome peculiar Things. Of this corporeal Frailty there might be many Inſtances given. We have ſeen how happy, and even famous, ſome have been at the *Mathematicks*; who, when you turn them to things *Theological*, or into the *Metaphyſicks*, they are quite lame, and ſtumble at every ſtep. They will avow they perfectly comprehend whatever concerns the Nature of a *Body*, but as to that of a *Spirit*, they cannot figure to themſelves the leaſt Notion or Signification of it. On the other ſide, you have others, who are ſo full of their Notion about *Spirits*, that they believe not a corner of the World to be void or deſtitute of them. They think they are preſent at every Thunder and every Rain; and they have muſtered and regimented them into ſuch Brigades; that it would make a Man ſweat to comprehend the Government and Intrigues which they impute unto this inviſible Race.

V. I Know not well how otherwiſe to judge of this *Diſeaſe in the Art of Thinking*, than that it grows from a particular Texture of Parts or a *prevalent Byaſs* in the Frame and Conſtitution of the Body. In ſome the Spirits are more ſtiff, groſs and tenacious; in others more volatile, unequal, and even turbulent. So that if a Man hath it in his Power (in the Language of the *Chymiſts*) to *fix the volatile*, and to *volatilize the fix'd*, (by which they promiſe themſelves Golden Mountains.) I mean

if

if he could bring his Spirits to a juſt proportion of Delicacy and Agility, and could then ſo totally controul their Motion, as to fix and ſettle them in the Contemplation of any particular Object, he were then certainly Maſter of the greateſt Secret in the World, towards the Knowledge and Contemplation of all Things.

VI. CUSTOM *is a corporeal Impreſſion, by which the Soul is extremely bent to judge of things, as true, good, or amiable; for no other Motive, but becauſe it has been accuſtomed ſo to judge, and ſo to act.* There is an Inſtance of this Depravity in the *Cannibals*, who eat Man's Fleſh without any Ceremony or ſort of Qualm whatever. And the Power of *Cuſtom* is ſo very ſtrong (as *Tully* obſerves it from *Ariſtotle*) that it becomes a *ſecond Nature.* Hence it is, that ſome inveterate Opinions uſurp among Mankind the Name of Principles, or common Notions; and a very *ill Cuſtom of the Country*, paſſes for *a Law of Nature.* How pernicious a *Fate* therefore is it, when young Men happen to be thus handled? How cautious ought all to be of any falſe or immoral Cuſtom? And how much does it import us to fly the Society of thoſe, who are over-run with any Habit, either of ill Notions, or ill Manners? *'Tis not to be imagined how a little Familiarity and Converſation with an ingenious Libertine, will inſenſibly ſteal away that Senſe of Honour, and of Virtue, which we firſt brought with us, when we fell into his acquaintance.*

VII. EDUCATION *is Cuſtom, with ſome remarkable Affections annex'd.* For commonly *Teachers* do inſtile their own Nations alſo, into the Eſteem of their Diſciples, as if it highly imported them to the perfecting of their Education. And ſo it comes, often, to paſs, that the Scholars will not afterwards endure the Correction of ſome inſufferable Errors, but perſiſt and die in them. Happy had it been for ſuch, had they never had any other Tutor than bare Nature: for then the Sparks of Virtue, and of Truth, which were in their tender Minds, had not been (as now by the Perfidy of an ill Maſter) extinguiſh'd. *Tully* takes occaſion (*in his Tuſculan Queſtions*) highly to exclaim hereat; affirming, *That we are born with ſuch Elements of Vertue, as, if they were not depreſs'd, even Nature itſelf would inſtigate us to a happy life.* Whereas now we are perverted as ſoon as born; and our Minds ſo ſcribled over with crooked Sentiments, as if they had been even mingled with our Milk. But this Misfortune is ſo little rectified in riper time by Inſtructors and Teachers, that Truth is laugh'd out of Countenance, vulgar Errors take place; and even Nature is ſubdu'd by Opinion.

VIII. As *Education* has Reference unto *Cuſtom*: *ſo a peculiar Genius or Inclination hath reference to a peculiar temperament of the Body, and is a corporeal Impreſſion by which a Man is ſo endowed, and ſo appropriated to certain ends, that he conceives all human Happineſs and Perfection to conſiſt therein; and that all are either miſerable, or much to be pitied, who are defective in that particular.*

particular. Thus it comes to paſs, that whether in *Oratory*, or in *Muſick*, or in *War*, *Politicks*, *Poetry*, *Philoſophy*, *Geometry*, or *Languages*, he that lays hold by a *peculiar Genius* on one of them alone, ſhall be ſo intoxicated, as to deſpiſe every Man that is addicted to any of the reſt. But this ſurely is a *Sickneſs of the Mind*, and wholly *Pedantick*; ſince every other *Genius* is equally happy, in the different Objects that delight and entertain him.

IX. WHEREFORE we ought to applaud in every Man what is either uſeful, or but honeſtly pleaſant. And, as to our ſelves, let not any Excellency we attain to, lead us to deſpiſe other excellent things: for this would be as a Judgment on us; and to be impriſon'd, as it were, in our own Tower; when by one degree of Knowledge we are blinded and excluded from all the reſt. There is no Man can truly be happy, but he that has attained to ſhare in that, which muſt make every Man happy. So that this does not properly appertain to the *Genius* we ſpeak of; unleſs a Man be ſo fortunately born, as to have his *Genius* ſet wholly upon Virtue. But if this be the Caſe, then indeed 'tis no more a Confinement or Captivity, but the moſt amiable, and the moſt extended Liberty in the World.

X. THERE are alſo Inclinations of this ſort, peculiar as well to the different *Ages* of Mankind, as to the different Objects of Life; and wherein Men bewray the impotence of the Mind; but they are too many to be here numbered up.

XI.

XI. PECULIAR *Fancy is a corporeal Impreſſion, whereby the Mind is carried to love or hate, to value or deſpiſe any Thing, or any Perſon, for ſome external and very trivial Circumſtances.*

This is not ſuch a Reference, or Rejection, as comes from any antecedent Paſſion; but rather a Conſequence, and that which from ſuch Impreſſion does enſue. 'Tis not that we hereby tax the Wiſdom of thoſe Ancients, and of the *Pythagoreans* in particular; who (as *Gellius* relates) did from the Mien, Geſture, and whole Air of the Body, penetrate into the Manners of Men: For this is no idle Speculation, ſince few Men can conceal their natural Propenſities from a curious and diligent Inſpector. But the Fault we accuſe, is, when Men run headlong to love, or hate, ſuch a thing or ſuch a perſon, not for any natural Perfection or Imperfection; but ſo ſlightly and ſuperficially; that often, upon the bare ſound of a Name, we ſee ſome paſſionately inclin'd to one Man more than to another; ſo that as well Perſons as Things are often, upon no better Arguments, either valu'd or deſpis'd. But alas, how much is the Frailty, the Mutability, and the impotent temper of Man's Soul detected hereby?

Noctes Atticæ, lib. 1. c. 9.

XII. SOME will ſay, that theſe Obſervations are too minute; but if they contribute to the making a better Judgment on all things, and ſuch as a good and prudent Man is bound to do, I think the Labour will not be wholly loſt.

THE

THE SECOND BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of the Number of the Primitive Virtues.

I. WE have hitherto ſpoken of *Virtue in general*; of *the Paſſions*, and of the reſt of the *Corporeal Impreſſions.*

Now follow the *Virtues* in the *kind*; and theſe are even, as was ſaid of the *Paſſions*, ſome of them *Primitive*, and others by *Derivation.* Of the firſt ſort there are theſe three, *Prudence*, *Sincerity*, and *Patience*; which do, in ſome ſort, anſwer and ſucceed to the *three Primitive Paſſions*, ſo as either to perfect or to correct them: Thus *Prudence* ſtands in balance to *Admiration*; *Sincerity* to *Concupiſcence*, and *Patience* to *Fury.*

And that it may not appear we have caſually fallen into this Triplicity of Virtue; but that Nature and Right Reaſon have inſtructed us therein, 'twill not be amiſs to expoſe how far the Ancients have beaten the ſame Path. They have frequently pointed at this

this very Summary of Duties, or of Virtues, tho perhaps not in the very Terms: Yet, while they concur in the Subſtance, it goes a great way to ſhew, that this threefold Diviſion is according to Nature.

II. METOPUS, the *Pythagorean*, intimates three Virtues from the three parts of the Mind: the firſt *Rational*; the next *Iraſcible*: *Which he makes as a Buckler or Defence againſt thoſe things, which may more nearly hurt us.* The third he calls the *Appetitive*, or *Concupiſcible*. And his Words in the beginning of that Fragment, are thus, *All Vertue muſt have theſe three things: Firſt, Reaſon. Secondly, Strength or Vigor. And thirdly, Appetite or Election. Reaſon to judge by; Vigor to reſiſt and overcome; and Appetite for love and Enjoyment.* So theſe three do plainly conform to our ſaid *Primitive Virtues.*

III. THEAGES alſo divides them into the ſame parts. And adds, *That Prudence is a Virtue of the rational part of the Soul, as Fortitude is of the Iraſcible. For the Habit of Reſiſting, or of ſubmitting to Evil, depends on this latter.* And therefore we term this *Patience, which is a Virtue that ſuſtains and conforms to whatever is grievous or ungrateful.* But inſtead of *Temperance*, which is a Virtue *derivative*, and but *particular*, we ſubſtitute *Sincerity*; as being a pure and original Virtue, and of the *Appetitive* Soul; ſuch as by whoſe Power we are led to that which is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt, and that purely for its own Conſideration.

IV.

IV. So what *Theages* ſays elſewhere, has a more evident reference hereto. As namely, *That the Principles of all Vertue were Knowledge, Power, and Appetition: That by Knowledge we conſider things and determine; that Power enables us by bodily Force to bear up and ſuſtain our ſelves in all Accidents that happen; and that Appetition was as the Hand of the Soul, which is thrown out to catch at this or that Object as occaſion requires.* To which triple Uſe of the Faculties, our *Triumvirate* of Virtues; namely, *Prudence, Sincerity,* and *Patience,* do moſt exactly conform.

V. So again *Marcus Aurelius* makes frequently the ſame Enumeration, and ſays in his Meditations; *That Philoſophy conſiſts of theſe three Virtues: Namely, firſt to preſerve the Soul (which he calls our Domeſtick God) clear and unſpotted from all carnal Temptations, ſo as neither to be ſubdued by Pleaſure, nor by Pains.* And this is that true *Patience* which comprehends both *Continence* and *Long-ſuffering.* Next he adviſes, *That nothing be raſhly done*: Which is the plain Office of *Prudence.* And laſtly, to be free from all *Hypocriſie* and *Diſſimulation*: Which is the part of *Sincerity.* *Marcus Anton. l. 2. § 17.*

VI. Again, in his ſeventh Book, *That it was a fundamental Duty to bear an innate Love to Mankind,* that is, *to reliſh whatever contributed to the more regular Adminiſtration of the World:* Which, as he often ſhews, is nothing elſe than frankly and entirely to purſue, not what refers to a Man's private Intereſt, but what tends moſt to *Sect. 55.*

the

the general Laws of Nature, and of Reaſon, and what is purely and eminently the beſt. For this temper of Mind (as he has it elſewhere) *is the true giving up a Man's ſelf in Sacrifice to Reaſon, and to God*; which is the Heighth of *Sincerity*. Next he requires, *That we never yield to corporeal Affections*; and this takes in *Patience*. Laſtly, *Not to precipitate our ſelves in any thing, leſt Error enſue*; which is the Dictate of *Prudence*. The ſame Philoſopher has much more, up and down, to the like effect.

Lib. 8. § 26.

VII. But particularly in his tenth Book he recommends three things, which much concern the Virtues in hand. As namely, *Intention of Mind*, which anſwers *Prudence*: *Contentment* and *Extenſion of the Mind*, which refer to *Sincerity and Patience*. For to ſay, the *Mind* is *intent*, is to ſay, it *dwells ſedately on its Object, and accurately ſifts into every part thereof*: which is the Buſineſs of *Prudence*. And for *Sincerity* and *Patience*, how can they better be ſet off than *by placing the Mind in a ſtate of Content? For this teſtifies a thankful, humble Acceptance of what Nature, in her common Diſtribution, hath given, whatever the Portion be.* And thus to acquieſce in Nature's common Law, is, in the Judgment of that wiſeſt Philoſopher, *To obey the common Reaſon, that is in God; nay, which is little leſs than God himſelf. For he is the living Law, in whoſe Adminiſtration the whole Univerſe remains; and he who beſtows on every Man, what he, in his Wiſdom thinks fit and competent for him.*

Sect. 8.

Marcus Anton. lib. 10. § 52.

VIII.

VIII. So then he that chearfully accepts and values, not what to his Senſe or Fancy might be more complacent, but what Providence thinks fit to order and impoſe (as indeed ſome things are ſent, which, altho not altogether unwholſom, yet unto Fleſh and Blood their Taſte is extreme bitter) this Man is by *Antoninus* cry'd up, *As one that ſincerely cooperates with that intellectual Power, which guides and comprehends all things.* He adds, *That the World is one and the ſame in every part; that God is every where the ſame; that there is but one Eſſence, and one Law, which is the common ſtandard and meaſure of all intellectual Beings; that there is one Truth, as alſo one Perfection of all Animals of the ſame kind; and but one and the ſame Reaſon among all the Creatures that partake thereof.* L. 8. § 52. L. 7. § 9.

IX. Thus is it plainly his Senſe, that one common Rule and Conſtitution runs through every intellectual Subſtance; and that rational Creatures are, in this way, made *a ſort of Fellow-Citizens with God*; and that nothing can degrade them, but a perverſe Will againſt that Bond and Sanction, by which they hold this State. Whereas if they reſign to every thing which the Divine Law, and immutable Reaſon lays on them; and do not ſo much as covet that things ſhould be otherwiſe than as they are: *Such* (ſays he) *are not to be reputed as bare Conformers, who ſubmit and are content, but as Men who are drawn, if not caught up, by God himſelf.* For they think L. 2. c. 4. § 4. *Marcus Antonin.* l. 12. § 23.

as

as he would have them, and they have no other Will, but the Will of their Creator. This therefore is the ſupremeſt Degree of *Sincerity*: For this is not only the purſuit of what is eminently the beſt, but a thirſting and panting after it for it's own ſake, and for it's intrinſick worth.

L. 10. § 8. 10. X. LASTY, he adviſes, *That we corroborate our Minds to ſuch a degree, as to repel not only the charming, but the rugged Aſſaults of the Fleſh; alſo to be above Vain-Glory, and even Death it ſelf.* This ſurely is enough, whereby to know what *Patience* is: and 'tis by this Virtue of Patience, that we ſurmount the Tempations of either Hand, whether they be ſoft or harſh. Now if it come to this; that neither infamy nor Death can otherwiſe be ſhun'd, than in ſubmitting to what is vile and contrary to the Laws of Reaſon; we muſt ſtand our ground, and with Patience congratulate them both. Upon the whole matter, we did not inconſiderately ſet down *Prudence*, *Sincerity*, and *Patience*, to be the firſt Fountains of all other Virtues. And this will be further manifeſt, when we ſhall, with a little more Accuracy, conſider and define the Nature of each.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Prudence, the first Primitive Virtue.

I. PRUDENCE *therefore is a Virtue, by which the Soul has such Dominion over the Passions properly so called, as well as over all sorts of corporeal Impressions, that the mind can receive no Impediment thereby, in rightly observing, and successfully judging of what is absolutely and simply the best.*

The Demonstration of this Virtue is made out by *Noema* the Twelfth. Hence therefore it is that *Prudence* is attended and surrounded by *Knowledge, Diligence, good Counsel, equal Determination, judicious Conjecture, Presence of Mind, Sense, and the Limits of Right Reason.* Of which in particular. For

II. KNOWLEDGE, or *Intelligence*, is the Companion of *Prudence*; because knowing is nothing else but a right comprehension of those things, whereof we are, by others, admonished. So *Aristotle* observes, *That 'tis by Prudence we apprehend, but by Knowledge that we judge and determine: so Men are call'd intelligent, only from their Facility of being taught.* Wherefore we may agree, that *prudent Men* are also the most *intelligent*: For as they still keep an open Ear to good Counsel, and are not given up to the Prejudice of any Passion, *Eudem.* l. 5. c. 12.

or corporeal Impreſſion; ſo are they qualified by this Temperament, ſtill to embrace Truth where ever they find it.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 13.

III. DILIGENCE (as is noted by *Ariſtotle*) ſhines moſt in the finding out of fit Mediums, and of applying them to the Mark: But if the Deſign be ill, then is a Man not termed *diligent*, but *ſhrewd* or *buſie*. Wherefore it ſeems there is ſome Sagacity and Subtilty of the Wit, required in *Diligence*, which the prudent Man can ſcarce ever want: For having both Mind and Body purified, as he hath, from the ſtains of Paſſion or Impreſſion, he has alſo a ſtock of ſubtil and lively Spirits always attending him.

Ethic. Eudem. l. 5. c. 9. & ad Nicom. l. 6. c. 10.

Where this *Diligence* preſides, there happy Counſel can never be wanting: For as the Philoſopher places *Rectitude of Counſel to adviſing that which is good*; ſo the Eſſentials herein are, that the Ends be honeſt, that the Means be lawful, and that the Conſultation be neither ſlow nor precipitate. And all theſe things meet in a prudent Man; as by the Definition of *Prudence* is manifeſt. So alſo *Antoninus* obſerves, *That the prudent Man, being Maſter of his Affections, will never raſhly break out*: That, being aſiſted by a Purity in his Blood and Spirits, he has no Motions that are either ſluggiſh or violent (for 'tis obſerv'd, that the Fluency and Purification of the Spirits does not a little conduce both to their Gentleneſs and Moderation:) Much leſs (ſays he) will ſuch a prudent Man attempt either

either things diſhoneſt, or even the moſt honeſt ones, if the Means be diſhonourable. For nothing of this ſort can happen, but where Paſſion and Appetite carry all before them.

IV. EQUAL *Determination* is very cloſe of kin to Prudence; *and is as the ſentence given upon Pleadings of Right:* For who can better be qualified to determine about what is Right, and what is Good, than he who is not only above Paſſion, but ſuperior to every Impreſſion and to every Cuſtom (how inveterate ſoever) that were but capable to miſguide him. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 11.*

For what concerns *Rectitude of Conjecture*, 'tis plain, that, ſince *Ariſtotle* makes Moral Vertue nothing elſe but, *A fit Habit of pointing or aiming at that juſt Medium which, in acting and in ſuffering, is to be wiſh'd for*: Who but the prudent can rightly calculate that Point? For he is Lord of his Paſſions, and his Spirits are ſo purged and defecated from the Lee, as he not only gets Preſence of Mind thereby, but even a ſort of Divination. 'Tis the ſame Philoſopher notes, that *Right Conjecture* is ſuch an Eruption of the Wit, and flies ſo ſuddenly to the Mark, as there is neither Deliberation or Reaſon imploy'd therein. But where any groſs Paſſions happen to intervene, they make a perfect Gulph between the Mind and Truth: And therefore this Pitch of Sagacity is not attainable, but by the prudent Man. 'Tis likewiſe as true of thoſe who are imprudent, that for what concerns the Senſe of Diſcrimination they have it not. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 9.* *Eudem. L. 5. c. 9.*

V. The Philoſopher, ſpeaking about the Rectitude of Conjecture, ſtyles it *Senſe*; Inaſmuch as whatever *Judgement* we make, *'tis collected from particulars, and from Senſe:* As he aſſerts in the Caſe of Anger, Grief, and the reſt.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 9.

The ſame he alſo repeats in his *Great Morals* (which before was hinted) ſaying, *That, if you have not within your ſelf a Senſe and Feeling of theſe Matters, all your Labour after them is but in vain.* This the *Pythagoreans* alſo called *quick and perfect Senſation*; ſaying, *There was a ſort of Feeling in our practical Intellect, by which it came to paſs that we were neither deceived in the ſenſe of what we ſuffered, nor impos'd on by ill reaſoning in what we were to act.*

L. 1. c. 2. § 9.

Iamblici, protrept. c. 2.

Thus therefore, by ſubjecting of our Paſſions, and the purifying of our Bodies and Souls, there ſprings up to us, as it were, a new *Senſibility* in the Mind or Spirit, which is only the Portion of the *prudent Man.* For in the Power thereof he finds out, and aſcertains that *Golden Mean* which we have hitherto ſo recommended. That which in every Action is ſo valuable, and whereof the *indiſcreet* or the impure Man can never have any Feeling.

VI. Lastly, the *limiting and defining of Right Reaſon* is every where left, by *Ariſtotle,* to the *prudent Man's* Determination. For whenever the Queſtion is ſtarted by him, what this Right Reaſon ſhould be; he ever refers it thus, *Prout vir prudens definiverit*; *'Tis*

even

even what a prudent man ſhall think fit. And ſurely this is not ſaid in vain, if but applied to the Man we ſpeak of. For how can there be *Right Reaſon* at all, if not found within the reach of that Prudence which already we have defin'd? And therefore if neither the *Pythagoreans*, the *Platoniſts*, or *Ariſtotle* himſelf, have taken much care in the defining of *Right Reaſon*, 'tis becauſe they finally referr'd it to the Arbitrement of this our Rectified and Prudent Man. For they all preſum'd, that the Mind of Man, when effectually purg'd from the Stains of Prejudice and Paſſion, did as naturally diſcern of things which were juſt and true, as an unblemiſh'd Eye does rightfully diſtinguiſh of Colours. So that *Ariſtotle* was well adviſed in pronouncing *Right Reaſon to be that which was conformable to Prudence*; taking *Prudence* in that Latitude we have already ſet forth.

Ethic. Eudem. l. 5. c. 13.

VII. From all that is now ſaid, two things deſerve Obſervation. Firſt, how haughtily, and yet very impertinently, do ſome Men carry it, who while they are deſtitute of all Capacity to judge (as being unacquainted with this *Moral Prudence*) yet are they ſo far from ſubſcribing to what the wiſe and prudent Men, of all Ages, and of every Nation, have eſtabliſhed for true and juſt, that they impudently contend there is nothing in its own Nature is either the one or the other, nothing right and nothing wrong? But ſurely, this is not leſs abſurd, than if a blind Man ſhould deny all

distinction of Colours, when he ought rather to enquire before all other things, what were good for his Eyes.

VIII. NEXT we may note, that *Prudence* is not any particular Science of external things, but rather somewhat above all Science. 'Tis a Skill or Sagacity in the Soul, whereby she steers so clear from those Rocks, which corporeal Passions and Impressions throw commonly in the way, as never to fail of making a true substantial Judgement in all things. And this is the Gift and Excellency which is peculiar unto *Prudence*, and which attends her in all her ways. But as to the knowledge and sense of things, all this and what appertains thereto we derive it from other Fountains; as either from Experience, or Natural Philosophy, or from Skill in War, or in the Laws, and the like. And hereunto *Aristotle* somewhere refers, in saying, *That the prudent Man had not regard to this or that particular thing, but to those which, in a more general way, appertain'd to the Good of Life.* So that *Prudence* is a sort of general Perfection *of the rational part of the Soul*, even as *Sincerity* is of the *Appetitive:* which from the *Pythagorean* Fragments we had noted before.

Ethic. Eudem. l. 5. c. 5. Ad Nicom. l. 6. c. 5.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the other two Primitive Virtues, Sincerity and Patience.

I. SINCERITY *is a Virtue of the Soul, by which the Will is intirely and ſincerely carried on to that which the Mind judgeth to be abſolutely and ſimply the beſt.* When I ſay *intirely* and *ſincerely*, I mean *perfectly* and *adequately*. For what is done *perfectly* is (according to *Antoninus*) *done with the whole Soul, as well in acting juſtly, as in ſpeaking of truth.* And the Meaning of *Adequate* is that no By-conſideration, whether of Profit or of Fame, muſt ever incline us. For the Soul ought ſo to be temper'd and inflam'd to that which is ſimply the beſt, as neither for Hurt or Ignominy to be diverted from it. *For to be oppreſs'd in a good Cauſe, is better than baſe Exemption.* As *Tully* does aſſert. *Lib.* 12. § 29.

The Nature of this Virtue is explain'd in *Noema* the third, fourth, fifth, and ſo on to the thirteenth: But the true Beauty and Perfection thereof can hardly enter into the Imagination of any Man, who is not already affected and acquainted with it. And 'tis to a Soul thus rectified, that we may apply that of *Ariſtotle, That neither the Evening or the Morning Star is half ſo charming.* There can *L.* 1. *c.* 2. § 9.

be no exterior Light half ſo bright, or ſo deſirable, as this of the Soul, which is pure, and perfect, and even Divine.

II. To this State of *Simplicity* or *Sincerity* in the *Soul*, is referable that of *Antoninus*, where he thus expoſtulates with himſelf —— *O my beloved Soul, when wilt thou be naked, ſimple, and entirely one?* And again he gives himſelf the Rule, —— *Do not diſcompoſe thy Mind, or excite the Dregs; but purifie thy ſelf to the utmoſt that is poſſible.*

L. 10. § 1.

L. 4 § 26.

For this *Sincerity* is a Fountain that runs clear, and is perennial; it pours in Conſolation, and fills the Life with internal Joy. This is the ſtate of that Peace, which is ſo conſtant and ineffable, that no Cares, no Croſſes, or ſo much as Jealouſies, can diſtract it. For in that which is ſingle, and but one, there can be no Diverſity: 'tis all Union, profound Love, and perfect Reſt. Wherefore it was not without cauſe, that the *Pythagoreans* call'd thoſe bleſſed, who could by this happy *Analyſis, reſolve all things into one and the ſame Principle*; which they plainly meant to be the Unity of God: and did accordingly bind themſelves *both to follow and to obey him.*

Jamblicus Protrept. c. 4.

III. But to *follow God* conſtantly and ſincerely, is to follow that which is eminently the beſt; tho not that which is moſt grateful to our Appetites. For who, as a meer Creature, can ſincerely and conſtantly proſecute that which is beſt? This muſt be the Gift of God, and the Effect of a Divine Senſe or Spirit.

Spirit. That Perfection does not originally appertain to any created Being, but to God the Creator: He, who is the common Father of us all, and the Legiſlator of the whole World: He, whom *Zeno* in *Laertius* ſtyles, *Right Reaſon penetrating all things; even the ſame Reaſon which is in* Jove *himſelf, the Captain and chief Pilot in the Adminiſtration of the Univerſe.*

IV. HERETO refers that Exhortation of *Antoninus, That we ſhould not any longer perplex our ſelves barely about the circumambient Air; but rather join and combine with that intellectual Power, which comprehends the Univerſe.* Which ſaying amounts to this, *That we ought to be drawn into one and the ſame mind with God.* This is the Paſſion that can only make a Man Divine: *For ſuch the Man is, as his Affections and Inclinations make him.* 'Tis not here enough to have ſimple Intellection; no, it rather calls up and ſummons the *Boniform Faculty,* which is repleniſh'd with that Divine Senſe and Reliſh, which affords the higheſt Pleaſure, the chiefeſt Beauty, and the utmoſt Perfection to the Soul. 'Tis by this ſupreme Faculty that we pant after God, that we adhere unto him, and that (as far as our Nature does admit) we are even like unto him: he, who is Goodneſs it ſelf, perfect Purity, and the moſt exalted Simplicity; he is that pattern whom in theſe Attributes we are to imitate; and this is that ſtate of *Sincerity* we are to aſpire to, as far as Humanity will permit.

L. 8. 54.

Tuſculan. Queſt. l. 5.

mit. And as in doing hereof the higheſt Perfection of Man's Will is beſt expreſs'd; ſo in the ſtate of *Patience* is there exerciſed that great Faculty, which the *Pythagoreans* have ſtyled, *the Strength and Bulwark of the Soul.*

V. PATIENCE *is a Vertue of the Soul, whereby 'tis enabled, for the ſake of that which is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt, to undergo all things; even that which, to the animal Nature, is totally harſh and ungrateful.*

We do not by *Patience* underſtand a bare paſſive and ſtupid Indolence; but a vigorous and poſitive Firmity of the Mind: ſuch as was before noted from *Metopus* the *Pythagorean*; *And ſuch as ſhrinks not from rugged and dangerous occaſions*, but bears up boldly and invincibly againſt all; ſo as 'tis not in the power of any Mortification whatever to turn the Will from the purſuit of that which is beſt.

VI. OF *Patience* there are two Parts or Species, which are *Continence*, and *Long ſuffering*. We mean hereby, not thoſe *Demi-Virtues*, which are ſpoken of in the Schools of *Pythagoras* and *Ariſtotle*, but Virtues that are complete. *Continence therefore is that part or ſpecies of Patience, whereby the Soul does, on account of that which is ſimply the beſt, both eaſily and conſtantly endure whatever Grief or Moleſtation can ariſe by denying the ſenſual Appetite thoſe things, which would otherwiſe be grateful to it.*

Suffering is that ſpecies or part of Patience, whereby the Soul does in like manner, for the ſake of

of that which is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt, both eaſily and conſtantly endure whatever is harſh and vexatious unto our natural Life.

VII. The Demonſtration of theſe Virtues will be found in the *Noem'as*, fifth, ſixth, ſeventh, eigth, ninth, tenth and eleventh: But the uſe of them is of ſuch extent, as to reach to almoſt all Virtues. Wherefore *Ariſtotle* every where ſpeaks to the ſame effect, ſaying, *That all Moral Virtue has reference either to pleaſure or to pain; that 'tis for pleaſure we commit what is vile, and for fear of pain withdraw our ſelves from things that are honeſt.* So that *Epictetus* thought all Moral Philoſophy was ſumm'd up in this ſhort Precept, *Suſtine & abſtine*: As one part thereof referr'd to *Suffering*, the other to *Continence*. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. c. 2. Magn. Moral. l. 1. c. 6.*

VIII. Hence it appears that *Continence*, and *Suffering*, are not barely Virtues, but ſuch as are of a high account. For they both, in their Derivation, have reference to that *Force* and *Power* which is in the *Soul*, either to excite motion, or procure its reſt. And to this Faculty refers what *Antoninus* adviſeth, *That we cleanſe the Imagination, and ſtop all Motions of the Senſe.* Which takes in both the Duty of *Continence*, and of *Suffering*. *L. 7. § 29.*

IX. But altho we have here ſaid enough of the *Primitive Virtues*; yet we may further inculcate, that they are ſo much the true Parents or Patriarchs of all the reſt, that in them alone all the Force and Eſſence of every other Virtue ſeems to be comprehended. Nor can any Man,

Man, that is poſſeſſed of theſe, find difficulty in acquiring the reſt. This we chuſe to notifie leſt the Mind ſhould be diſtracted after many things, when theſe very few Objects are ſufficient not only for its Excerciſe, but to ſatisfie the moſt zealous ſearch and anxiety after Virtue, and for attaining that Felicity which alone can attend it.

X. We only add, that 'tis impoſſible, if a Man wants theſe, he ſhould have any Real Virtue, whatever he may ſhew of what is counterfeit or caſual. For Virtue muſt not be incumbred with Error, nor can it live but under the Regency of that *Prudence* we have already deſcribed. Yet if a Man ſhall by adventure, and without that Prudence, light upon the doing of ſome brave Action, 'tis not Virtue, but Fortune, that muſt be applauded for ſuch happy chance.

XI. Nor can *Sincerity*, or *Simplicity*, be wanting unto Virtue: For without theſe, 'tis not Virtue, but a ſhadow and pretended Image thereof. And therefore if it ſhall appear even in things well done, that they ſcarce had either been begun or perfected, without ſome extrinſecal and adventitious end; 'tis plain, thoſe events, how proſperous ſoever, loſe both the Name and Nature of *Virtues*. For this was not the proſecuting that was abſolutely and ſimply the beſt; but what which to the Man himſelf, and to his Appetite, was moſt inviting. This is not Virtue's Office, but the Contrivance or Heat of ſome animal Deſign.

Deſign. 'Tis what is true, ſimple, and ſincere, is unto human Nature, as well as to Right Reaſon, moſt agreeable. As *Tully* in his *Offices* hath explain'd. *Offic. l.* 1.

XII. But laſtly, as for *Patience*, a good Man can leſs be without it than any of the reſt: ſince there can be no ſecurity of the reſt without this. For how can the effeminate Man, the ambitious, or he that is a meer Slave to his Appetite, be faithful either to his Prince, his Country, Religion, Friend, or himſelf. No, he will abandon God above, he will betray all, if a Storm ariſe; and to exempt himſelf from the Difficulties that affright him, he will not ſcruple to expoſe and ſell Mankind.

Theſe are the Monſters and Reproach of their Race, Men that know not Friendſhip or Juſtice, or have a ny ſenſe of human Society. For the ſame *Tully* affirms, *That no man can be juſt, who fears Death, Pain, Baniſhment, or Want; or who prefers before Juſtice the things which are contrary to theſe Evils.* Of ſuch Power is *Patience* for the ſupport and vindication of Honeſty. *Offic. l.* 2.

XIII. The ſame excellent Philoſopher, as well as Orator, refers to the like Points, when again, in his *Offices*, he ſays,—*That to think meanly of thoſe things which others exalt, and even to ſpurn at them upon a ſteady and rational account, was the part of a great Mind. And, on the other ſide, bear patiently things that are calamitous, ſo as not to loſe the Decorum*

of

of Nature, or the Dignity of a wiſe Man, was the Mark of a generous Soul, and of an unſhaken Mind. The firſt part of this Sentence points towards *Continence*, and the latter to *Suffering*. But he adds at laſt——*That to ſee a Man bid defiance to all Fears, yet be melted down by his own Deſires; to ſee him invincible againſt all Labour, and yet to be overcome with his Luſts: this was a moſt deplorable ſtate.* In this alſo we have a more plain intimation of thoſe two Branches of *Patience*, namely, *Continence* and *Suffering*. And let this in ſhort be ſufficient for the three *Primitive Virtues*.

CHAP. IV.

Of Juſtice in general: which is the firſt of the three principal Virtues, which are term'd Derivative.

I. THE *principal Derivative* Virtues are alſo three, as *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, *aad Temperance*.

Juſtice is well defin'd by the Lawyers, to be, *Conſtans & perpetua Voluntas ſuum cuique tribuendi, A conſtant and perpetual Will to give every man his own.* And to this Senſe *Ariſtotle* alſo conforms. So that this Virtue looks chiefly abroad, and 'tis therefore properly call-ed by the ſame Philoſopher, *The Good of another*:

Ethic. Nicom. l. 5. *c.* 10.

ther: and eſpecially if you regard that Branch of it which comprehends our Duty towards our Neighbour. But there is a part hereof, which takes in what we owe to God; altho we are as unable to advantage him by our Offerings, as we are to diminiſh or damnifie his bleſſed State by our Demerits. The Principles of Juſtice are to be found in *Noema* the thirteenth, fourteenth, *&c.* on to the twenty third.

II. That which, in this *Definition*, is called *Suum*, or a *Man's own*; is alſo frequently termed by the Lawyers, *Jus* or *Right:* and they ſay every thing is truly ſo ſtyled, which by a ſort of Fit, and congruous Habitude (that is, by cuſtom, Sanction, or Conſtitution) appertains to any Man. Now this Habitude, or Title of Property, takes its Riſe from ſomewhat founded in the Perſon, to whom ſuch Right is owing or accrews; whether it be by ſome Quality, or Action, or even any Paſſion, as underſtood in the largeſt Senſe. For the Man, who falls into Poverty, but yet is Honeſt, has a ſort of Right or Title to receive Alms: and he, who has gotten any thing by Lawful Induſtry, has Right to keep it; and the ſame, if it come to him by Donation: And ſo of the reſt.

III. But altho all Right is founded in, and ariſeth from things themſelves (as they are the Object or Subject matter of perſonal Right) yet is not ſuch Right always clear or intelligible, without reference to ſome *Law*, which

*Lib.*5.*c.* 9. which muſt explain it. So *Andronicus Rhodius*, in his Commentary upon *Ariſtotle*, ſays,—— *In thoſe things the Right is placed, in which the Law is alſo placed: For Law and Judgement is that which ſeparates and diſcriminates Right from Wrong, and Juſt from Unjuſt.* However, as all Law is not of one and the ſame Nature, ſo neither all Right: For there is *Right Natural*, and *Right Legal*; and there is alſo *Law Natural*, and *Law Poſitive.* The firſt produceth thoſe Sanctions, which are *immovable* and *permanent*; as from the latter come ſuch as are *temporary* or *mutable.* Theſe laſt do not obtain in every place; ſince they were made and fitted to thoſe places only that ſtood in need of them.

IV. As to this *Law of Nature*, *Cicero* does in very apt, tho lofty, Terms, ſet it off in his Firſt Book *de Legibus* —— *Let us* (ſays he) *for determining and conſtituting of Right, take our beginning from the ſupreme Law which did in all Ages ſubſiſt both before any Law, was written, or any City or Society of Men were in being.* But afterwards when he preſcribes, that whatever partakes of Divine Nature (as he plainly owns our Souls to do) ſhould be governed and directed by the Nature of God, by his Reaſon, Mind, Power, and Influence; in this he diſcovers, and reveals unto us, the Fountain and Original from whence proceeds the beſt and the moſt perfect Law of all.

For what (ſays he) *either among Men below, or in Heaven above, or in Earth, can be diviner than*

than Reaſon? This is the Faculty, which, being matur'd and brought to its Perfection, is by a more exalted Name call'd true Sapience. *Wherefore* (ſays he) *ſince nothing is preferable to this Reaſon, which is conſpicuous in man, as well as in God; we may conclude, it was Reaſon that made the firſt Bond of Society between God and Man. And this Bond being a Law, we may preſume that Men are conſociated to the Gods by Law.* By which he plainly intimates, that this ſupreme Law, which was equally referable to Gods and Men, was *Right Reaſon*: and from thence inculcates a ſimilitude of Man with God. *Lib.* 2. *c.* 1. § 9.

V. AGAIN in his ſecond Book, where he deſcribes this *natural Law*, he calls it, Reaſon which reſulteth from the nature of things; and which did not (as he ſays) then begin to be a Law, when firſt it was written, but when it firſt had being; and that ſuch Being it had from Eternity in the Divine Will. So that Law, which is eminent and truly ſuch, fit to command, and fit to reſtrain, is the *Right Reaſon* of *Jupiter* himſelf. (This Sentence correſponds with what was cited before from *Zeno*, and *Antoninus*.) *Lib.* 2. *c.* 4. § 3. *Cap.* 3. § 3. *Cap.* 1. § 7, 8, 9.

VI. THE truth is, all Men do agree, that the ſupreme Law is *Right Reaſon*: and this Reaſon, being alſo a Divine Thing, is therefore immutable, always conſtant and like unto itſelf. But as it is placed in ſo mutable a Subject, as is human Nature, we ſee ſometimes how this Reaſon is not ſo much altered, as even deſtroy'd and extinguiſh'd: But in

God, and among the number of Bleſſed Spirits (which are, by *Antoninus*, called immortal Gods) the ſame Reaſon flouriſhes everlaſtingly. This ſeems alſo to be the very mind of *Andronicus*, that beſt Interpreter of *Ariſtotle*. *For altho* (ſays he) *among Men all Laws were mutable, yet 'tis of neceſſity, that with the Gods they ſhould be immutable, and that Right ſhould therefore be ſome natural Thing. Nay even among Men who are of ſound mind, and under any conſtitution, there is that immutable Law which is called Natural. For it does not much import, that Men of depraved minds do not comprehend what is juſt: ſince Honey is ſtill ſweet, tho to the ſick, who have loſt their reliſh, it may appear otherwiſe.*

L. 5. c. 10.

There is therefore a Law, which is eternal and immutable, and in ſome ſort common both to God and Men; namely *Right Reaſon*: which altho it enters not into the minds of Men wholly vitiated and profligate, yet ſtill is preſent, and always manifeſt to the ſound and prudent; which we have ſufficiently expos'd before.

Cap. 2. § 1, 6, 7.

VII. Now 'tis from this immutable and ſupreme Law, that all other Laws and Ordinances are drawn; even thoſe which are term'd mutable, and which would have no validity in them, unleſs by virtue of that high and external Law. And of this kind, the keeping of Faith in Contracts is a principal part.

So *Virgil.*

Virgil. Æneid. l. 8. —— *At tu dictis*, Albane, *maneres.*

Wherefore

Wherefore, inaſmuch as every man is bound to ſtand to his Promiſe or Compact; he is tied to thoſe Ordinances, which are not ſuch by Nature, but by Law. Nay, Law itſelf is but a Compact, and, as ſuch, muſt bind, where nothing is enacted by it againſt the ſupreme and immutable Law: But againſt this there is no Compact or Authority big enough to make any thing binding. For what is unjuſt in its own Nature, cannot by any external Conſideration be made juſt. On which occaſion *Cicero* ſays remarkably thus —— *If Laws were only to be conſtituted by the Command of the People, by the Decrees of the Prince, or by the Sentence of the Judges; it might be lawful to Rob, to commit Adulteries, and to forge Wills, by procuring the Vote and Suffrage of the Multitude thereunto. And if ſuch, and ſo great a Power, could reſide in the Voices of unruly Men, ſo as to alter the very Nature of things; 'tis ſtrange to me how they forbear enacting, that the moſt pernicious things be not preſently made both laudable and juſt.* This is the Raillery wherewith that great Man treated ſo weak and ſo fantaſtick a Paradox. *De Legibus, lib. 1.*

VIII. Thus it appears; That, as from the Supreme Law, which is termed *Right Reaſon*, all perfect Knowledge of *Right* takes its original: ſo from the Obſervation of *Right* proceeds all Exerciſe of Juſtice.

CHAP. V.

Of Piety.

I. JUSTICE comprehends the two parts of *Piety* and *Probity*. For Piety itſelf is a ſort of *Juſtice*, by which we render to God the thing which is God's; that is to ſay, the thing which of Right appertaineth to him. And this Right of God's is very commonly term'd *Worſhip*: Which principally conſiſts in this, that we preſs vehemently to know him truly, as the infallible Means to love and honour him entirely. For as we are ſprung from him, and wholly depend upon his Will, ſo ought we to conſecrate all the Faculties of Soul and Body to his good Pleaſure, and to have our affiance in his Providence. And as to his holy Commands, whether thoſe that are written in Books, or inſcribed inwardly in our Hearts; we muſt ſo fervently hearken and adhere thereto, as rather to bear all Infamy, Poverty, Oppreſſion, and even Death itſelf, than quit our Integrity, or violate a good Conſcience. Theſe are God's Rights; and he that dares to derogate from them, or to infringe them, does as much as in him lies defraud and injure God himſelf.

II. 'TIS very obvious, that in theſe ſorts of things, the true Worſhip of God does conſiſt, ſeeing

ſeeing all Men do by *Worſhip*, underſtand the Honour which is paid to God. Now 'tis plain, that thoſe, of all others, do pay moſt Honour to God, who (knowing the excellency of the Divine Nature, and alſo what Affinity the Mind of Man holds therewith) do moſt ardently contend to have that part of the Soul which is ſo ally'd, preſerve its ſimilitude to the great Original; and ſo renounce all things, even life itſelf, rather than to damnifie that holy Reſemblance.

III. THERE can be no Proof ſo convincing as this, of the Love, Honour, and Eſteem we pay to God. For while we reverence that poor Extract we bear of him; to the degree of ſpurning, not only the Pleaſures of Life, but even Life itſelf, in compariſon of thoſe Conſolations, which in true Virtue and Right Reaſon can only be found: We do therein openly avow, that as God is infinitely more excellent than his poor Image; ſo is he by infinite Degrees both honour'd and valu'd by us above our ſelves. And to do otherwiſe, or to be negligent and languiſhing in his holy Worſhip, were either to be ignorant of a God, or elſe not to know that Reverence, which the Divine Nature both deſerves and demands from us.

IV. NOW that Virtue is a thing Divine, and God's true Image, is herein manifeſt, that 'tis defin'd to be not what is moſt grateful to the Animal Life, but that which is abſolutely and ſimply the beſt. It was in this high ſenſe

the ancient Philoſophers underſtood it: where *Plato* (teaching that Miſeries would then have an end, when we fled from this mortal ſtate unto the Gods) he ſays, —— *That ſuch Flight was our Tranſlation into the ſimilitude of God, and that ſuch ſimilitude (ſo far as it was poſſible) did conſiſt in our being holy, juſt, and prudent.*

V. He adds in another place, that the Divine Nature was the Law and Boundary to all temperate Men. *For* (ſays he) *to the honeſt, and to the prudent, God is the Law; but to the unadviſed, there was no Law, but their Appetites.* And again he adds, —— *That God was the true Meaſure of all things, and not Man a Meaſure to himſelf.* And again, —— *That whoever was wiſe and honeſt was God's Friend, as being like unto him.* By all which *Plato* inculcates, how divine a thing Virtue was, and how much ally'd, and reſembling unto God himſelf.

Tuſcul. Quæſt. 6. lib. 5.

VI. Hence it is that *Cicero* in his *Tuſculan Queſtions*, has ſuch magnificent Words touching human Souls; —— *As if*, ſays he, *the mind of man were extracted from the mind divine; and to be compar'd with no other but God himſelf, if it were not arrogance ſo to ſpeak.* And then explaining, in his firſt Book *de Legibus*, that ſaying from the *Delphick* Oracle of *Noſce teipſum*; he adds —— *That whoever knows himſelf, muſt preſently feel within him ſomething which is divine; That he muſt conclude the Underſtanding given him, ought to be but as ſome Image dedicated to God; and that he ſtands*

De Legib.

bound

bound both to ſay and act ſuch things as are worthy of ſo Heavenly a Gift.

VII. CONSONANT hereto are the frequent Sayings of *Marcus Antoninus*, —— *That we muſt confeſs we have ſomewhat within us more excellent and divine than what ſubmits to the Controlment of our Paſſions, or than can be agitated by them as it were a meer Puppet.* He adds a little after, —— *That every Man's Mind is a God, and had its Original from him.* And again,—— *Why ſeek we farther than the immediate buſineſs of a Creature intellectual? One that loves Society, and partakes in thoſe Laws which are common to God?* It were endleſs to name all he ſays: yet, where he teaches in brief what it was to be converſant with the Gods, he ſays thus, *That every Man lives with the Gods, who does what is dictated by that God, which* Jupiter *has given him for his Captain and Director.* Meaning thereby, *That every Man's own Reaſon, and his Intellect, was that Director or inferior God.* Nay, ſo ally'd he thinks the Soul unto God, as to call it a diſmembred *Parcel* of him: altho herein he ſpoke but little as a Philoſpher.

Lib. 12. § 19.

Sect. 2.

Sect. 12.

VIII. SINCE therefore there is ſo much of Divinity interwoven in a virtuous Mind; 'tis plain, that if we cultivate Virtue, as it has reference to God, and as 'tis his moſt viſible Image, we manifeſtly worſhip the great God himſelf. And whereas other Rituals have been ſubject to Mutation, and ſhall not be laſting; this one Right of Adoration, which is God's Right, muſt be immutable and everlaſting.

Wherefore the Sum of all natural *Religion* ſeems to conſiſt in that Precept of *Antoninus*, *Lib.* 10. *To remember God, and to know that he abhors all* *Lib.* 6. § 7. *Hypocriſie, and will not be ſerv'd but with what is rational and like to himſelf.* Or, as he elſewhere ſpeaks, *That a Man ſhould not rejoice, or acquieſce in any thing, but in paſſing from one good action to another; ſuch as had reference to God's Glory, and to the publick Good.* For God's moſt *immoveable* and *immutable Right* is this, that we love him for his wonderful Perfections, and then imitate him as much as we can.

IX. THIS however is not ſaid to the excluſion of other Rights; which have either been reveal'd by holy Oracles, or injoin'd by the Decree of the ſupreme Magiſtrate. For there may be various Ceremonies, and other Circumſtances of Divine Worſhip, which, in Virtue of a Law, may be eſtabliſh'd as of Divine Right, and ſuch as may not be violated, till by Legal Authority they are revok'd. But ſtill theſe muſt have no Repugnancy in them, either to the Oracles of God, or to the ſupreme Laws of Virtue.

X. NOW from all that has been ſaid, 'tis eaſie to comprehend what *Piety* is; For according to *Plato's* Definition, *Holineſs is a part of Juſtice*; and ſo *Andronicus Rhodius* (almoſt to the ſame ſenſe) defines it to be, *A Sience that makes us faithful and obedient unto the Laws Divine.* Whence 'tis manifeſt what Impiety muſt be: and how fitly it may be divided into theſe ſeveral kinds, namely, *Superſtition*, *Profaneneſs*, *Enthuſiaſm*, and *Rituality*. XI.

XI. Now *Superſtition* is a ſort or mode of Impiety, in faſtening upon God (by way of Worſhip) thoſe things which are contumelious to him: which is plainly to be injurious to the Deity. Wherefore, *Superſtition is that Impiety, by which a man conſiders God to be ſo light, or ſo paſſionate, as with trivial things either to be appeas'd, or elſe mov'd to wrath.*

Prophaneneſs alſo is that Impiety, by which a Man does with Impudence and Imprudence violate all Divine Rights, whether temporary, or immutable. And this Diſeaſe does ſometimes ripen into downright *Atheiſm*; than which no ſtate of the Soul can be more ſad and deplorable.

XII. Enthusiasm is that Impiety, by which a Man does boldly violate, and kick under foot, all external Rights; while yet he drives on, whith Heat and Ardor of Mind, to ſome internal and ſpiritual Worſhip of God.

But *Rituality* is that Impiety, by which a Man, while he is obſerving thoſe exterior Rights of God, and adheres with a ſort of Conſcience to things ceremonial; does in the mean time freeze, as to any ſpiritual Feeling, or internal Worſhip of God.

XIII. These in a manner are thoſe Offences in Religion, which are moſt obvious: but if others increaſe the number, I ſhall not gainſay it. I confeſs it was our intention to treat rather of the Virtues than of the Vices: But, as *Ariſtole* ſays, the one may be known by compariſon with the other. *And the Rule or Law is Judge unto both.* How- *De Anima, l. 1. c. 5.*

However the Demonſtration of the preſent Virtue of Piety is particularly explain'd in *Noema* the thirteenth, ſixteenth, and twenty firſt: As alſo in the fifth, eighth, tenth, *&c.* For as to the Being of a God, and that our Souls are immortal; we have ſufficiently prov'd theſe in our Writings *againſt Atheiſm, and of the Souls immortality*: unto which we therefore refer.

CHAP. VI.

Of Probity: Or of Juſtice, properly ſo call'd.

I. THE other part of *Juſtice* is *Probity*, by which we give to every Man what is his own. And this may be divided into three parts: *Political, Oeconomical,* and *Moral.*

The firſt contains the Offices of the Magiſtrate towards the People, and of the People to the Magiſtrate.

The ſecond refers to the Duties of a Father towards Children, Wife, and Family; and of each of theſe towards their Maſter, Father, and Husband.

The third refers to the Duties of private Men, or at leaſt of equals, each to other. Of all which to ſpeak in particular would be too tedious.

II. But this in ſhort may be ſaid, that 'tis not the part of a Magiſtrate to act againſt Reaſon, or to be ſway'd by his own paſſion, but in

in all things to adhere to what is preſcribed by Law and by Right Reaſon. For as *Ariſtotle* calls the Magiſtrate, *The very Soul and Spirit of the Law*; ſo *Tully* on the other hand holds, *That a Magiſtrate ſhould not only be directed, but even animated by the Laws. This* (ſays he) *is the Power and Duty of a Magiſtrate who preſides, that he direct things profitable and juſt, and ſuch as hold conformity with the Laws. For as the Magiſtrate is above the People, ſo are the Laws above the Magiſtrate.* Now the Peoples Duty is, to obey the Magiſtrate, to contribute chearfully and liberally to the publick Charge; not to contend about things indifferent, ſuch as have by Cuſtom paſs'd into Right, but to preſerve Peace, Society and good Order.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 5.

De Legibus, lib. 3.

III. The Father of a Family ſhould be careful, to look about; to provide all things neceſſary; to treat with Gentleneſs his Wife, Children, and Servants: Above all, to avoid either giving pernicious example, or permitting it in others, but rather early to ſuppreſs, or expel it from the Houſe. On the other hand, 'tis the Duty of each of theſe reſpectively, to give the other all fit Obſervance; and, tho he ſhould at times be out of humor, or a little in the wrong, yet were it not wiſe or proper haſtily to contend or diſpute with him. For as *Pittacus* adviſed, *'Tis not ſeemly to be wrangling with your Parents, altho what you ſpeak be the right.* And indeed this Rule may well take place in reſpect of Magiſtrates, and even all that are ſuperior to us, either in Age

Age or in Relation: Age, even to our Uncles in particular, whom the Ancients called Parents.

IV. Lastly, the Duty of private Men towards their Equals, and indeed towards all, is, ever to be aiding either in Help or Counsel, when it is in your power to do it. Much more are we tied to observe all our Compacts and Promises; but never to seek our own Benefit by another Man's Hurt.

V. Now as to that celebrated Division of Justice into *Distributive* and *Corrective*, it has chiefly reference to the Politicks. And in that Division it is where *Aristotle's* Observation takes place, namely, that *Justice* was a sort of *Equality*. But the *Equality* whereto Justice inclines, and which it seems to affect, is of that sort which shews itself in the ways of *Proportion*. For Proportion is a *Rationum Æqualitas*, which *Ratio* (in the Language of Geometry) is that Relative Correspondence which one Quantity or Number has to another; or by which it appears, how often one Quantity or Number does comprehend, or is comprehended in another.

VI. But as to Proportion or Analogy, this is either *Geometrical* or *Arithmetical*.

The *Geometrical Proportion* is when four Magnitudes, or four Numbers are so compar'd, namely, 2, 6; 4, 12; or 6, 2; 12, 4: As that the third (namely 12) in this latter Example, doth as often contain the Fourth (which is 4,) as the first (namely 6) does contain

contain the ſecond (which is 2;) And that the third in the firſt Example (namely 4) is as often contain'd in the fourth (which is 12) as is the firſt (namely 2) in the ſecond (which is 6.)

This is the Proportion that refers to *Diſtributive Juſtice.* For as one perſon is to another, ſuppoſe *Ajax* to *Achilles*, ſo alſo, in judicial Determinations, ought there to be had a due conſideration of Honor to Honor. This is that which is call'd the Equality of *Proportion.* For if the Merits of ſeveral Men ſhall happen to have the ſame Circumſtances and Reaſons of Equality; 'tis fit that not only in *Reaſon*, but even in *Magnitude*, their Rewards ſhould be alſo equal.

VII. As for *Arithmetical Proportion* 'tis when four Numbers, or Magnitudes, are ſo compar'd, as in 5, 7 : 9, 11. That the ſame Exceſs or Defect attends the two firſt each to other, as is in one of the latter to the other. Namely, that in each of them there be the ſame Equality, both of Exceſs, and of Defect, as in the Numbers above. And this has reference to *Corrective Juſtice.*

But here we muſt ingenuouſly confeſs, that it ſeems hard to find in the Meaſures of *Corrective Juſtice* any ſufficient or competent Image of ſuch *Arithmetical Proportion* as in this Diſtinction of the ſaid four Terms is expreſs'd. For whatever *Andronicus* thought to the contrary, 'tis plain, that the Exceſſes and Defects which ariſe from the Terms before

before enumerated, are not equal. 'Tis true, that two and two, as to the *Ratio* are equal. But to take two from ſeven, and but two from eleven, is as to *Proportion* unequal. So alſo to add two to ſeven, and but two to five is not equal. Wherefore if we
Lib. 5. c. 5. ſhould humour *Andronicus* in his own way, and venture to ſuppoſe or invent a Caſe of four Terms, it would ſeem fit to make the two firſt of them to be (as for example) the Party who bears the Injury, and them the Party who gave it, which however is ſo to be underſtood, that as yet no Appeal is made to any Judge, or Sentence given againſt the Wrong-doer. But when afterwards the offended Party takes on him the Name of Plaintiff, and the offending Party that of Defendant, here two other new Terms are ſtarted up, and then it follows, after Sentence given by the Judge; that the Exceſs or Difference, which before appear'd between him that did the wrong, and him that bore it, is quite inverted. For what the Doer or Defendant injuriouſly took, is now by Sentence commanded back; and by how much he firſt overcame the Sufferer or Plantiff by what he took away; by ſo much is he now pulled back, and damnified by what he is forced to refund. And this is true *Arithmetical Proportion.*

L. 5. c. 5. VIII. The ſame *Andronicus* ſeems to level at the like thing in what he thus adds, *That as is the Wrong doer to the Sufferer, ſo is the Judge to the Wrong doer: For what this Man did againſt the*

the other, the Judge does the ſame againſt him; and ſo makes them equal. And this ought to refer as well to the Defect, as to the Excels, of what is equal; for Injuries, whether great or ſmall, ought to have proportionable Reparation. But he that is curious after ſuch Niceties as theſe, may, if he think fit, conſult that Author, who dwells (as we conceive) too long on this Piece of Subtilty. For 'tis plainly our Opinion, that a Man may very well adminiſter *Corrective Juſtice*, tho he never heard, in his life, the Meaning of *Arithmetical Proportion.*

IX. It would make more to our purpoſe, if as well that Diſtinction, as that Relation, between *Juſtice* and *Equity*, were obſerv'd, which *Andronicus* notes in theſe words; *That* (ſays he) *which we call equal, is juſt: and in ſome Caſes more excellent than what is only juſt. Not that Equity excels Juſtice; or that it is of another kind, and ſo more excellent in its nature; but only by being of a great extent. For* (as he adds) *Equity is that which ſupplies the Defects of the Law; And, ſince all Events could not be particularly foreſeen, Equity not only corrects Errors, but ſuperadds Reſtrictions and Limitations, which were omitted at the making of the Law.* L. 5. c. 16.

X. Now it ſeems worth our while to reflect on this Definition of *Equity*, as it plainly teſtifies there is ſomething, which in its own Nature is juſt. For if nothing were juſt, but in virtue of ſome written Law; what need then would there be of Emendation; ſeeing

ſeeing the Law (whatever it were) made every thing juſt? But 'tis the part and Province of *Equity*, to over-rule and correct the very Law (even as the Intellect does the Will;) and, as *Ariſtotle* ſays, *To eſtabliſh ſuch things in ſuch Caſes, as the Legiſlator himſelf had not failed to have provided for, had he but foreſeen the event.* But this Saying of his had been very ridiculous, if the Nature of *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*, had not been grounded on the Nature of things, and the various Circumſtances that attend them; but depended meerly on the Will and Pleaſure of a Legiſlator.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 5. c. 14.

L. 2. c. 4. §3.

And thus much of *Juſtice.*

CHAP. VII.

Of the other two principal Derivative Virtues, Fortitude and Temperance.

I. FORTITUDE and *Temperance* herein agree, that they relate more immediately to our ſelves: yet the Benefit of theſe, as of every other Virtue, redounds ſome way unto our Neighbour; and hence we ſtyle it *Univerſal Juſtice.* So *Rhodius* the Paraphraſt has it: *This is Juſtice, when we turn every Virtue to the Uſe and Advantage of another.* So to abſtain from another Man's Wife is *Juſtice* as well as *Temperance*; and to repel the Enemies of our Country, is *Juſtice* and *Fortitude* both; for as this is a Debt we owe our Country

L. 5. c. 1.

try, ſo without Fortitude we could not diſcharge it.

II. But what *Fortitude* is, both *Tully* and *Ariſtotle* inform us, in their Deſcriptions of a *couragious Man.* The firſt tells us; *That the Man of a ſteady and couragious mind, is not to be ſhaken at croſs events; he muſt not fall from his Character, and ſhew Confuſion; he muſt have preſence of mind to direct what ſtands with Reaſon: and 'tis the mark of a high Capacity to foreſee all that may fall out, and to provide accordingly for it. Herein conſiſts the chief Renown, to overcome by Prudence and good Advice: for to ruſh headlong into a Battle, or to fall to handy-blows with an Enemy, this alone is a poor and brutal thing. 'Tis true, when the time is come, and that neceſſity requires it, then we muſt ſtrike heartily, and prefer death before any thing that is ſervile or baſe. But as we muſt not paſs for Cowards by an induſtrious ſhunning of Dangers; ſo 'tis not neceſſary, and it were even ridiculous, to expoſe our ſelves, when there is no Cauſe that requires it.* *De Officiis, l. 1.*

III. Yet *Andronicus*, in Conformity with his *Ariſtotle*, makes it one part of a *valiant Man*, that he dares intrepidly advance towards any danger: *So that his ſtout Man is he that fears nothing.* And *Tully* elſewhere ſays, *That the two great Gifts of Fortitude, are the Contempt of Pain and Death.* But *Andronicus* is more accurate in Circumſtances: adding, that the Dangers attending his Hero ſhould be, *Such as allow'd him to exert the Power of an* *L. 3. c. 7.* *L. 3. c. 8.*

inflexible Mind, and the Dint of his Will; or else to have before him the Contemplation of a noble Death: For that he was properly valiant, who could frankly submit to any excellent way of dying.

He has it also elsewhere, *That whoever is valiant, moves steadily towards a glorious Death.* But this sort of Death can only be purchased in the Cause and Quarrel of Virtue. *For not those, who passionately rage and lay about them, are the Men we speak of: they are Frighters indeed, but not valiant. Whence we may conclude, that Fortitude is a Virtue, by which a Man may, with Constancy of Mind, bear up against all the Dangers of Life, and even Death it self. And this either for the Cause of Honesty, or the sake of that which is simply and absolutely the best.*

IV. I mention here *Constancy of Mind*, and not *Indolence* or *Insensibility*. For as *Andronicus*, according to the Mind of *Aristotle*, has it,

L. 3. c. 9. *To be gnaw'd with sorrow upon cross events, is not at all inconsistent with being couragious. For by how much a Man is oppress'd with Grief, and yet bears up for Virtues sake, by so much the more deserves he the Reputation of being valiant.* But here I also mention a *virtuous Cause*: For a Mind that is dispos'd to Dangers, not for common Utility, but for private Ends, this must rather pass for *Boldness* than for *Fortitude*.

De Offic. l. 1. V. CICERO saith, *A Mind that is great and valiant has these two Marks. The first is a light esteem of outward things; for it will plainly appear, that a Man ought neither to admire, or wish for, any thing, but what is just and suitable.*

Nor

Nor ought he ever to ſubmit ſervilely to any Man, or be ſubjected to the Perturbations of Mind or Fortune. The other is, when a Mind is ſo fram'd and conſtituted, as to undergo great things; I mean, publick Services, full of Difficulty, Labour, and Danger: and particularly with reference to life, and all the Conveniences of living. This excellent Sentence of *Cicero*, may ſerve as a Paraphraſe on the Definition we have mention'd before.

VI. But as for the Cauſe of Honeſty or Virtue, the greateſt Dangers are to be undertaken; ſo on the ſame account are corporeal Pleaſures to be renounced. Elſe it were not ſo much *Temperance*, as a certain Moroſeneſs or Stupidity of the Mind. For there can be no Virtue, where the end is other than what is honeſt and ſimply good. Wherefore *Temperance* may be defin'd to be, *A Virtue, by which a Man forbids himſelf corporeal Pleaſures; to the end he may enjoy that Pleaſure, which reſults from a Conſcience of well-doing, both more conſtantly and more entirely.* For to obſerve great Rules of *Temperance* meerly for Health's ſake, may alſo be the Virtue of a Beaſt: This does not mount up to that point, which makes us Men, but is a thing in common with very inferior Creatures.

VII. By *bodily Pleaſures*, I here underſtand not thoſe thin and purer ones, which come by *Seeing*, *Hearing*, or *Smelling*; but (as *Ariſtotle* notes) thoſe groſſer ones of the *Taſte*, and the *Touch*: which relate to *Senſuality*, *Ethic. Nicom. l. 3. c. 13.*

lity, and to the Companions and Inflamers of it, namely, to Wine, and high Feeding. *Temperance* is, almoſt by all Writers, confin'd to the Boundaries we here ſet down: Whence 'tis plain, that 'tis but a Branch or Parcel of that Primitive Virtue, which we have call'd *Continence*, even as *Fortitude* is a Branch of *Patience*.

The Reaſons of *Temperance* and *Fortitude*, may be had from *Noema* the fifth, ſixth, ſeventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth. As of *Probity*, from the fourteenth, fifteenth, ſixteenth, ſeventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, two and twentieth, and three and twentieth. Which, unto all who think fit to examine them, will ſoon appear.

Chap VIII.

Of the Reductive Virtues.

I. WE have explain'd the nature of the principal *Derivative Virtues*; and the Reaſons of them are, from their *Noema*'s, briefly expos'd.

To theſe three Virtues, all that remain may not unfitly be reduced, ſo as we venture to call them all Reductive Virtues: And the reaſon of each will be found in thoſe *Noema*'s, unto which their Principles are referr'd.

II. Now ſuch of this kind as are reducible unto *Juſtice*, are as follow, *Liberality*, *Magnificence*,

cence, Veracity, Gratitude, Candor, Urbanity, Fidelity, Modeſty, Humanity (or a Love to Mankind) and *Hoſpitality*. Laſtly, *Friendſhip* it ſelf, and ſuch others as comprize Good-Will towards our Neighbours; namely, *Affability, Courteſie*, or *Officiouſneſs*, which are alſo Branches of *Humanity*. For ſince the Effects of all theſe Virtues have reference to our Neighbour; and that all are dictated from right Reaſon, which has the power of a Law: Tis but fit to rank them as Parts and Parcels of *Juſtice*.

Unto *Fortitude* we refer *Magnanimity* and its Dependents; as *Generoſity, Lenity, Conſtancy*, and alſo *Diligence*, *Andronicus* adds unto them *Vivacity, Preſence of Mind, Vigor*, and *Manhood*.

Laſtly, unto *Temperance* we refer *Frugality, Humility, Modeſty, Auſterity*, and thoſe other Adherents which *Andronicus* adds, namely, *A ſlender and uncompounded Diet, Unblamableneſs in Behaviour*, and *a contented Mind*.

Theſe are the Names of the moſt remarkable of the Reductive Virtues; for we ravel not into every ſmall thing, nor involve our ſelves in their ſtrict and minute Definitions; ſince the Nature of ſuch Dependents, may enough be known from thoſe *Principal* or *Primitive Virtues*, unto which they refer.

III. However, it will not be amiſs to touch a little on each of thoſe above, and eſpecially on ſuch of them as have reference unto *Juſtice*, becauſe they are Branches of that *Juſtice*,

ſtice, which *Rhodius* calls and defines to be *Voluntary Juſtice*. For the Probity of every Man is more conſpicuous, where no Penalty compels him, than where he is liable to Law, or elſe to Defamation, for what he does.

IV. LIBERALITY has reference to the Uſe of Mony: *And there is no other Uſe thereof, than ſpending and beſtowing it.* So that he who, according to his Fortune, does chearfully and willingly ſpend upon fit Perſons, and in things convenient, and in proper place; he may juſtly be ſtiled *Liberal*; he that keeps no Meaſures, is a *Prodigal*; and he that falls ſhort in theſe, is a *Niggard*.

Andronicus, l.4.c.1.

V. MAGNIFICENCE has alſo reference to Expence; but then it muſt be in things ſingular and great, as the Name it ſelf denotes. And here, in like manner, three Conſiderations muſt enter, of the *Perſon*, of the *Work*, and of its *End* or *Uſe*. For it behoves not every Man to make large Expence; nor is he that does it properly *Magnificent*, unleſs what he ſplendidly lays out, is alſo dedicated to ſome very great End. Wherefore *Ariſtotle* notes, That things of this Rate and denomination, are commonly for *Divine Uſe*, or for the *Publick*.

Ethic. Nicom. l.4. c.5.

VI. GRATITUDE is an excellent and chearful part of *Juſtice*; by which he that receives a Benefit, does impatiently, and as ſoon as poſſibly he can, repay it with Advantage.

VII. VERACITY is a Virtue which leads a Man to ſhew, both in word and deed, what really

really he is, without Simulation or Diſſimulation in any thing. However, the latter of theſe two Faults is more excuſable, if moderately performed, and only done to avoid a ſhew of Vanity or Pride. But, if it exceed Bounds, it ſavours of Arrogance; juſt as *Ariſtotle* obſerved in the *Laconic* Garment, ſaying, *He that is too affected in his own diminution, as well as he who is Pragmatical in his own Praiſes, is guilty of Oſtentation.* But tho that of *Ariſtotle's* be an elegant Care, in his oppoſing two Vices to every Virtue; yet to me it would ſeem more profitable, if we oppoſed unto Truth that ſingle Vice, by which one Man takes on him the Guiſe of another to conceal his own; and which we do moſt ſignificantly term *Hypocriſie.* This is an Evil in the World, which is the Mother of much Miſchief; and many are involved in great Diſappointments and Tribulations by it, as well as the *Hypocrite* himſelf.

Nicom. Ethic. l. 4. *c.* 13.

L. 2. *c.* 9. § 1.

VIII. CANDOR is that which guides us to interpret with Benignity the Words and Actions of all Men: But when they are ſuch as cannot well be born; then, with an honeſt and decent Liberty, to check and reprehend them. The Oppoſites to this Virtue are called *Moroſeneſs* on the one hand, as of *Careſſing* on the other: But when it tends to our Lucre or Advantage, then 'tis called *Cajoling* or *Adulation.*

IX. URBANITY is when either we pleaſantly and inoffenſively play upon others, or

bear the like from them: And thoſe, who will agree to neither of theſe ways, are by *Ariſtotle* call'd *Clowns* and *Ruſticks*. But for ſuch as ſpare none, and keep neither Bounds nor Decorum in their Jeſting, they are termed *Scurrilous*.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 4. c. 14.

X. FIDELITY is ſeen, when we ſtand to our Promiſes, and in reſtoring back what has been depoſited with us, where no written Law can compel it.

XI. MODESTY is a conſtant and perpetual Obſervance of what belongs to *Decorum*: Wherefore it ſeems as the very Flower of *Juſtice*, or rather ſomewhat more delicate, or paramount unto it. For *Juſtice* commands us to do Violence to no Man; but *Modeſty* ſays, do not ſo much as diſpleaſe a Man. And in this (ſays *Cicero*) is the Power of *Decorum* chiefly ſeen. For he defines it to be, *A thing which conforms to that Superiority in Man, by which his Nature has diſtinguiſh'd him from other Creatures*. And ſurely this is enough to admoniſh us againſt yielding to any thing that is brutal, or againſt the Dignity of our Compoſition.

De Offic. l. 1.

But we are further to know, that, beſide general *Decorum*, there are alſo ſome ſpecial Acts therein, which are ſuited to every Rank, Age, and Condition of Life: As to the Prince and to the Prieſt; the Philoſopher and the Plebeian; Men and Women; the Aged and the Young, and the like. But let this be the Rule for all, That we pay to every one what by cuſtom they may expect; and that

that which, by the common Opinion of all Men, is eſtabliſh'd and approv'd. Thus we ſhall give Diſapointment to none, nor deſpiſe the Judgement of the Publick. But for any ſingle Man to ſet up in defiance of all his Companions, and to deſpiſe whatever the Neighbourhood ſhall ſay of him; this looks not only arrogant, but as if he were ſtupid, or growing profligate.

Wherefore to obſerve a degree of Reverence towards all Men, is part of *Juſtice*; neither ſhould we by ill Geſtures, or by immoderate Talking, offend the Sight, or overload the Hearing of any one.

XII. HUMANITY is a Virtue, which, from the ſenſe of that Excellency that is in human Nature and the common Affinity we have with all Mankind, leads us to be officious and benevolent to every one.

Hoſpitality is a Virtue, which moves us to be kind to Strangers, not only as they are Men, but as deſtitute perhaps, while abroad, of thoſe Conveniences they had at home.

XIII. CIVILITY is a Virtue that minds us of our Tye to all Men in the common Link of Humanity; and bids us with ſuch Chearfulneſs of Voice, Countenance, and Geſture, to ſalute whom we meet; as that when we ask them How they do, they may think themſelves even the better for our asking.

Affability is when we, being met and ſpoken to by others, do with Gentleneſs and good Expreſſions entertain them.

But

But *Officiouſneſs* is where a Man ſtoops to every little Service towards his Superiors, or at leaſt his Equals; and is flying to do every ſmall thing that the Company ſeems to want.

All theſe Virtues are fitly referable to *Humanity.*

But hereto is oppoſed, not only what is plain *Inhumanity*, but that fond and affected Humor of ſome, who will needs pretend to oblige the whole World, and ſo to careſs ſome Men in particular, as if preſently they would adopt them, and make their Fortunes; while in reality, they mind nothing they ſay, or intend more by thoſe enormous Civilities, than the pleaſure of ſuppoſing they are juſt credited while they ſpeak.

This we call a manifeſt Infraction of *Juſtice*, becauſe by ſuch deluſion, an honeſt Heart is often rob'd of his ſincereſt Affections; than which he has not a more valuable Treaſure to beſtow, where he is really willing to oblige, or to be grateful: So that we juſtly make this no leſs criminal, than any other Rape or Felony.

XIV. LASTLY, *true Friendſhip* ſtands in the rank of Virtue. But for that which is vulgarly ſo called, 'tis, for the moſt part, nothing elſe, but the Combination of a few cunning Men againſt the reſt of their Neighbours, to ſerve the Turn of each other. They award unjuſtly, and bear falſe witneſs; and call this mutual Good-Will and Friendſhip among themſelves, while they undo the reſt. This is the more vile and abject piece of *Injuſtice*, as it

is

is mixed with *Hypocriſie:* For they ſatisfie themſelves, in that the Injury is not done with intention to hurt their Neighbour, but only to gratifie a Friend.

But as for that which is real *Friendſhip*, doubtleſs, there is nothing more Holy, or more Divine; 'tis not leſs a Virtue, than is *Humanity* or *Hoſpitality*: And 'tis only to be found with ſuch as are poſſeſs'd of all other Virtues. It comprehends thoſe Duties, which are not only owing to good Men in general, but to thoſe eſpecially, whoſe long Converſation, whoſe try'd Sincerity, whoſe Uſefulneſs and good Turns, have obliged us to diſtinguiſh and place them above the reſt of Mortals.

However the beſt Fruit of Friendſhip is a mutual Stimulation unto Virtue. Thus it was noted of old among the *Pythagoreans*: *For* (ſays *Iamblicus*) *they did frequently admoniſh each other, never to ſeparate from him, who was one with them in God. For all their application to Friendſhip, both in word and deed, tended but to an Union and Communion with God; and that all might be, as it were, incorporated together into a Divine Life.* To which he preſently adds, *Than which, nothing better can be found, either in their Diſcourſes, or in their practice of Living. And I do likewiſe believe, that it comprehends all the Duties of true Friendſhip.* *Iamblicus de Vitâ Pythagoricâ. c.* 33. *Ethic. Nicom. l.* 9. *c.* 8. *Ariſtotle* is not much different from this ſenſe, where he notes, that the principal Fruit and Pleaſure of Friendſhip, did conſiſt in thoſe things

things which are proper to us as Men, namely, as we were rational and diſcourſive: *For the Society of Men at a Table, was as the buſineſs of Cattle feeding in the ſame Paſture, but for Ratiocination and Intercourſe of Speech.*

And thus much, in ſhort, of thoſe Virtues which are reducible to *Juſtice.*

XV. MAGNANIMITY is the firſt of thoſe Virtues, which have reference to *Fortitude*, or rather unto *Sufferance.* But it is ſufficiently underſtood from *Ariſtotle*'s Character of one that is *Magnanimous. He is one* (ſays he) *who ſtrives to do great Things, or what may be for great Ends, and by which he may acquire great Honour. He is not therefore ſo apt to run into frequent Dangers, as into great ones; not prompt for every Turn, but rather ſlow and deliberate; he will not raſhly undertake even great Matters, but with Counſel and good Caution; he is not much taken up with the Care of worldly Concerns, as not thinking them either great enough, or of much account. But Honour is, in his eſteem, as the higheſt of human external Benefits, inaſmuch as he obſerves, 'tis the higheſt thing we have to pay, even to the Gods.*

Ethic. Nicom. l. 4. c. 7. 8.

Here we ſuppoſe our magnanimous Man to be ſo perfectly endowed; as that knowing his own Virtue, which is a Heavenly Gift, he believes he ought not to be deprived by Men of the Honour which ſhould attend it.

Yet if Men ſhall ungratefully refuſe to do their Parts herein, he makes no Idol of this Honour, or of their popular Incenſe: For, being

being conſcious of his own ſingle Virtue, he can there ſit down as at a Feaſt. And thus the Learned Paraphraſt adds to his Character, *That he is a Man who has greater conſideration for Truth, and for his Duty than for Fame.* And as *Ennius* alſo notes, *He is one that carries Friendſhip and Enmity in an open Breaſt.* For who need fly to Corners, or be aſham'd of Truth, that being ſatisfied of his own Goodneſs, and raviſh'd with the Joys of ſuch a Bleſſing, muſt needs have Contempt for inferior Matters, and can ſooner part with his Life, than renounce Virtue, or any Branch thereof?

Theſe are the chief Marks and Characters, that *Ariſtotle* gives the *Magnanimous.* And 'tis with good reaſon that *Magnanimity* is referr'd to *Fortitude,* and to *Sufferance:* For we cannot poſſibly undertake great Things, without much Labour and great Vexation, and thoſe who voluntarily decline Honour and publick Office, do it for the moſt part upon the ſcore of Eaſe.

XVI. LENITY alſo is fitly referr'd to *Fortitude,* and to *Sufferance*; inaſmuch as to bear Injuries is an Act of *Patience,* and to deſpiſe them, the property of a great Mind: So that from both or either of them, reſults *Lenity*; by which, tho injur'd, we are not eaſily provok'd to Reſentments, at leaſt, we can eaſily abſtain from Revenge. And hereto refers that excellent Advice of *Antoninus*: *That it was highly eſtimable to live benignly, and to practiſe Truth and Juſtice, even among Men of no Truth,* *Lib. 6. Sect. 47.*

Truth, and of no Juſtice. For indeed nothing does more naturally try or ſtir up the Indignation of a generous Mind, than to ſee Men given over to Falſhood and Impoſture.

XVII. GENEROSITY differs herein from *Magnanimity*, that it ſeems to be a more common Virtue, and is not only reſtrain'd to great Honours, or to great Enterpriſes, but conſiſts in this, That a Man exerciſe his own freedom and liberty of Thinking in the beſt manner he can; that he reſt contented herein; and as to Fortune, and the World's Opinion, to look on them as things of indifferency; yet ſtill to regard all Men with Civility, and to ſuppoſe them what they ought to be, till the contrary be made manifeſt.

XVIII. CONSTANCY is a Virtue, by which we are taught to be juſt and conformable to our ſelves, in all things we do or ſay.

Diligence is a Virtue, by which we proſecute indefatigably whatever we had good cauſe to undertake.

Lib. de Paſſionibus.

Vivacity is defin'd by *Andronicus*, *To be a firm and lively Aptitude in the Soul to perfect whatever is begun.*

But *Preſence of Mind* ſeems to intimate a certain Promptitude of the Soul, to undertake what it ought, and therein to perſiſt: So that it ſeems to differ but little from *Diligence.* He names alſo *Strenuouſneſs*, which he makes to be an Habit that enables us to hold out in the laborious Searches of Virtue.

Laſtly

Laſtly, *Manhood* or *Virility*, is by him defin'd to be, *A Virtue, by which a Man carries himſelf ſtoutly, and with Circumſpection through publick Affairs.* And he makes the principal Functions hereof to conſiſt, in being intrepid as to Death, Bold in all Dangers, and to prefer an Honourable Exit before Shameful Living. Theſe indeed are the Parts of *Fortitude* alſo.

XIX. THERE now only remain thoſe Vertues, which appertain to *Temperance*, or (if you will) to *Continence.*

Such as *Frugality*, that is a Virtue, by which a Man, conſulting both Temperance and his own Condition, becomes more ſparing in his Expence, yet ſo as not to be quite Parſimonious. From which Definition 'tis plain, that *Frugality* is fitly referr'd unto *Temperance*, as is *Liberality* unto *Juſtice*: For this latter appertains to the Benefit of others, whereas the former has reference to our ſelves.

XX. HUMILITY is a Vertue, by which we eaſily ſuppreſs and extinguiſh all inordinate Deſires of Honour, Rule, and the Splendor of Riches; that ſo we may be able to fix our Minds upon better things. This conforms to the Mind of *Marcus* the Emperor, who adviſes a Man, *In every Occaſion that preſents, to demonſtrate himſelf juſt, prudent, and a plain follower of God.* *Marcus, l.* 12. § 27.

XXI. AUSTERITY is defin'd, by *Andronicus Rhodius*, to be, *An Habit of the Soul that cannot bear any Lewdneſs either in Speech or Pleaſures.*

ſures. *Modeſty* ſeems nearly ally'd, as being a Vertue in the Soul, which chaſeth early away all the Preparations to Sin; nay it cannot eaſily bear any thing that looks but ſuſpiciouſly naught.

XXII. As to the *Slenderneſs of Diet* in point of *Quantity*, and the *plainneſs* of it in reference to *Coſt*, this ſeems ſomething ſtricter than *Frugality* it ſelf. *Andronicus* calls this latter, *An habit of being content with any thing*: And the firſt, *An habit void of Deſire to ſee Charge or Preparation in any thing.*

De Paſſionibus.

For the *Inoffenſiveneſs of Geſture*, it does conſiſt, in Ordering the Figure and Motion of the Body, according to Decorum; and this makes it to be a part of *Modeſty.*

Contentment of Mind is an habit of being eaſily ſatisfied with the common Conveniences of Life. For, according to the old Obſervation, *Nature is content with a very little.*

XXIII. Thus have we treated of the *Reductive Virtues*, with what Brevity we could. But as we dwelt not long upon them, ſo we judge it leſs needful to enumerate every Vice, ſince their Natures are known enough from the Doctrine of thoſe Vertues which they contradict.

However, as we ſtill reſolve not to go far, or meddle with every Vice, which ſome ſuppoſe to be as ſo many Extremes to Virtue; yet we ſhall preſume to examin that *Mediocrity* which *Ariſtotle* treats of, and in which the Nature of Virtue is made to conſiſt.

Much

Much Contention is made herein; yet we ſhall venture to ſpeak our Senſe in the *Chapter* following.

CHAP. IX.

Of that Mediocrity, in which Vertue does conſiſt: And of the true meaſure of ſuch Mediocrity.

I. THAT Vertue lies in a *Mediocrity* is not quite untrue, if rightly underſtood: Yet as ſome introduce Vertue attended, on each hand, with oppoſite Vices; and juſt as it were a Roſe placed between two Nettles: This, we do confeſs, were a pretty Show, but it cannot poſſibly hold in every Caſe. L. 1. c. 8. § 7.

II. FOR in the Caſe of *Juſtice*, where a Man takes no more than what is of right his due; this is plainly oppoſite to that part which is vicious, and where a Man takes more than what is his due. But here if a Man takes leſs; this ſurely ſeems no Vice, but rather a ſort of *Generoſity*, or *Modeſty*. So again in the Conferring of Rewards, to beſtow leſs than was agreed for, hath as much of *Injuſtice*, as to give according to Proportion is juſt: Yet to beſtow more largely than was agreed for, is not, on the other hand, *Injuſtice*, but rather *Liberality*. So alſo, in the way of Buying and Selling; the over-weight that is thrown in to get a Cuſtomer's Good-Will, altho either in

Weight or Meaſure, it exceed the Bargain, yet ſurely this has nothing of *Injuſtice* in it.

III. MOREOVER unto *Prudence* (which doubtleſs is a Moral Vertue) there is only *Impudence* to be oppos'd, which is the Defect of *Prudence*. So to *Sincerity* is nothing oppoſite but *Inſincerity*, or at large *Hypocriſie*, which exceeds or falls ſhort of the Perfection of *Sincerity*. So *Patience*, *Continence*, and *Suffering*, do only go lame (as we ſay) on the one ſide, as namely, by *Impatience*, *Incontinence*, and by *Effeminacy*: So *Temperance* by *Intemperance*. And therefore to put (which ſome do) a ſort of *Inſenſibility*, to anſwer as an oppoſite Vice on the other ſide, is quite without Reaſon. *For* (as *Andronicus* notes from *Ariſtotle*) *'tis ſcarce within Reach of Human Nature to be Inſenſible to ſuch a Pitch*: And if any Man were ſo, this would look much more like a Diſeaſe of the Body, than a Vice of the Soul.

Lib. 3. *Cap.* 12.

But ſhould it happen, that the Power of the Soul could be ſo far extended, as to be able to weigh down, and even extinguiſh the ſenſe of every Corporeal Pain and Pleaſure; this certainly were ſo far from being a Defect in the Soul, that it would rather amount to a wonderful Vertue and Perfection. And to abuſe ſuch Perfection would argue either Inſincerity, or Imprudence. However, if any Man will needs call it an *Intemperate ſort of Temperance*, I will not much contend in the Matter.

IV. AS to *Fortitude*, it ſeems properly enough placed between *Boldneſs* and *Timorouſneſs*;

neſs; *Liberality* between *Niggardize* and *Prodigality*; *Truth* between *Arrogance* and *Diſſimulation*: Nor do we deny, but that ſomewhat like to this Equality, may happen in ſome few other Virtues. But this we think worthy of ſpecial Notice, That even from the Inſtances given, 'tis not very apparent that Virtue, according to it's moſt Internal *Eſſence*, is a *Mediocrity*. We rather ſuppoſe that according to the Definition given, it is ſome Intellectual Power is the *Cauſe* of that *Mediocrity*, which we obſerve as well in our Actings as our Sufferings. For in theſe Caſes ſuch *Mediocrity* appears: But as to Virtue her ſelf, ſhe muſt not pretend to go farther than in what barely is Juſt.

V. NAY Virtue is rather an Extreme; And this not only as to it's Well-being and Beſt Eſtate (which *Ariſtotle* himſelf conſents to) but we call it an *Extreme* even as to it's Eſſence and Definition. For how can Virtue, as to it's Eſſence, be a *Mediocrity*; when *Mediocrity*, as we ſaid, is only what we ſeek for, and adhere to, in thoſe Objects about which Virtue is converſant; namely, in thoſe Actings and Sufferings which befalls us? Wherefore ſince Virtue is, according to it's own Nature, the beſt of Bleſſings that Mankind is capable of, and the moſt excelling Power and Perfection of our Souls; it cannot be better Defin'd than in ſtyling it, *The very Triumph and Inauguration of Human Nature; or its Supreme Good.* And 'tis no more than what

Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 6.

is due to the Eſſence of Virtue, that it ſhould bear this high Preheminence: Wherefore it ſeems defectively ſaid of *Ariſtotle*, That Virtue was only an Extreme as to its Well-being and Beſt Eſtate, but not according to its Eſſence. For even that Beſt Eſtate muſt of neceſſity be Part of Virtues Eſſence, and both concur to the Top and Complement of our Natures: Which is no more, than what the *Pythagoreans* have every where obſerv'd.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 9.

VI. WHEREFORE that Philoſopher treads much more carefully, where he makes Virtue to conſiſt in *Finding* and *Electing* a *Medium*, than when he makes Virtue itſelf that *Medium* or *Mediocrity*. For this is juſt as if one ſhould call the *Inſtrument*, that is fram'd to find out two Middle Lines which hold a continued Proportion, to be the very Lines themſelves: Or to ſay that a Pair of Compaſſes, which find or make the Centre of a Circle; are the very Middle or Centre itſelf.

VII. LASTLY, When his Followers declare Virtue to be this *Medium*, they underſtand it in reſpect of two Things, which are *Homogeneous* or conſonant to ſuch *Medium*. For ſo *Ariſtotle* does illuſtrate it by Examples of *Arithmetical Proportion*, as well in Magnitude as Numbers: Altho after all, he ſeems herein rather to have found the *Medium Rei*, than the *Medium quoad Nos*; I mean that which is rather true in Speculation than in Practice. But his Affecting to make it *Homogeneous*, is hereby manifeſt, That, while he calls

calls Virtue a certain *Medium*, he makes it to partake of either Extreme. Thus *Andronicus* (his Paraphraſt) calls Virtue, *The Middle of the Two Extremes falling ſhort on the one ſide, and exceeding on the other*: Even as it appears in *Fortitude*, which to a certain Degree may be term'd *Confidence*.

But this can never hold: For while he thus turns Confidence into Virtue (which ſtill is defin'd to be a Thing abſolutely good) if we ſuppoſe that ſuch his Confidence were a Virtue to the Degree of three, it would follow, That ſuch Confidence would doubly excel, if rais'd to the degree of ſix. But by ſuch Logick, Vice would become better than Virtue which muſt never be underſtood.

Wherefore we ſuppoſe, that Virtue is not the *Medium* itſelf, but rather the Finder and the Chooſer of ſuch *Medium*. Nay, we affirm, that ſuch *Medium* is not ſingly diſcovered by the degrees of more or leſs, or of Exceſs or of Defect; but is alſo determin'd by other prudential Circumſtances, even as *Ariſtotle* himſelf declares: namely, *That the true Medium in Virtue, and that which is its very beſt, muſt be aſcertain'd with regard unto Time, and to Occaſions, and to the Perſons with whom, or for whoſe ſake we act, and to the manner of acting.* So by this 'tis plain, that to purſue all Caſes under the notion and fancy of a Mediocrity, were meerly ſuperſtitious, if not altogether vain. *Ethic. Nicom. lib. 2.*

VIII. I think it, for my part, ſufficient, if what Virtue ſeeks out and electeth, be that

which is *Rectum* or *Right*. 'Tis very true, that this Right itſelf ſeems alſo to be a certain middle thing; juſt as a Line, which is drawn upon another ſtreight Line at Right Angels, is equally the *Medium* of all others, that can be drawn from the ſame Point, and that unequally vary from ſuch Line. Wherefore the *Pythagoreans* were wont to ſay, *That Good was Uniform*, and *Evil Multiform*. And *Andronicus* is poſitive, *That this Right is ſomething, which is of a Simple and Uniform Nature.*

Magn. Moral. l. 1. cap. 25. Nicom. l. 2. c. 5.

IX. Let us alſo add, that this *Rectum* (which Virtue purſues in all things) is termed *Equal*, and a thing which holds *Congruity* and *Proportion*. *For things congruous are alſo equal*, as in Geometry is manifeſt. So that all theſe things point at a *Mediocrity*: For what is greater or leſs than another, is not congruous. And therefore that ought to be the *Medium*, which is neither more or leſs; and which is alſo called *Equality*.

Andronicus, l. 5. c. 1.

Upon the whole Matter, let us agree how far Virtue conſiſts in a *Mediocrity* or *Medium*. 'Tis not that ſhe herſelf is that *Medium*; but that our Souls do, by her Aid, elect that which is congruous, or in the Middle: For thus only can that Sentence be true and ſolid.

X. But now the Difficulty remaining will be, to eſtabliſh ſomething, unto which this *Rectitude* and *Congruity* (which Virtue every where ſeeks) is to conform. *Ariſtotle* ſays, *That what is congruous to Right Reaſon is right.* And again, *That the Medium, in every thing,*

Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 1.

is

is what Right Reaſon declares to be ſuch. And ſo in his Definition of Virtue, *That 'tis bounded with Reaſon:* And he adds alſo, *Even as a prudent Man ſhall determine thereof.* As if by thoſe Words he ſhould ſtop any farther Inquiry, what kind of thing this Right Reaſon was, by which that which is right and congruous ſhould be try'd. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 6.*

Now, according to *Ariſtotle*, *Right Reaſon is that which is conformable to Prudence.* But then he himſelf elſewhere defines *Prudence, To be a true Habit, exerting itſelf in what happens to a Man good or bad, according to Reaſon.* But ſurely this ſounds very odd, and is no better than a trifling Circle, to define Right Reaſon by Prudence, and Prudence again by Right Reaſon. *Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 5.*

XI. However, if there be but Recourſe had to that Definition of *Prudence*, which we before have delivered, the point will be fully reſolv'd: For it will from thence appear that whoever is *prudent* is alſo of a Mind ſo cleans'd and defecated, that the Light of Truth is not Eclipſed in him, either by Paſſions, or any corporeal Impediments. And, for this Cauſe, let no Man wonder, if *Right Reaſon* be ſtyl'd, *That which is according to Prudence*: For if the prudent Man, as to Life and good Manners, have it not, it can no where be found. *Ariſtotle* (in his *Ethicks* to *Nicomachus*) is of the ſame mind. *For the good Man* (ſays he) *judges all things aright; and Truth is viſible unto him, where-ever it be; and good things appear*

both proper and pleaſant in every ſhape. And 'tis very poſſible that a good Man grows more excellent, if, while he finds Truth in others, he has cauſe to think that he himſelf was the Rule and Meaſure thereof. But as to Plebeians, they tumble into Error for Pleaſure-ſake, as counting that real Good, which is really otherwiſe.

The ſame Author has other Paſſages to the little intent: For he makes *Temperance, the only true Guardian and Conſervator of Prudence:* And that the ſober Man is only wiſe, in all that concerns Probity of Life. *He does not think that the Motives of Pleaſure, or of Pain, can influence or pervert our Opinions, as to the Doctrine of a Triangle, and it's having ſo many Angels as are equal unto two right ones, or the like: But as to Manners, and the Conduct of our Life, thoſe Motives have, as he believes, ſtrange Influence.* Nav, he ſuppoſes, that whoever is led by his Paſſions, *and the Senſe only of Pleaſure or of Pain,* is led as a blind Man that has loſt his Eyes; *and in whom the very Principles for his Direction are extinguiſh'd.*

Eth. Nic. l. 6. c. 5.

XII. Let us therefore here applaud this wiſe Philoſopher, for that Variety of Truth and of Utility, which redounds from this Advice. For 'tis plain from hence, that our Minds, being thus purg'd from Vanities and Paſſions, can, as in an inſtant, diſcern not only all that is worthy and valuable in human Affairs, but what is noxious or of no account. Next, we may gather from it, that ſome things are valuable and worthy, even in their own Nature: ſince

ſince if they were not at all, and had no Being, they could never be ſeen. But ſince they are ſeen and beheld by a clear and perſpicacious Mind, 'tis of evidence they are ſuch in their own nature, as they appear. *L.* 1. *c.* 6. § 12.

Laſtly, to waſte time in diſputing, whether any thing be (in its own nature) laudable, before we take pains to reform our Minds in the way preſcrib'd, is not only Labour loſt, but a ſort of Frenzy. And if we ſhall conclude that nothing is of its own nature honeſt and laudable, when at the ſame time we live in Vice and Wickedneſs, this is to be downright impudent; for we ought firſt to try, and then to give our Opinion. We have touch'd this point before, and therefore we need not dwell upon it any longer here.

XIII. THERE is now but one thing more, to clear before us all the Difficulty that remains. For whereas it may ſound as if we give up our prudent Man to Inſpirations and to Enthuſiaſm; while we contend he cannot in any other reſpect be wiſe, than as his Mind is reform'd and purg'd: and that it muſt alſo needs hence enſue, that whatſoever a Man ſo purg'd, ſhall afterwards imagine, muſt therefore be according to Right Reaſon, or Right Reaſon itſelf, meerly becauſe he thinks ſo: And that, in ſhort, there muſt be no other Meaſure, or Principle; but that his Imagination ſhall be as the Standard of Congruity and of Right.

Therefore

Therefore it is neceſſary (as *Andronicus Rhodius* ſpeaks) firſt to inquire and find out, *What is the Mode and Standard of this Right Reaſon? And what that Principle in human Affairs that is juſt and congruous?* For ſurely that alone is Right Reaſon, which to ſuch Standard, Mode, and Principle, can be apply'd; and this muſt be ſome Primitive Good, which is not only moſt ſimple, but moſt excellent, and a true *Baſis*, *Norma* and *Standard*, for all the reſt.

L. 1. *c.* 2. § 5, *&c.* XIV. Now while I am in this high purſuit, I call to witneſs all that is holy, that in my Senſe, there cannot, in the whole compaſs of Nature, be found a greater Good than is that *Love*, which (to free it from all other Imputations) we call *Intellectual*. For what can more fill, elevate, and irradiate the Soul than this intellectual Love? Surely nothing is more exalted or Divine, nothing more raviſhing, and complacent, nothing more ſharp in diſtinguiſhing what in every Caſe is decorous and right, or more quick in executing whatſoever is laudable and juſt.

L. 3. *c.* 8. § 8.

Since therefore this is the moſt high and the moſt ſimple good; it ought in preference, to be the Rule and Standard of all the reſt; and nothing ſhould paſs, or be accounted, for Right Reaſon, which from this Divine Source and Fountain did not take its Birth.

XV. And what is all this *Intellectual Love*, we ſo deſcribe, but an inward Life and Senſe, that moves in the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul*? 'Tis

Vid. Margin. ſupra.

'Tis by this the Soul reliſheth what is ſimply the beſt; thither it tends, and in that alone is has its Joy and Triumph. Hence we are inſtructed how to ſet God before our Eyes; to love him above all; to adhere to him as the ſupremeſt Good; to conſider him as the Perfection of all Reaſon, of all Beauty, of all Love; how all was made by his Power, and that all is upheld by his Providence. Hence alſo is the Soul taught how to affect and admire the Creation, and all the Parcels of it, as they ſhare in that Divine Perfection and Beneficence, which is diſperſed through the whole Maſs: So that if any of theſe Parcels appear defective or diſcompos'd, the Soul compaſſionates and brings help, ſtrenuouſly endeavouring, as it is able, to reſtore every thing to that ſtate of Felicity, which God and Nature intended for it. In ſhort, it turns all its Faculties to make good Men happy; and all its Care and Diſcipline is to make bad Men good.

XVI. THEREFORE I ſay, this moſt ſimple and Divine Senſe and Feeling in the *Boniform Faculty of the Soul*, is that Rule or Boundary, whereby Reaſon is examin'd and approves herſelf. For if ſhe offers or affirms any thing that is contrary to this Senſe and Feeling, 'tis ſpurious and diſhoneſt; if congruous to it, 'tis Orthodox, fit, and juſt. So that we need not invent any other *external* Idea of Good; or follow thoſe, who vainly Dream of remoter Objects; when as this inward Life and *V. Marg. ſupr.*

and Senſe points ſingly at that Idea, which is fram'd not from exterior things, but from the Reliſh and intrinſick Feeling of the *Boniform Faculty* within. And aſtho this Idea be but ſingle and alone, yet from thence ariſe all the Shapes and Modes of Virtue and of Well-doing: And 'tis into this again, that all of them may, by a due and unerring Analyſis, be reſolv'd. For as all Numbers ariſe from Unity, and by Unities are all meaſur'd: ſo we affirm, that by this *Intellectual Love*, as from a Principle the moſt pure and moſt abſtracted of all others, all the Modes and Kinds of *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, and even of *Temperance* itſelf, are to be meaſur'd: for nothing is ſo detrimental to leſſen and extinguiſh this Love, as is the Exerciſe and Infection of ſenſual Delights.

XVII. Now, in the laſt place, if any ſhall object that we have done amiſs; and that all this ſplendid Fabrick of the Virtues is by us laid on a weak and tottering Foundation: As, namely in Paſſion, ſuch as they may ſuppoſe this our *Love* to be. Let them for their better Information, know, that this Love is not more a Paſſion than is Intellection itſelf, which ſurely they cannot but believe to be very valuable, and very Divine. 'Tis very true we may as to this point (with *Des Cartes*) allow, that all Intellection has ſo much of Paſſion, as it is the Perception of ſomething imprinted from without. However, as this Perception, which is made by Intellection, is not from the Body,

Body, but rather from the Soul, exerting and exciting herſelf into ſuch Action: So neither is this Love from the Body; but either from the Soul itſelf, or elſe from God above, who calls and quickens the Soul to ſuch a Divine *Effort*. And tho this Perception may, if they pleaſe, be termed a ſort of Paſſion, yet 'twill derogate no more from the Dignity and Excellency of it, than from Intellection itſelf: Which, becauſe 'tis an Act of Perception, may on that account be alſo termed a Paſſion.

XVIII. YET when all is ſaid, perhaps this Love, which we inſiſt upon, may not ſo truly be termed a Paſſion, as acknowledg'd to be the Peace and Tranquillity of the Mind: nay a ſtate of ſuch Serenity, as hath no other Motions than thoſe of Benignity and Beneficence. So that this Love may rather be thought a firm and unſhaken Benignity, or Bounty of the Soul; ſuch as has nothing more perfect, or more approaching to the immortals Gods. I mean hereby that State of the Bleſſed Spirits, unto which we ought all to aſpire: and ſurely without this Love, thoſe very Spirits would not be as Gods, but as a Race of Devils. And therefore we may conclude this Love, to be the moſt perfect, and the moſt Angelick Thing of all others; far excelling even Intellection itſelf. And, in truth, much more aptly to deſerve thoſe lofty Words, which *Ariſtotle* beſtows upon the Speculative Intellect; where he ſays, *That according to*

ſome

Ethic. Nicom. l. 10 c. 7. *some Doctors we are not to converse with human things, altho we are Men, nor with things transitory, altho we are meer Mortals; but, as much as is possible, we should affect to live as do the immortal Gods: And this, by performing every thing in such sort, as conforms to that Principle, which is the most excellent thing within us.* Now *Andronicus* (his Paraphraſt) declares, *This most excellent thing within us, to be the Intellect.* But I beg leave to call it rather by the Name of *Intellectual Love.*

L. 10. c. 9

Thus I end a Point, on which ſome may think I have inſiſted too long: But the whole will ſhew our Senſe of Virtue; and of its kinds; and how it may be ſaid to conſiſt in a *Mediocrity*; and what alſo is the *Norma* or Meaſure of ſuch *Mediocrity*. The next Step will be touching *Good* that is *external.*

CHAP. X.

Of Good Things, which are External.

I. THIS not only ſuch Things as are placed without a Man, that we call *External Goods*; but whatever is placed without in reſpect to Virtue: I mean without which Virtue may conſiſt in its Perfection, altho ſuch things may indeed paſs as Ornaments to her, and as neceſſary Complements unto Happineſs. And theſe are threefold; either in reſpect of the *Soul*, of the *Body*, or of *both.*

We

We will touch upon ſome particulars herein; and how far they help, or how ſhort they fall, as to the compleating of Happineſs.

II. THINGS which relate to the *Soul*, are the *Dexterity* or *Subtilty of the Wit, a vaſt and faithful Memory:* Alſo *Science*, *Art*, and *Sapience.*

To the *Body*, *Strength*, *Agility*, *Comlineſs*, and *Health.*

To *both* theſe, as they conſtitute Man, *Wealth*, *Liberty*, *Nobility*, *Authority*: And laſtly the *Friendſhip* and *Favour* of *many.*

Of all theſe we may ſay in ſhort, that they are Good, and more to be deſired than the things that are contrary to them: And yet that ſeveral of them are of ſuch ſlender Account, that their Abſence does no more obſtruct the Perfection and Integrity of Happineſs, than Mountains and Valleys do ſpoil the Roundneſs of the Earth, whoſe Magnitude makes thoſe ſmall Inequalities of no conſideration. Scarce do thoſe things add unto Happineſs while preſent, or retrench from it when abſent; inaſmuch as they hold no Proportion with compleat and perfect Virtue.

III. I would fain know what great matter is gotten by *Subtilty of Wit*; if a Man be otherwiſe prudent, if his Mind be firm and unſhaken, if he have Love towards his Neighbour, and Good-Will for Mankind?

I find *Antoninus* the Emperor, when he blamed his Parts for want of ſufficient Activity, could yet conſole himſelf with this Reflection,

L. 7. § 67. flection, *That a happy Life was made up of very few things; and that, altho a Man were neither Logician nor Philoſopher, he might yet be generous, modeſt, a Lover of his Country, and obedient to God.* On the other hand, to hear one lament his Unhappineſs, for want of ſuch *high Subtilty*, or *Dexterity of Wit*; is little other, than if a Man ſhou'd complain he was not able to walk, becauſe not able, as ſome Juglers, to dance upon a Rope.

IV. As to a ſtrong and retentive *Memory*, which holds all faſt, how many an honeſt Man is there that has it not? For, as *Antoninus* ſaid before, ſo *Ariſtotle* alſo ſays, *That thoſe Noble and Divine Things, wherein Happineſs did conſiſt, were very few.* Nay rather, that it was but one certain thing, by which the Diſcrimination was made of things honeſt or vile, even as all Variety of Colours are judg'd of by the Eye. And hereto may refer that of *Plato, That Truth was contain'd in a very narrow ſpace.* For the good and perfect Man is not ſo much actuated by a Liſt of Precepts gotten without Book, as by living inwardly, and printing in his Mind a ſingle and ſincere Senſe of Things. From this alone, he will be able to know whatever Duty lies incumbent on him; juſt as, by one Candle, a Man may ſee all the variety of Objects before him: And as all Colours of the Rain-bow do ariſe from the Sun, ſo indeed the Diſtinction of all Duties have but the ſame ſingle Source.

But

But for *exterior* things, and ſuch as are not reducible into this Diviner Senſe: Let it ſuffice, if your Memory be as that of an old Man, who (as they ſay) does not eaſily forget whatever he takes to heart, and lets nothing go that may much afflict him if it be loſt.

V. As to *Science*, *Art*, and *Sapience*; we do not conceive they are ſo very eſſential unto Happineſs. For tho *Ariſtotle* ſays, *That Science is about neceſſary Matters, and ſuch as are not ſubject to Alteration*; Yet this our Happineſs does not conſiſt in thoſe immutable Things, but in the ſingle Conſtance of Mind, and in a ſteady Reſolution to proſecute, in all our Actions, that which is ſimply and abſolutely the beſt. And therefore, in that admirable Table of *Cebes*, they who thus purſue Virtue, are admitted within the ſecond Pale; while others have no admiſſion at all into the *Palace of Safety*, neither the Men of Logick, nor of Figures, nor of Geometry, nor Aſtrologers, Poets, Orators, or Muſicians: But all alike, even as infamous or uſeleſs Fidlers, are excluded and ſhut without. *Andronicus, l. 6. c. 8.*

VI. That Happineſs, which is due to human Nature, is a plainer Thing, and a more common Good, than to be calculated only for Philoſophers and Artiſts. Wherefore as *Science* is not to be counted a part of Happineſs, ſo neither is that *Art*, which *Ariſtotle* defines to be, *A rational fabricating Habit.* And by which he ſhews, it belongs unto Artiſts or Artificers. *Ethic. Eudem. l. 5. c. 4.*

VII. Much leſs ought *Sapience* to paſs for ſuch an Eſſential; ſeeing *Her Objects are Things ſingular, ſtupendous, difficult, and even Magical*: Such as *Anaxagoras* and *Thales* of old are ſaid to have ſtudied, and which *Ariſtotle* upbraids as unprofitable, and little availing to the Happineſs of human Life. But as to *Magical Things* here ſpoken of, his Meaning appears by his defining in that place, *Sapience to be the Skill and Vnderſtanding of thoſe Things which in Nature have the chiefeſt Excellence.* And a while after, *That there were other things, which by Nature were far Diviner than Men; as thoſe illuſtrious and conſpicuous Objects, whereof the World was fram'd.* 'Tis theſe therefore are thoſe *Magical Matters*, that are called Objects of *Sapience*, and which are reputed more *Divine and Excellent than Man.* But yet for any Science herein, 'tis ſo far from being neceſſary to Happineſs, that *Ariſtotle* will ſcarce allow it to be uſeful.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 7.

VIII. Now altho perfect Happineſs, which is that Pleaſure that ariſeth from a Senſe of Virtue, and a Conſcience of *Well-doing*, may want *Science*, *Art*, and *Sapience*; yet we muſt alſo affirm, that ſuch *Intelligence* as, by *Andronicus*, is defin'd, *To be the Knowledge of Principles*, can by no means be ſeparate from Happineſs. For 'tis in truth impoſſible that a Mind, which is purified and influenced by true Prudence, can be ſo blunt or ſtupify'd, as to admit any Doubt concerning the Principles of Science.

L. 6. c. 7.

IX.

IX. For what concerns *Bodily Endowments*, we may venture to ſay that *Strength*, and *Agility*, are more the Happineſs of the Bull, and of the Squirrel, than of a Man. Nay a brawny and robuſt Habit is ſo far from adapting Men to Virtue, that the Senſe of refined Things is often dull'd and ſuffocated thereby. And it would be as unreaſonable to expect that all good Men ſhould be Robuſt and Agil, as to compel them all to be Racers, or good at Fiſty-Cuffs.

X. As to *Beauty* or *Comlineſs*, the plain Truth is, it has a Charm; for it draws Favour, and ſtrangely turns the Minds of the Beholders: and even Virtue itſelf is indebted to the Ornaments it beſtows,

Gratior eſt pulchro veniens de corpore Virtus.

Beauty, when with Virtue joyn'd,
Gives a luſtre to the Mind.

Yet after all, 'tis but a poor Ingredient of ſolid Happineſs. It ſeems rather to be anothers good than our own. If we had not a Looking-Glaſs, we cou'd know nothing of it. Whereas internal Beauty needs no ſuch help, the Mind is ſatisfied of itſelf, and 'tis a continual Feaſt.

XI. Health, I confeſs, is one of the chiefeſt Bleſſings, and 'tis certainly neceſſary to compleat Happineſs; at leaſt ſuch a Proportion thereof, as may exempt the Body from Torture, and the Mind from Rage and Diſtraction. For whatſoever ſhall either extin-

guiſh the Operations of the Mind, or compel them to Evil, and there detain them, muſt either deſtroy Happineſs, or make it very imperfect.

XII. Among the *good things of Fortune*, whether *Liberty* or *Wealth* be beſt, has been a Doubt. I for my part have ſtill preferr'd the firſt; eſpecially ſince *Wealth* implies ſomewhat of abounding, with which a good Man may well diſpenſe. Wherefore the Loſs of Wealth would in no degree afflict me like that of Liberty, ſo as a Competency were but left for Life. And I ſhould think it more Gentle, as well as more Tolerable, to be depriv'd of thoſe things which are ſuperfluous to Happineſs, than to be truſted with too much. For if the top of human Felicity conſiſts in Virtue, 'tis much if it be not damnified by Temptations which Plenty draws us into.

In the Caſes even of *Want* and *Servitud* they ſeem nothing dreadful; if they are but qualified, as not to hinder the Mind in th Exerciſe of Virtue nor to extinguiſh the Sen of that Pleaſure, which a pious Soul takes ſubmitting to God. For to him, who gi up his Will and Affections to a Conform with the Divine Providence, there are c tain Raptures of Joy, which a Senſe of t Obedience, and that Reſignation affords h

L. 2. c. 10. § 19.

XIII. As for *Nobility*, that this is not nee for Happineſs ſeems herein evident, that 'tis a Shadow of Anceſtors Virtue, which is upon Poſterity. And if this Shadow be Thing; how great then is Virtue itſelf, w

can ſo gild, and for Ages to come ſo glorifie, a Race of Men by her meer Reflection? Surely where Virtue herſelf is preſent (whoſe Ray could do ſo much) what Bleſſings will not this great Parent of ſolid happineſs beſtow? He that has Virtue, will ſtand in want of Nobility no more, than does the Sun of that Light, which is borrow'd from him, I mean, the Light of the Moon.

Wherefore bare *Nobility* makes b ut little-wards Happineſs: But if the Virtue alſo of Anceſtors ſhall deſcend upon their Poſterity, then indeed it has equal, if not a greater, Force towards Human Felicity, than if Virtue were deſtitute of that Help.

XIV. But if *Nobility* be not neceſſary to a happy Life, much leſs is *Empire* and *Authority*. For no Man will hold, that Princes only and Magiſtrates are happy; ſince the Number of them is ſo few, in reſpect of other Mortals: ſince alſo they are Vexed with Cares, and incompaſs'd about with Dangers.

XV. Lastly, As to *Friendſhip*, it muſt be confeſs'd, that Favour, and the good Will of Men, adds a wonderful Complacency to Life, as well as Security. And indeed Virtue can hardly ſtand without it; eſpecially if ſuch *Friendſhip* be attended with perfect Sincerity, and with a certain ſweetneſs of Behaviour and Benignity of Mind. Beſides all Men of Probity are in a ſort confederated; and being by Virtue, as by a Mark of Diſtinction put conſtantly in mind of the Relation and Con-

ſanguinity which ties them together, they look upon themſelves as obliged, to cheriſh and aſſiſt each other.

But if it be a Man's hard Hap, to live and converſe only among the wicked, we muſt then depend upon the Protection of the Laws.
L. 1. c. 7. *For*, as *Ariſtotle* rightly takes notice, *the Rules of Policy and the Doctrines of Morality, do all aim at the ſame thing.* And *Andronicus* handſomly expounds it, ſaying, *That the ſame Advantage is ſought for, as well from every ſingle Man, as from the City or Government.* So that a good Man will want but little as to ſolid Felicity, if he may get what belongs to him even by Natural Right. Nor does that celebrated Example of *Damon* and *Pythias* ſeem more to refer to *Friendſhip*, than it does to *Juſtice* and *Equity:*

Wherefore Virtue, and eſpecially among good Men, or in a good Government, ſeems not to want, or ſtand in need of, more Favour, than ſhe is able to prevail for, upon her own Account.

XVI. HOWEVER, that I may diſguiſe Nothing, it is manifeſt, that Iniquity is ſometimes interwoven in the very Texture of the Laws, and in thoſe more eſpecially that have regard unto Religion. And it often happens that for the Cauſe of Truth and Virtue, we fall into the Diſpleaſure and Hatred of Men: For vicious Minds can no better endure the Trials of Virtue and of Truth, than vitiated Eyes can endure the Sun. Of this poor *Socrates*

found

found ſad effects; and ſo have innumerable others, as well *Chriſtians* as *Jews*. In this Caſe, 'tis certainly more adviſable to converſe but with a few, and thoſe of the moſt approved Integrity. But if there be no faithful Companions of this ſort, there is no other Remedy left, but to withdraw, and embrace Solitude: *Which however*, (in *Ariſtotle*'s Opinion) *no Man can be contented with, but either he becomes a God or a Beaſt*. Yet, in my Sentiment, a good Man, even in this State, ceaſes not to be joyful, and happy: for tho he be not a God, yet he bears about him ſomewhat that is Divine; and, while he can feel and contemplate the Joys thereof, he can want nothing that is eſſential to true Happineſs. *Politicorum, l. 1. c. 2.*

XVII. But if it ſhall happen that Men will ſtill be malevolent, and by their ill Nature give Diſturbance even to this Peace and Retirement: Here, I confeſs, there wants not only the Friendſhip of Equals, but rather Patronage from the powerful, which might avert this Malice, and retort the envenomed Darts. Yet if none of theſe may be had; let the good Man, fill'd with the Conſcience and Senſe of God, betake himſelf to the Armor of *Patience*, *Fortitude*, and *Magnanimity*. Let him revolve on that of *Epictetus*, *Now begins the Fight, and the Olympicks are now at hand*: And let him ſuffer every Fortune, and Life itſelf to be raviſh'd from him, rather than not perſiſt and overcome. *Enchiridion. c. 75.*

XVIII. Now if any Man ſhall here ask, In what condition is our good Man left, when fallen from all Felicity, ſtrip'd of Friends, and deſtitute of all Protection? Let him remember that this Queſtion has not a bare reference to want of Friends, but involves all Calamities, and the higheſt Deſolation that Mortals are ſubjected to. In this Caſe we may conſider what *Ariſtotle* has ſaid, in the Words of his Interpreter *Rhodius*, *'Tis true, Misfortunes afflict the juſt Man, and force him to ſtagger, and diſable him in many of his good Works. However as he bears all with equal Temper, not ſtupify'd or inſenſible, but with a magnanimous Soul; the very Splendor of Virtue ſhines out in the midſt of all his Suffering. For ſince Happineſs has its being in the Operations of Virtue, and that ſuch Operations do govern the Life of him that is happy; 'tis impoſſible that any happy Man can be made miſerable, becauſe he will never ingage in what is odious and vile.* He alſo adds, *That the happy Man looks not that all things ſhould flow in according to his Wiſh, but he makes the beſt of his preſent Fortune. And hence it is, that he can never be made miſerable, tho he fall into the greateſt Miſeries: For it can only be ſaid of him in reſpect of Fortune, he will not be baſely happy.* But the Words of *Ariſtotle* himſelf are a little more dejected, where he ſays, *That a Man cannot be call'd happy, if he falls into the Calamities of King* Priamus. And yet, even in this Eſtate, he will not allow him to be call'd miſerable.

L. 1. *c.* 17.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 1. *c.* 10.

XIX.

XIX. But altho this more moderate Saying of *Ariſtotle* may have place in ſuch Calamities as do accidentally befal us; yet where we ſuffer for Virtue's ſake, and by the Iniquity of the wicked, the Reaſon is far different. For if a Man, in his greateſt Sufferings, do not abandon God and Virtue, neither ſhall he be abondon'd by them. The Sharpneſs of ſuch a Conflict is ſo far from imparing his Happineſs, that it ſeems rather to augment and carry it higher: For the Operations of Virtue, in which the very Life of Happineſs does conſiſt, are propagated and exalted by ſuch Conflict. 'Tis not to be doubted, but where Patience is ſo invincible, the Mind is attended and ſupported by ſome Motions, which are not only generous, but plainly Divine. And let us not think of *Socrates*, that it was for vain Oſtentation, but from his Experience of the World (from clear Divination, and a ſolid Fortitude of the Mind) that he pronounced thoſe undaunted Words in *Epictetus*; *If the immortals Gods think fit to have it ſo, even ſo let it be. And tho my Accuſers,* Anytus *and* Melitus, *can deprive me of life, yet can they do me no hurt.*

L. 2. *c.* 10. § 12.

L. 13. *c.* 10. § 5.

Enchiridion. c. 79.

And this in brief as to *External Good.*

THE

THE THIRD BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Of Free-Will.

I. WE have hitherto treated about the way to know *Happineſs*, or rather *Virtue*; which is the principal part of Happineſs, if not its full Perfection: The next thing is about the way to attain it. And in this part we ſhall be rather brief, ſince what is hitherto delivered goes far to that End: And we are not willing to have that ſwell'd which we only call an *Epitome*. So then we ſhall here expoſe what may look like Heads of Meditation in the *Search of Virtue*, rather than any extended Treatiſe of it.

II. BUT before we can well enter into this Province, there is a thing called *Free Will*, of which it is needful previouſly to ſpeak: ſince till this be clear'd and aſſerted, all Exhortation to Virtue ſeems in vain.

Ariſtotle

Ariſtotle has ſometimes propos'd a Famous Queſtion, (but *Plato* in his *Menon* handles it more largely) and it hath affinity with this our Subject of *Free-Will*; as namely, *Whether Virtue gets into Men by Cuſtom, or by Nature, or by ſome Divine Fate* (which is the ſame as *Good Fortune?*) There are ſome Men extremely ſcandaliz'd at the Affirmative Part of this Queſtion; as thinking it a derogation from Humane Nature, to make Men at this rate neceſſarily Good, and to deprive them of all *Free-Will.* For they judge a Thing voluntarily done, to be of far different Merit from what happens by Compulſion: Which yet (I confeſs) ſounds to me, as if God, who is Good, ſhould be the leſs Adorable, becauſe he cannot be Naught. For I will preſume that whoever is Good, either by Nature or the Divine Fate, is alſo endowed with ſo true and efficacious a Senſe of Honeſty, that he can no more go againſt this Senſe, than that a ſober Man ſhould Stab himſelf with a Dagger.

Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. *Eudem. l.* 7. *c.* 14.

L. 1. *c.* 3. § 7.

III. WERE there but a Race of ſuch Men; they were of all others the moſt fitted for Heroes; and as deriving Virtue from the Gods: 'Tis of ſuch that *Homer* ſpeaks,

——— *Nec eum eſſe putares*
Mortali Genitore ſatum, at Genus eſſe Deorum.

You'd think a Man of ſuch Heroick frame
Not made below; but that from Heaven he came.

Ariſtotle

Ethic. Nicom. l. 7. c. 1.

Ariſtotle quotes this very Verſe in his Deſcription of *Heroical Virtue*; and thinks ſuch Virtue more given from Above, than the product of Human Induſtry. My Opinion is, That if all ſuch Force or Power from above were United; and either by Impreſſion or Inſpiration fix'd in the Mind at once; yet it might properly by called *Virtue*. For, according to our Definition, Virtue is a *Power* or *Energy*, not a *Habit*. And tho *Habit* be a ſort of *Power*, ariſing from Exerciſe and Cuſtom; yet this very Way and Circumſtance of acquiring Virtue, is nothing material, as to the true Nature of it. For if this *Power* or *Energy* be got within us, and operates in our Souls as by a Spring or Native Elaſticity, what matter is it, whether it came by repeated Actions, or by Inſpiration?

L. 1. c. 3. § 1.

IV. But foraſmuch as the Bleſſings of this Kind come rarely (if at all) to the Lot of any; we need not over-labour the difficulty of this Point. We need not ſtudy Admonitions for ſuch ſorts of Men, who by Nature or ſome Divine Fate, are already ſo well and ſo neceſſarily inclin'd: but rather preſs and convince the neceſſity of Virtue unto other Mortals; who, while they may exerciſe the Liberty of their Wills to either ſide, ſhould be urged and excited by all that can be ſaid, to incline their Wills to that ſide, where Right Reaſon, and a Senſe of their Duty, calls them.

V. They

V. They muſt, above all things, be told of that Excellent, and almoſt Divine Pre-eminence which they enjoy. For while all other Creatures have their Sences ty'd down to the ſervice of the Body, or ſome particular Delights; they can mount aloft, and are enabled by a *Liberty* in their *Wills*, to ſhake off, or gradually deſtroy thoſe ill Deſires, with which they are beſet; and, by the help of Heaven, to aſſert that Liberty, which is moſt ſuitable to a Creature made by God's Image, and a partaker of Divine Senſe.

VI. And as this is a moſt true Perſwaſion, and hath wonderful Power among Men, to draw them to Virtue, and alſo to corroborate their Minds againſt the Allurements or Aſſaults of Vice; Let thoſe Men be aſham'd who have ſo tamper'd with Mankind to perſwade the contrary. This (in truth) has been vigorouſly and ſtudiouſly attempted by Mr. *Hobbs*, in his Book, *Of Liberty and Neceſſity*; But we think his principal Arguments are all lay'd low, in our Treatiſe of the *Soul's Immortality*, unto which we therefore refer. *Lib.* 2. *Cap.* 3.

VII. In the mean time, I cannot here forget, That where, among other Motives, he contends to have Man's Will neceſſarily determin'd to any profligate Action; He owns that this his Opinion of *Neceſſity* takes place among the reſt. But certainly, if that falſe Opinion have ſuch Force, as to what is Vicious and Bad; it follows, That the true Opinion, touching Liberty to fly from Evil, deſerves *L.* 3 *c.* 1. § 25.

equal

equal Force at leaſt, as to Virtue and good Life: And therefore, that a Perſwaſion, ſo efficaciouſly contributing to our Advantage, ſhould be adher'd unto, and ſtrongly contended for by us.

VIII. But to make the truth of this Opinion more manifeſt; Let us take Notice what this *Liberum Arbitrium* or *Free-Will* is; and then Demonſtrate that there is really ſuch a Principle within us. Firſt, Liberty of the Will, which the *Greeks* call *Autexouſion*, ſeems almoſt to imply, The *having a Power to Act or not Act within ourſelves.* Now in that *Free-Will* is a Principle of Acting within one's ſelf, it ſo far agrees with what the *Greeks* call *Hecouſion*, which is the ſame as *Spontaneous*: And which (as *Andronicus* defines it) is that,

Lib. 3. *Cap.* 1. *Whoſe Principle in Acting is wholly in the Agent.* Yet what he ſtraight ſubjoins in the ſame Chapter, ſaying, *That in what a Man Acts, as mov'd thereunto by himſelf, he is Lord and Maſter of Doing it, or letting it alone.* This think is not altogether ſo exact.

For a Man may Act out of his own meer Motion; that is to ſay, from ſuch inbred Principles of Virtue, and by ſo ſtrong and efficacious a ſenſe of Honeſty, as not to be able to act otherwiſe, or to draw his Will to any different Thing. For inſtance, an Honeſt Man has Power indeed, by his Wit and bodily Force, treacherouſly to deſtroy an Innocent Man, and even one that has well deſerved of him. But can that Honeſt Man do

do this Thing? No, God forbid! He dare not let himſelf do it. For that vigorous and lively ſenſe of what is Honeſt, and with which his Mind is tinctur'd and poſſeſs'd, can by no means permit him to execute ſo horrid a Villany. Now as ſuch a Perſon, tho never ſo much ſollicited by Promiſes and Rewards, ſtarts back, and (in the ſenſe of *Antonine*) ſtops all his Faculties of Motion, and does not reſign himſelf to ſo baſe a Fact; this doubtleſs is entirely *from himſelf*, and none elſe is the Cauſe, why *that* Advantage is not taken. However, I ſay, he is not, in this Caſe, ſo much Maſter of his Forbearance, as that it is in his power not to forbear. I grant (indeed) that if he would, he were able to commit ſo wicked a Thing; but that he is able to Will it, or bring his Will unto it, is what I utterly deny.

IX. We ſay therefore there is ſome Difference between having *Free-Will*, and being a *Voluntary* or *Spontaneous Agent*. The former is more reſtrain'd and particular, and obtains in fewer Caſes; the latter is more large and general. When we ſay that a Man has *Liberum Arbitrium* or *Free-Will*, we add a particular Difference to the general Notion of *Voluntarineſs*, that is to ſay, We ſuppoſe he is ſuch a voluntary Agent, as can Act and not Act as he pleaſes: Whereas to the being a voluntary Agent, ſimply or generally ſpeaking there is no ſuch Difference required. It is ſufficient to denominate

Andronicus, *Lib.* 3. *Cap.* 2.

nate any Agent to be ſuch, whoſe Principle of Action is in himſelf, and who underſtands and takes cognizance of his own Actions and the Circumſtances that relate to them: Tho, in the mean time, it may not be in his Power, every time he Acts, to Act otherwiſe than he does.

This now being the Notion of *Spontaneous* or *Voluntary*; we ſee plainly what is the Oppoſite to it; namely, every thing that proceeds either from *Ignorance*, or *Outward Force*. Whatever Action is done from either of theſe Principles, muſt needs be inſpontaneous and involuntary. For in the one Caſe (that of *Force*) the Agent does not act from his own Principles, but is compelled from without: In the other Caſe (that of *Ignorance*) tho he act from his own Principle, yet he has no Notice of the Moral Circumſtances of the Action, which if he had known, he would not have done that Action.

X. But now as to *Liberum Arbitrium*, or *Freedom of the Will*; what we call by that Name is only that ſort of Spontaneity or Voluntarineſs in us; which is ſo free and undetermin'd, that it is in our Power, to Will or Act this way or the other way, as we pleaſe. This (I ſay) is properly *Free-Will*; and it ſuppoſeth a free Election or Choice in our ſelves: And accordingly *Andronicus* (from *Ariſtotle*) defines it to be, *A deliberate Wiſhing or Appetition of thoſe Things, which are within our Power.* For thoſe things (ſays he)

Lib. 3. *Cap.* 4.

are

are the ſubjects of Deliberation, whereof every one is Maſter to do them, or to leave them undone: And theſe are thoſe very Things, which he declares to be within our Power.

Now this Power of not acting, when it regards thoſe things which are Baſe and Diſhoneſt, is a great Perfection; But when it has reſpect to things that are noble and Honeſt, 'tis a great Imperfection: For 'tis in the very next Degree of Acting diſhoneſtly, to be able to incline the Will towards an Action that is vile.

However, to know we are able, and poſſeſs'd with a Power to abſtain from a vile Thing (tho poſſibly we do not abſtain) this is a ſort of Perfective State, and of high Conſequence for a Man to diſcover in himſelf whether he have it or no.

Now that ſuch a real Power is planted in Man, of being able to abſtain from doing ill, tho he fails at ſome times to exert that Power, is very plain from the Inſtances that follow.

XI. We need not bring hereunto any other Help, than what was noted before, in the Chapter about the Interpretation of the Paſſions. For as we feel the Checks of Conſcience after doing ſome things which were doubtingly Acted, and without mature Deliberation: Even from hence it is manifeſt, that we ſometimes Act ſo, as that to have Will'd and Acted otherwiſe, was in our Power.

And this Power of abſtaining from Ill, is that very Thing, which is truly called *Free-Will.*

XII. The Reaſon alſo of *Repentance*, is
L. 1. *c.* 11. § 7. cloſe of Relation hereunto. For when we are captivated by ſome Appetite, and commit what we know, and are very ſenſible, is againſt the Dictates of Honeſty; 'tis of theſe things we are afterwards ſaid to Repent. 'Tis not ſaid, We lament ſuch things as *Misfortunes*; which they ought in reaſon to paſs for, if either by Fate, or a neceſſary Chain of Cauſes, we were always deſtin'd or irreſiſtibly determin'd to them, and that it had never been within our Power or Capacity
Lib. 2. *Cap.* 3. to have avoided them. For no Man Repents himſelf of his *Misfortunes*, but of his *Sins*; becauſe theſe are committed by his own Crime, when he might have abſtain'd, and done otherwiſe. But to Repent of *Sins*, which were never in our Power to withſtand; is as if a Man ſhould greatly lament his Improbity and Malice, or undertake ſome
L. 2. *c.* 1. § 15. ſharp Penance, for not having been Created an Angel, or elſe born a Prince. As to the like Effect we have hinted before.

XIII. But, in the laſt place, To what purpoſe do we reprehend ſome Men for what they act, pardon others, and have pity on the reſt; if Mankind be deſtitute of *Free-Will*; If it be not given him, to turn away from what is Vile, and to embrace what is Laudable and Juſt? For we might, in point of Juſtice, inſiſt upon it, that if Men are ty'd

to

to Sin, do it by *Neceſſity*, and cannot otherwiſe act; there is both Pardon and Commiſeration due unto them: Alſo by how much a Man's Sins were crying and flagitious, by ſo much would they become the more worthy of ſuch Pardon and Moral Pity. But ſince theſe things are repugnant to common Senſe, and the inbred Characters of our Mind; it follows of Neceſſity, that we muſt acknowledge ſome Actions, at leaſt, of Man to be *Free*: that is to ſay, that they ſpring from ſuch a Principle, as we have out of *Ariſtotle* deſcrib'd, and which we call *Free-Will*. And we hope no Man will doubt hereof, when we ſhall have ſatisfi'd the Two Principal Objects, wherewith the Champions of the other ſide do ſo loudly, and with ſuch Clamours, contend.

CHAP. II.

Two Principal Objections againſt Free-Will *are Propos'd and Anſwer'd.*

1. THE firſt Objection ariſeth from God's Fore knowledg; which (they ſay) muſt take away all Contingency, and, in Conſequence, the Liberty of Man's Will. *L.* 1. *c.* 11. § 5.

The ſecond is taken from the Nature of Good, altho but Apparent: For as often or

as long as any thing ſeems Good or Excellent to any one in the Circumſtances he then is in, his Will is neceſſarily compell'd to embrace it, becauſe there is no Motive either to divert him, or ſuſpend his Aſſent. For ſince the Will of Man is ſo fram'd, as to bend this Way or that, according to the Weight and Importance of the Object; it ſeems impoſſible it ſhould not bend, where moſt Reaſon compels, and when nothing is in the other Scale to counterpoiſe it: Nay, if ſomething ſhould be in the other Scale, yet ſtill that Good which is moſt Apparent will certainly outweigh. For there is no Reaſon to be rendered, why a Man ſhould be prevail'd on by a leſſer Good, more then by no Good at all: Since if, in the Scale of Reaſon, that which is Leſs ſhould weigh down that which is Greater, then a Leſs than that, till it came to Nothing, would preponderate; and alſo our Reaſon and Election would thus be mov'd by Nothing: Both which are abſurd to Believe.

Wherefore the Will evermore inclines to that Good which is moſt apparent; and upon that account 'tis neceſſarily determin'd to *One Thing*: Whence it comes to paſs, that we have no ſuch thing as *Free-Will* in us, and that we could never have acted otherwiſe than as we have already done.

II. As to the firſt of theſe Objections, the Anſwer is not hard. 'Tis true, we cannot otherwiſe think of God's Fore-knowledge, but to be every way clear and perfect, and without poſſibility

poſſibility of Error, as to thoſe Objects about which he judges or does pronounce. And ſurely he does always judge and determine of things according as they are; that is to ſay, of a contingent thing, that it is contingent; and of a neceſſary thing that it is neceſſary. Whence it comes to paſs, that thoſe things, which are contingent and proceed from a Free Principle of Acting, they are allow'd to be ſuch by God's Conſent. For we ought not to confine God's Omniſcience within narrower Bounds than we do his Omnipotence, which all Men acknowledge to be able to do whatever does not imply a Contradiction.

And therefore, to diſpatch this difficulty in a few words: We ſay that the Fore-knowledg of contingent Effects, which proceed from a Free-Principle of Acting, does either imply a Contradiction, or it does not. If it does imply a Contradiction, then ſuch Effects are not the Object of God's Omniſcience, nor determin'd by it, or rightly ſuppos'd to be determin'd at all. But if it do not imply a Contradiction, then we actually confeſs, that Divine Preſcience and Man's Free-Will, are not inconſiſtent, but that both of them may fitly ſtand with each other. Therefore by neither way, can any ſound or convincing Argument be drawn from God's Fore knowledge againſt the Liberty of Man's Will.

III. As to the other Difficulty, the whole Senſe thereof falls within this Proverbial Saying, *Nemo eſt lubens Malus, aut Beatus invitus*;

Ethic Nicom. l. 3. c. 5.

that is, No Man is willingly Wicked, or Happy againſt his Will: Or elſe into that ſaying of *Socrates*, *Omnis Improbus ignorat*, That no Man was Wicked, but through Ignorance. Which ſounds as if the Will of Man wanted nothing, but the Knowledge of what was Good and Virtuous, to force him to imbrace it: Nay, that the Will was ſo fram'd, as not to be able to reſiſt that Good, which it did but once underſtand. Now if this were true, there would not need ſo much Exhortation to the love of Virtue, as to the Study of Wiſdom; Nor would the Liberty of Man's Will conſiſt ſo much in Pre-election, as in Counſels and Deliberations: and theſe to be ſtill ſo Govern'd, as that nothing ſhould prove repugnant to ſome Excellent End.

IV. WHEREFORE inaſmuch as we find that Idea of the chief End, which is termed *Beatitude* or *Happineſs*, to be but confuſedly apprehended by us; 'tis every Man's Duty with principal Care to find out, in what this chief *Happineſs* doth conſiſt, and how we may attain it: Yet whether all this be plac'd within every Man's Reach, is a very hard thing to determine.

We ſee, the Bulk of Mankind are like thoſe; who, falling ſick of a Diſeaſe and not knowing how to cure themſelves, ought to be viſited by others that are in Health, and from them take Remedies and Advice. So the Generality, that ſee little of themſelves, while they are dazled by falſe Lights and the bare

bare Apparitions of Good, can never diſcover, What is the Ultimate Good, and what the moſt Excellent Object of Human Life. *For* (as *Ariſtotle* obſerv'd) *all men ſeek after Apparent Good; nor are they Maſters of their own Imagination; but every Man frames a different Good to himſelf, according to his Complexion.* *Ethic. Nicom. l. 3. c. 5*

V. 'Tis in the Third Book of his *Ethicks*, that the *Philoſopher* propoſes this Queſtion; and yet he does not otherwiſe clear it, than by granting, That it was ſome time or other in the Power of thoſe, who now are Blinded, to have beheld what was truly Good; and that Men are not leſs willingly Bad than Good: But this does not directly ſatisfie the Objection. Alſo he is pleas'd to expoſe it with more Words and Ornaments than is uſual with him, as in manner following, *That no Man is to himſelf the Cauſe of doing Ill, but that ſuch Things are done by Ignorance of the End, and as Hoping he ſhall thereby attain what is Beſt for him. That the Deſire of the End falls not within our Choice: but that it imports every Man to be ſo born, as Naturally to See and Diſcern that what he chooſeth is truly Good: And he, who has this Felicity by Birth, is as it were Inſpir'd, and much oblig'd to Nature. For he ſhall poſſeſs that High and Excellent Good, which could never have been had either by Purchaſe, or by Inſtruction, had it not come by Birth Right. And thus to be born, and under ſo benign a Planet, is the true Perfecting of Ingenuity.*

VI. SINCE therefore this *Natural Talent*, or *inherent Aptitude*, which is ſo capable of Virtue and the Senſe of all Good Things, is antecedent to all our Induſtry (as being the Gift of Nature, and not the Reward of our Care and Diligence) if a Man be deſtitute hereof, 'tis manifeſt that the Duties and Performances, requir'd by Virtue, are not in his Power; Neither can the ſoundeſt Admonitions find Effect or Obedience with him, unleſs he be awak'ned by Stripes and Force, or unleſs he be reform'd by ſomething of Miracle from above. But whether any are ſo utterly depriv'd of this *Natural Aptitude*, or by what Fate it befals them, if they are ſo; is to me ſo hard and perplexing a Queſtion, that I had rather wholly decline it, than involve my ſelf within ſuch Myſteries of Providence.

VII. HOWEVER, as to thoſe, who are ſo endow'd as to have ſome Native Fore-taſt of this high and Excellent Good; it ſeems to be plac'd within their Power, either to acquire to themſelves a clearer and more extended Knowledge therein, or elſe to let that by degrees extinguiſh which already they have. Into which Error, if they ſhall unhappily run; 'tis with the ſame reaſon they may be ſaid to be *Willingly wicked*, as of the Intemperate man, that he throws himſelf *Willfully into a Diſtemper*. And of whom *Andronicus* ſpeaks in this ſort, *Before the Man fell ſick, it was in his own Power to have preſerv'd his Health: But*

L. 3. *c.* 6.

But when Health is loſt by Incontinence and Debauch, it is not in his Power to Recover it. So any Man may throw a Stone to the Bottom of the Sea, but being caſt thither he cannot recover it: However the Stone was willingly caſt by him, for it was in his Power, either to Caſt, or to have with-held it.

VIII. As for thoſe Men, who throw off all Diſtinction of Things Honeſt and Vile; who have no other Senſe than of the *Animal Life*; who conſider only for themſelves, be it Right or Wrong; who think that *Good* is but of one Sort, and this only referable to Animal Content (or if, perchance, they think Good to be various, yet ſtill they fix and appropriate all to themſelves;) In ſuch Men as theſe, I do confeſs, their Will is perpetually determin'd to what is the moſt apparent Good. They enjoy no more Liberty than Brutes, whoſe Appetite is neceſſarily ty'd down to the greater Good: For they have but one ſingle Principle of Acting, and 'tis but one ſort of Object that is before their Senſe. And in this ſingle Caſe 'tis confeſs'd, that the Second Objection has its Force.

IX. But when we conſider, how there is a double Principle in the greateſt Part of Mankind; the one *Divine*, and the other *Animal*. How that the Voice and Dictate of the *Divine Principle*, is ever for that which is ſimple and abſolutely the Beſt; and Virtue propoſeth, in every of our Thoughts or Actions, that which is moſt conforming to the Eternal

L. 1. *c.* 6. § 4.

Eternal and immutable Law of Reaſon: Which (in *Tully*'s Opinion before mention'd) is the common Standard both to God and to our ſelves. When alſo, on the other ſide, we conſider that the *Animal* Principle dictates nothing to Man, but what to himſelf is either good, pleaſing, or advantageous; that is, what may be grateful to himſelf alone, tho it never ſo much violate that Law, or Univerſal Reaſon of things, before ſpoken of. I ſay, that from the Conflict and Oppoſition of theſe two Principles, we have a clear Proſpect, what is the Condition, and what the Nature, of that Free-Will whereof we treat.

L 1. c. 6. §. 4.

X. THIS is a thing, which all Men have experience of, that at ſome times, and even then when we behold clearly what were beſt and moſt conſonant to the Divine Law; yet we do not excite our Minds to it; or put on that Courage, which we know we have, to purſue ſo fair and ſo fit an Object; but yield and go on where-ever the Stream of Pleaſure, or of our own Utility, will carry us. But certainly we have the more to anſwer for herein; as at the ſame time we are inwardly conſcious, it is in our Power to over-rule all external Motions of the Body. And that, if we would obey ſuch Power, and abſtain from acting, there would nothing of that Guilt enſue, which for Self-Intereſt or Concupiſcence we too frequently incur.

XI. IN the mean time, while ſuch Men as theſe do ſtill go on, and ſtill delude themſelves

ſelves with Apologies for their Sloth and Immorality (as either truſting to the Divine Goodneſs for Pardon, or elſe putting off their Amendments to a further Day) 'tis manifeſt, that altho they do perſiſt to ſatisfie their ill Deſires, and poſtpone their Repentance to future time: yet are they convinc'd, it were far better, if already done; and that 'tis equally now, as well as hereafter, within their Power to do it. And this is enough to ſhew, how plainly, even theſe confeſs the *Liberty of Man's Will.*

XII. And thus is it made evident, that 'tis not neceſſary, that Man's Will ſhould ſtill be carried on to the greater (that is, to the more excellent) Good. For it may, according to the Liberty it hath, deſert what is abſolutely the beſt; and either cloſe with what is moſt grateful to the Animal Life, or ſuffer itſelf to be captiv'd by it, for want of exerting the Power and Faculties it hath.

XIII. And here I do as freely confeſs, that were there no other Life or Law in us, than to reliſh and purſue what were moſt for our particular Pleaſure, and not that which is the moſt ſimple and moſt abſolute Good, (which aſſuredly is ſome Divine Thing, and by Nature congruous and conſonant to that Eternal Wiſdom, which has fram'd and does preſerve the Univerſe) it would be hard to prove, that we had any Free-Will; or that our Will was not neceſſarily determin'd to ſome one thing, which, as

in all Deliberations, appear'd to us for the beſt.

XIV. But, on the other ſide, it is plain and manifeſt to me, that this Divine Law is as perfectly in us, as the Animal; and that Right Reaſon is that Law (and it is a high Gift and Bleſſing of God unto mortals) by which we are taught, and ſtand bound, to prefer publick Good before our private, and never to make our own Pleaſure or Utility to be the Meaſure of human Actions. And whoever he be, that thinks himſelf juſtly diſcharged from the Obligation of this Heavenly Law; I am bold to affirm, he deſerves to paſs for the moſt vile, as well as moſt contemptible, Creature upon Earth.

XV. Thus much of *Free-Will*, and with what Brevity and Perſpicuity we are able: For what concerns the chief Arguments, or rather Sophiſms of Mr. *Hobbs*; we have ſufficiently refuted them in our Treatiſe *Of the Immortality of the Soul*: Whereunto the Reader is already refer'd. So that we now paſs to thoſe Theorems or Precepts, which are uſeful in the acquiring of Virtue.

Lib. 2. *c.* 3.

CHAP.

Chap. III.

Theorems, which are of general Uſe, in the Acquiring of Virtue.

I. THE *Theorems* or Precepts, which are ſubſervient to the acquiring of Virtue, are either *General* or *Special*

And the *General* are reduc'd to three Heads.

1. To prove that we ought to labour after Virtue.

2. That 'tis in our Power to attain it.

3. To add a few efficacious Precepts to that End.

II. THAT *we ought to purſue Virtue, and fly from Vice,* is a thing clearly manifeſt to us by the Senſe and Dictate of Conſcience. Moreover that we are obliged to perform all the Duties of Virtue, is plain, from that Law of Reaſon, which God has implanted in us: for that Intellect, or Right Reaſon, which is in us, is a ſuperior thing; and all other Faculties are, by Natural Right, ſubjected to its Obedience. But the Law of Virtue, and of Right Reaſon, is altogether the ſame. For Virtue ſeeks nothing in every Action, but what is ſimply the beſt, and that which to Right Reaſon is moſt conſonant. And ſince this Law of Virtue, and Right Reaſon, is not any poſitive or arbitrary Thing, but of a Nature eternal and immutable; we cannot therefore

fore doubt, but we are bound to obey its Precepts and Directions by an external and indiſſoluble Obligation.

III. FURTHERMORE all Men are bound, by the common Law of Nature, to do what appertains unto them; I mean, thoſe things which are conſonant to their own Natures. So that Men ſhould live like Men, and not as Brutes; but certainly if Life wants the Fruit of Virtue and of Right Reaſon, 'tis not manly but meerly brutal.

Whatever is in us, beneath Virtue and Right Reaſon, muſt not (as *Plotinus* ſays) be reputed to be of us, but rather as a certain *Brutal Addition*, ſavouring of the Lion or the Bear, which is to be ſubdu'd, and made obſequious to the true Nature of Man. For we only are that thing, which is moſt eminent in us, and by which alone we excel other Creatures. So *Andronicus Rhodius* declares, *Every Man to be that, which is beſt and principal in him; and that he who liv'd according thereunto, is rightly ſaid, to live unto himſelf, and to enjoy moſt his own Life and Being.* But he noted a little before, how abſurd a thing it would appear, for any one to reject his own Life, to chuſe that of another. This he calls *A wild and horrid Choice*; and thinks them guilty of it, who prefer Concupiſcence unto Virtue: ſince they exchange thereby the human ſtate, for that which is low and irrational.

L. 10. c. 9.

IV. BESIDES, if every Man be a Debtor to himſelf, and to his Concerns; and is bound, by

by Foreſight, to put off and diſappoint all great Misfortunes: Surely we ought to cultivate and embrace that Virtue, without whoſe Aid we can neither avoid the Calamities of this Life, or the Pains of a Future. That *Hell*, I mean, which is threatned not only by true Religion, but by the very Philoſophy of *Plato*, and of others.

V. Lastly, Altho we ſhould not ſeem ty'd by Duty, to chuſe that which was beſt for our ſelves (becauſe no Injury, as they ſay, can be done to a Willing Man) Yet ſeeing we are not born by Chance, but made and created by God above, doubtleſs we are his own by Right of Creation. And, he having an unlimited Juriſdiction over us, we are bound to do all thoſe Things, which by his Divine Laws, he has required of us.

And ſurely his Divine Law is no other, than Eternal and Immutable Reaſon; which being Right is evermore one and the ſame, even as the Figure of a Triangle or Circle, that changeth never. This is what the Almighty has put into us. And, in the Words of *Hierocles*, *'Tis to preſide over the Soul, as it were a Domeſtic God.* 'Tis the Judge and Oracle we are to conſult in all our Actions. For as nothing is dictated from thence, but the meer Tranſcripts of the Divine Will: So the Top of all is this, that we ſhake off whatever is vicious, and apply our ſelves wholly to that which is Virtuous and Good.

VI. 'Tis

VI. 'Tis to the like Effect, what the ſame *Hierocles* does (in his Comment on the *Golden Verſes* of *Pythagoras*) declare: Namely, *That God, being not only the Legiſlator who makes the Law, but the Judge alſo whoſe part it is to expound and have it Executed; does not only enact what is Good, but knows how to eradicate all that is Evil. That the whole Scope of the Law refers to that which is congruous unto God, and profitable to Man: And that this was to be effected not only by Weeding and Rooting out of all Vice, but by putting the Soul under ſuch a Diſcipline of Juſtice, as might purge her from contracted Evils, and reſtore her to the Uſe and Exerciſe of Right Reaſon.* Wherefore ſince this Eternal Law of Right Reaſon has regard to a Judge and Legiſlator without us, one ſo Powerful, and to whom by the Right of Creation alſo we are ſubjected; I affirm that it is not allowed unto us, to be Miſerable; But we ſtand oblig'd by Law Inviolable, to aſpire unto Virtue, and to true Felicity.

VII. But that it lies not only on our Part to aſpire unto Virtue, but is plainly in our Power to attain it, has been before made out: Namely, becauſe we are endow'd with a Free-Will, and are told by Natural Conſcience, That in what we have done amiſs, it was in our Power to have done otherwiſe. 'Tis manifeſt, we have it in our Power wonderfully to corroborate and extend this Faculty; and that either if we abſtain from Indifferent

rent things, when they ſeem greatly to delight us; or elſe ſubmit unto others, meerly becauſe harſh and unpleaſing; that ſo, by degrees, we may conquer all our Averſions to them.

For it ſeems plainly in our Power, either to move, or to reſtrain, this *External Engine*: Altho perhaps in thoſe Interior Motions, which old Philoſophers call the *firſt Eruptions of Nature*, our Authority is not ſo Abſolute. But however it be, that Variety of Deſires, as well as of Averſion, creep eaſily upon us; Yet 'tis, in a manner, at our own Diſcretion, either to turn away from ſuch Objects as are Tempting, or to converſe with thoſe that are leſs Grateful to us

Did we but, in Things Indifferent, purſue this Courſe ſo far as Health and Good Manners ſhould allow; 'Tis ſtrange how ſoon we ſhould find the increaſe of Power in our Free-Will, and all things, as it were, in our Liberty, and at Command. And did we not over-eaſily humour our Cupidities and Averſions, they would ſoon grow faint, and Reaſon have the Aſcendant over them all.

VIII. But there are yet other Arguments to Evince, That it lies almoſt wholly in us, to become Men of Probity and Virtue. For it is manifeſtly in our Power to be Sincere; Since here I mean nothing elſe, by *Sincerity*, than a conſtant purpoſe of doing all that is in our Power to the obtaining of true Virtue. But that we ſhould not be able, to do whatever

is in our Power to do, is not leſs than a Contradiction: And therefore 'tis in our Power to be *Sincere.*

IX. Now let every Plain and Sincere Man (for his Comfort) know, That he is fortify'd, and girt about with a ſpecial Degree of Providence; And that even God is at Hand to aſſiſt all his Endeavours, juſt as *Hercules* (in the Fable) put his Shoulder to the Wheel, to help the poor labouring Countryman with all the ſtrength he had. For Nature is every where repleniſh'd with Divine Aſſiſtants, and Good Spirits; ſuch, I mean, as ſeek out proper Objects, on whom to caſt their Eyes of Favour. And being true Champions of undefiled Simplicity, they delight to be Miniſterial to Souls that are Sincere. They do by Good Offices diſintangle ſuch Men from the Snares of this World; and lift them from the Impurities of Life, to a ſtate of Safety that is unblemiſh'd. But for Men of wavering and inconſtant Minds, thoſe they reject; And paſs them over, juſt as Artificers do in Work, thoſe Materials, which are either untractable or unſound. The ſaying of *Hierocles* is not only true in reſpect of Subſtances, but alſo of Qualities: Namely, *That the Law of Providence was as Extenſive as all the Beings of the Univerſe.* But if it be to be taken, in general, of all other Men, what he ſpoke but a little before: Namely, *That Juſtice and Order had, for the Adminiſtration of our Affairs, appointed, That the Immortal Gods, who walk*

L. 2. *c.* 10. § 16.

walk before us, ſhould Meditate of our Condition, and not only cauſe a Diminution of our Sins, but think how to recall us again unto themſelves. Alſo that they regarded us, as Relations that were lapſ'd, and were even ſollicitous for our Reſtoration. How much the more aſſured then may we be, that God, and his Holy Angels, will aſſiſt the Sincere and Faithful Souls! Inaſmuch as there is no Bulwark founded upon Vice, that can reſiſt his Power, without being ſoon overthrown, or ſhatter'd into Duſt.

X. ADD hereunto, That God himſelf vouchſafes, by ſome Inward Motions, to communicate and deal benignly with us. For as ſoon as we advance to the Knowing what appertains to Virtue, and become *Maſters of the Divine Senſe*, there is a certain Power above all that is Human, that aſſociates with us and gets into us. But as, when Men yield themſelves to Animal Complacences, and are dipt in the Impurities of Nature; they afterwards run headlong to every pernicious thing, and ſeem fatally ty'd down by ſome Chains that are Inviſible, ſo as when Remorſe prompts them to return, they cannot ariſe: So, on the other ſide, thoſe who, with Sincere Affections, do even pant and thirſt after Virtue, They on the ſudden are caught up by *that Intellectual Spirit, which repleniſhes every Thing*; They are animated and ſupported by it, and finally therewith join'd in the ſtricteſt aſſociation of Love. So that, to conclude in the Words of

Lib. 3. *Cap.* 10. § 16.

L. 1. *c.* 6. § 8.

Marcus Antoninus.

Plato, *They are as Men rapt up, and inſpir'd by ſome Divinity*; and they are eaſily and ſpontaneouſly led on to every Good Work.

XI. THIS alſo is the Senſe of what we quoted before, out of *Antonine*: Namely, That we ſtood bound, not only to conſpire with the very Air that ſurrounds us, but to concur with that Intellectual Power, which comprehends All. *For* (ſays he) *this Intel-*
L. 8. § 54. *lectual Power, was no leſs diſpers'd, and even extended to every Man, who was prepar'd to Imbibe it, than was the open Air to him, who had Lungs, and a Deſire to Breath it.* 'Tis plain, we want nothing for attracting this Power unto us, but that Sincere Love, by which we are taught the true Reliſh of Virtuous Things. For 'tis thus alone we can grow upwards, and have Conjunction with God himſelf; Since Virtue, being the Divineſt of all Things, has moſt Power to aſſimilate us unto Him. Thus *Hierocles* pronounces (in his ſaid Commentary on the Verſes of *Pythagoras*;) *That if an Inſpir'd Senſe be but ſufficiently fix'd and eſtabliſh'd, it gives us a Conjunction with God: For it was neceſſary that a like Thing ſhould be carry'd unto its Like.*

I wou'd therefore now ask, Whether any thing, in the Duties of Virtue, can be too hard for us, if we are but United to ſo Great and Potent an Ally? Or how can we doubt of God, and his Holy Providence, while his Grace, his Life, his Energy, are felt ſenſibly in us? For it is God's Life, rather than our own;

own; if by putting off our Selves, (that is, our Animal Affections) we contend and pant after that alone, which is Eminently Good: and which only belongs to God, who equally conſults the Benefit of the whole Univerſe. Wherefore we are not to diſtruſt, but that, being aſſiſted by ſo ſtrong a Principle, and ſo prevailing a Guide, we may in the End attain unto the Perfection of Virtue.

XII. We muſt not, in the laſt place, here omit, That there are ſome Methods for the more eaſie accompliſhing of this Work: Such as, *Seriouſly and frequently to Meditate of our Diſſolution; the certain End of this Frail Body; And alſo of the Immortality of our Souls.* For 'tis impoſſible that this ſhould not, in a large Meaſure, extinguiſh all thoſe Deſires and Appetites, which center in the Body; If we but think how ſoon the Viſible Man, and this Corporeal Shape we carry about us, muſt crumble and be ſhatter'd into Atoms; how all the preſent Furniture of this Fabrick, ſuch as Wealth and Honour, and all the Luxuries they attract, muſt ever and for ever be ſnatch'd away and rifled from it. Who then would not, in due time, conſider how to place a very moderate and indifferent Value on ſuch periſhable Things, and ſtrive to wean himſelf, by degrees, from the Dominion and Inſolence of this Fleſh! This is the only Way to bring the Soul to thoſe Operations that are Pure, and to thoſe Pleaſures that are Divine;

having no Reference or Dependence at all on Carnal Things. And this indeed was the Top of all *Plato*'s Philoſophy, which made him therefore ſtyle it, *The Meditation of* Death.

Hiſt. Nat. l. 7. c. 50.

XIII. 'Tis true, *Pliny* perverſly enough intimates, as if this were, *To Die by Wiſdom*: But that, which is the moſt perfect Wiſdom, muſt not be call'd a *Diſeaſe*. For who is the Wiſer Man? He that forecaſts what may hereafter happen; Or he that, by plunging into Luxury and the Train of Evils attending it, ſhall firſt ſubmit, and then be Oppreſs'd? Let Virtue therefore be that Mark, which is evermore in our Sight: Since ſhe alone is Immortal, even as the Soul; nor indeed has the Soul any other proper Ornament or Perfection, but Virtue. Nay, ſuch is the Affinity between her and the Soul's Immortality; that, for the moſt part, there is a kind of Senſe and Perception of Immortality engendred in us, as ſoon as the Soul grows virtuous.

XIV. In the Second Place, let us conſider, *How conſummate and even ineffable that Pleaſure is that fills and poſſeſſes the Soul in Virtue.* For ſeeing the Diſtemper and Lapſe of the Soul, is from a ſtate of Virtue into that of Vice; it cannot otherwiſe be, but that, when ſhe is call'd back to her Primitive Condition, there muſt be Raptures of Joy, at ſuch Reſtitution. For the Philoſophers make *Pleaſure*, in its very Definition, to be, *The Reſtitution to a Natural State.* But

But ſurely, the moſt Natural State of that which partakes of Reaſon, muſt be Virtue: inaſmuch as Virtue is nothing elſe, but a conſtant Aptitude and Propenſity to the Dictates of Right Reaſon.

To which we may add what is noted by *Ariſtotle*, That this Pleaſure is ours by a ſort of Propriety; and therefore it muſt be both Joyful and Excelling: *For that which is moſt appropriate to the Nature of every Thing, is the trueſt and moſt Genial Delight.* But unto Man there is nothing more proper than Right Reaſon: And therefore that Pleaſure, which ariſeth from a conſtant Dedication of the Mind thereto, muſt in many Conſiderations excel the reſt. *Andronicus, l. 10. c. 9. Ariſtot. cap. 7.*

XV. In the third Place, we may here ſuperadd, *That this Life of Virtue, and this Pleaſure reſulting from it, is the moſt Divine of all other Things.* For a Soul, that is got thus far, has nothing farther to wiſh, unleſs out of Vanity, to aim at ſomething which is more perfect than even the Deity itſelf. But alas, that which is a Creature cannot be Good: For all that he can have muſt be by Participation, and through the help of Virtue, which (as all confeſs) is a ſort of Divine Nature and God-like Life. For the Creature, as he is Animal, can only follow what is grateful to the Appetite: 'Tis, as he is the Image of God, that he proſecutes that which is ſimply and eminently the Beſt.

Wherefore as to this Point, *Hierocles*, while he owns both Life and Pleaſure ariſing from Virtue, to be perfectly Divine, does dexterouſly play the Philoſopher in ſaying, *Since therefore Life, which conforms to Virtue, and ſo carries a Divine Similitude, muſt needs be Divine; and that which abides in Vice, muſt needs be Brutiſh and Atheiſtical: 'Tis manifeſt, that the Pleaſures of a Good Man are Imitations of Divine Joy, becauſe his Mind is Aſſociating with Good; Whereas that which is ſtyled the Pleaſure of a Wicked Wretch, is only a Commotion that is altogether ſtupid and Brutal.*

In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.

And hereto alſo refers, what the ſame Philoſopher ſpeaks of that *Reaſon*, which is the Rule of Virtue, ſaying, *That to obey Right Reaſon, and to Obey God, is the ſame Thing: For a Rational Being, that ſufficiently partakes of Natural Illumination, Wills and Covets the ſame Things, which the Divine Law ordains. And a Soul, that is fram'd according to God, falls into the ſame Determinations with God; and, by contemplating that Light and Majeſty which is Divine, does the ſame things, which God in like Circumſtances would do.*

XVII. MANY things of the ſame Force, occur in ancient Writers, and more eſpecially in *Antoninus* and *Cicero*; which from what has been cited will eaſily be believ'd. We ſhall therefore add, out of the firſt Book of *Tully de Legibus*, only that ſhort ſaying, Namely, *That Virtue was in Man, the ſame as in God.* But if the Caſe ſtand thus, What can be a more

more Natural, or binding Conjugation between them, than this is? 'Tis alſo referable to the Pleaſure of Virtue and of the Divine Life, what the ſame *Cicero* ſays elſewhere, in adviſing a Man to conſult his own *Delphic* Oracle, that is, *The Knowledg of Himſelf and of his own Soul:* For thus the Mind, being made ſenſible how exempt it was from Vice, and how conjoin'd to the Divine Nature; it might be filled with Joys that were unſpeakable. *Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 5.*

XVIII. THE truth is, there was little need, thus to heap up, and with the Authority of the *Ancients* thus to adorn, what, as we have ſo often affirmed, was by the very Nature and Definition of Virtue ſo ſufficiently manifeſt. For to proſecute what is Simply the Beſt, and not what is moſt grateful to the *Animal Nature*, has ſtill been inculcated to be ſomething Divine, and manifeſtly elevated above the Animal State. Wherefore we muſt not barely confine our ſelves to the Beſt Principle we find about us, but muſt live up to that, which our Nature, at its full improvement, is moſt capable of; and that which is truly and really Divine. And this is what ought to be eſteem'd the Supreme Pleaſure, the Chief Good, and Ultimate End; In which our Soul, as in its higheſt Perfection and Felicity, ought only to Acquieſce.

XIX. SUCH Reflections as theſe, can ſcarce ever fail to inflame our Minds in the Study of Virtue. And there are yet ſome farther things

things which may facilitate, and guide us in the ſame courſe. Among which the firſt Rule of *Antoninus*, is, *That we never meddle with any thing raſhly, or without due Conſultation.*

XX. ANOTHER is of *Epictetus*, *Never to act any Thing againſt our own Conſcience*; But that, as well in Small Matters as in Great, we preſerve it ſound and unſhaken. And to this End let another Precept of the ſame Philoſopher be ſtill before us, *Quicquid videtur Optimum, id Lex eſto tibi inviolabilis.* Whatever appears unto you to be Beſt, let it be unto you as an Inviolable Law; For he that once learns (tho even with the aſſent of Conſcience) to reject a Greater Good, for the ſake of a Leſs; 'tis odds, but in time he may learn, even for the ſame Reaſon, to throw off his ſmall Reſidue of Good, and ſo plunge himſelf totally into Vice. For that part of Good, which he firſt refuſed, was equally as good as the Remainder, which he may alſo as eaſily part withal. Wherefore we muſt both early and diligently watch againſt all ſorts of Depravity: For preſent Sin makes way for a Future; and every Sin we commit makes a Link of that Iron-Chain, by which we are ty'd down to inextricable Sorrow, and to Darkneſs that will have no End.

Enchiridion c. 75.

XXI. THE third Rule is, *That whatever Work we ſet about, let it appear we do not forget Virtue in the doing of it.* There is a double Manner of proceeding in every Buſineſs, not only

only a Right Way and a Wrong; but a Gentle and a Rough; a Violent Way and a Moderate. Wherefore 'tis of no ſmall Moment, in the courſe of our Life to hit upon the Beſt; and that commonly is the Beſt, which ſavours moſt of Moderation, Grace and *Decorum.*

XXII. FOURTHLY, *That we do by Ardent Prayers contend, that Good would pour into us a ſufficiency of ſtrength, for the Acquiſition of Virtue,* No Mortal ought to be aſham'd to Beg, and to accept from Him ſo Divine a Gift, from whom he had alſo his Being. For we dare Affirm, that whoever pretends to Virtue, without Imploring it at God's Hand, will only catch the empty Shadow thereof. *Cicero* obſerv'd, *That no Man could be Great, but as Illuminated by ſome Ray, or Inſpir'd by ſome Breath from Heaven.* And if nothing be of a more Heavenly Nature than Virtue, 'tis then impoſſible to have it without the Help of God. *De Natu-Deorûm, l. 2.*

XXIII. NOR muſt any Man wonder, that we annex Prayers unto *Moral Philoſophy*; ſince we have already made Piety an Eſſential part thereof. *Epictetus*, *Plato*, *Andronicus*, and other Philoſophers, have done the like. And here let us obſerve the words of *Hierocles*, who has in this Part exceeded the reſt, *'Tis not enough* (ſays he) *with Promptitude and Vigor, to enterprize that which is Laudable, as if the ſucceſs were wholly in our Power, and without need of aſſiſtance from God. No, we muſt Implore* *In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.*

Implore the Divine Aid; and not only Implore it, but Endeavour alſo to Obtain by our Induſtry, what we ask in our Prayer. For otherwiſe we make Virtue as it were a ſhare in Atheiſm and Hypocriſie; or elſe render our own Prayers Ineffectual. The firſt of which by its Impiety would take away the very Eſſence of Virtue, and the latter by Stupidity would extinguiſh the Nature of Prayer.

Xenophon de Adminiſtratione domeſticâ.

De Legibus l. 2.

Arrian, Comment. l. 2. c. 18.

Let us hereunto add that ſaying out of *Socrates* mentioned by *Xenophon*, *That every Undertaking ſhould begin with a Recommendation thereof to the Gods*; and that of *Cicero*, *That the Riſe and Source of all our Actions be founded with the Immortal Gods.* Likewiſe that of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, *That whatever work we take in hand, be it great, or be it ſmall, never to begin without firſt Invoking of God.* And laſtly that excellent ſaying of *Epictetus*, as to the Government and ſubduing of the Affection; He ſays, *This is in truth a great Conflict, and a work meerly Divine. Wherefore think upon God, and call upon his Holy Aid and Aſſiſtance; juſt as the poor Mariners do, in a ſinking Condition, upon* Caſtor *and* Pollux. *For what greater Tempeſt can there be, than what ariſeth from violent Imaginations, ſuch as Toſs and diſtract Reaſon, and by which it is in danger of ſhipwrack?* As this Sentence is of moment to the Point in hand; ſo it appears how many of the other Philoſophers inſiſted upon fervent *Prayer*: For we do not only hereby acknowledg him, who is the Fountain of all Virtue;

Virtue; but we own, that 'tis God only, that can Bleſs, and Crown all our Endeavours for it with Succeſs.

XXIV. HOWEVER 'tis not here underſtood, that thoſe are the Longeſt, or the Loudeſt, or the moſt Eloquent; but rather thoſe ſhort and frequent Ejaculations, which the Soul, after long and convincing thoughtfulneſs, ſends up to Heaven: Such, I mean, as are attended with ſighs and a vehement Yerning after God and Virtue. For by ſuch pious Anxiety, we exerciſe and rarifie the Blood and Spirits; we pour into them new ſupplies of pure and hallow'd Air; we corroborate and augment our inward Sentiments of Heaven, and ſend up our Prayers, as in a Chariot of Light or Fire. So that as, in theſe frevent and holy Paintings, we do (in a ſort) draw God into the Soul; we do, in like manner, breath back nothing but that which is Celeſtial and Divine.

XXV. THE fifth and laſt Precept is that of *Pythagoras*, *That we fail not every Night, before we take Reſt, to ſum up the Actions of the paſt Day.* Thus if we have done any thing well, we may give God the thanks and glory of it: But, if otherwiſe, then to repent of the Miſdoing, and by this means daily fix and ſettle in our minds a reſolution of acting in every thing according to the moſt perfect Rule of Virtue.

Mollia

Mollia nec priùs obducat tua Lumina Somnus,
Exacti quàm ter reputâſti Facta Diei:
Quid laſpus feci? Quid rectè? Quid boni omiſi?

The obſerving of this Rule would work a ſtrange Reformation in our Manners; and kindle in us great Reſolutions to Virtue.

CHAP. IV.

Things which contribute to the Attaining of the Primitive Virtues.

I. WHAT we have hitherto deliver'd, for acquiring Virtue in the general, is in Truth, if proſecuted, of that Effect, that it looks ſuperfluous to deſcend unto Particulars. And yet we will touch theſe alſo, tho in a very few words.

As to the Three Primitive Virtues, this we admoniſh, if not repeat, That no ſort of Virtue can either be acquir'd or practis'd or even well thought on without them. Wherefore the intire poſſeſſion of theſe *Three Firſt*, is indiſpenſible.

II. PRUDENCE is the Firſt of all; And how this is to be compaſſed, does by its Definition and Explication (in the *Second Book*) ſufficiently

ſufficiently appear. But as it reaches and preſides, as far as things of Action or Contemplation can go; let us, in our way, refer to the firſt of theſe, that ſaying of *Antoninus*, *That we Critically examine our preſent Imaginations, leſt any thing creep in, that is not throughly weigh'd and underſtood.* This he again inculcates by another great Rule; namely, *That whatever falls within our Imagnitation; we ſhould ſtill frame ſome Definition, and paint out the Lineaments thereof. That ſo we may behold it naked and intire, and what it is in its whole Eſſence, and in every Part.* And this ſurely is the great Buſineſs of *Prudence.* For how elſe are Men carry'd away, or come to be diſappointed, in what they ſhould avoid or purſue; but for not looking round, and not taking into conſideration both the Whole and the Part? They catch things at firſt ſight, and from ſome few parts, which *Pleaſe* or *Diſpleaſe*, determine the Fate of all the reſt. Thus they become very groſs Accountants; For while they computed and raſhly caſt up what in Bulk or value is but part of the Thing (as if it were the whole) they are not capable of Judging; and only diſcover, that Precipitation is the Root of moſt Miſtakes. *Lib.* 2. *Sect.* 54. *Lib.* 3. *Sect.* 11.

It were good therefore, to obſerve the Advice that *Epictetus* gave him who was ſo very intent to conquer at the *Olympic* Games: Namely, *That he ſhould well revolve in his Mind, what things were Antecedent, and what Conſequent to that Enterpriſe; and then ſtick cloſe*

close to the Work. And to this belongs what he adds in the following Chapter, O *Man, first consider what the Work is, and then thy own Nature, if thou art able to support it.* For if these be not adjusted, we shall quickly pass as vain Projectors, repenting that we ever set forth, and sharing in the Contempts and scorns of the Unfortunate.

To this kind of Prudence we may refer that most Excellent Admonition of *Epicharmus, Be thou sober, and remember to Distrust; For these Things are the very Nerves of Wisdom.* And, as consonant hereunto, let us add this Advice of our own, *Never much to believe either Fortune or Men: but to trust in God and Virtue which can never Change.* For Men differ, in few Days, even from themselves; and their Wills and Counsels are not to morrow the same

III. But as to the Second Branch, about things Contemplative; let the searcher of Wisdom take these few Rules.

To suspend his Assent till the Thing be clearly and distinctly understood.

That whatever Things may be, in their own Natures; yet to afford them in our Reasoning no other place, than as they are manifest to the Faculties of our Mind.

That the inward and naked Essence of a Thing cannot be known, but only its Essential Attributes, or its Essential Properties.

That

That Eſſential Attributes muſt immediately be in, and belong to, the Subject: Nor ought any Phyſical Reaſon be ask'd, or can be given, why they are in it.

That the Idea of every Thing, does conſiſt of certain Eſſential Attributes.

That to the perfect Knowledge of any Thing, ſuch an Idea or Notion therefore is requiſite; as is not only clear and diſtinct, but full and adequate: ſo as to comprehend all thoſe inſeparable Attributes, which appertain unto it. For 'tis poſſible, either by Induſtry or by Neglect, ſo to think of a Subject, as not to think of any of thoſe Attributes, which in truth are inſeparable from it: And this, I fanſie, *Des Cartes* has done, in his Notion of the Human Soul; while he *Defines* it *only by Cogitation.*

Laſtly, To diſtruſt him, whoſe Mind is not yet refin'd; To credit no Maſters, or any Faculty whatever, except Reaſon, ſolid Experience, and the Intellect (which is the Wardrobe of Common Notions.)

IV. As to the Second of theſe Great Vertues, which is *Sincerity*; you may, as to Men, weigh it in this Ballance. To obſerve if you treat them in the ſame manner, as you would be willingly treated by them: And mind ſtill what is ſaid by *Cicero, That there is no one Thing ſo like or ſo Equal to another, as are all Men to one another.* Whence 'tis manifeſt that, where Circumſtances are the ſame, we are mutually obliged in the ſame manner to treat each other. *De Legibus, l. 1.*

But as to God and Virtue, your *Sincerity* will appear, if you ſo debaſe your ſelf, and all you have, in reſpect of them; that you even deſire to give up Liberty, Fortune, and Life it ſelf for their ſakes. Now, if you feel within you a reſolution of this Force, you may then conclude you are come to the perfection of Patience. But for poor wretched Creatures as we are; ſhould we, on the other hand, prefer and eſteem of our ſelves above God and Virtue; It were ſo lewd and ſo abhorrent a Crime, that this thought alone (if we would but think it) were enough to conſtrain us to be *Sincere*.

V. Nor is the Argument for *Patience* of leſs weight. Since the Juſt, who die for the Cauſe of God and of Virtue, are not only Crown'd with Immortality, but their Souls adorn'd with Glory; which is a double Reward. And it will contribute not a little to this Virtue; if here we take in, what before was advis'd for augmenting the power of *Free-Will*; namely, That we ſet our ſelves vigorouſly to abſtain from all thoſe things, which to the Corporeal and to the Animal Life are moſt grateful: Alſo that, as far as Health and good Manners will permit, we inure our ſelves reſolutely to harſh and unpleaſing things. For if we but firmly maintain theſe Characters, we ſhall ſoon find enlargement in our *Inward Faculties:* We ſhall excite within us not only joy, but a new greatneſs of Soul, and feel our ſelves in a ſtate to enterpriſe every

very thing that is Honourable. We ſhall not account we have loſt, but only chang'd, our Delights: ſeeing the Soul, by a ſenſe of Adhering unto, and Reverencing, the Precepts of Virtue, ſhall attain a Joy not Corporeal, but diſtinct and peculiar to it ſelf, and be even raviſh'd with the Fruition thereof.

CHAP V.

How the Three Principal Derivative Vertues may be acquir'd.

I. AS for *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, and *Temperance*: We ſay firſt, that the principal part of *Juſtice*, which is true *Piety*, will, in the Minds of Candid Men, ſoon take root, if they but take the Image of *Impiety*; and ſee how Rude, how Barbarous, and how void of all good Nurture it is. For does any Man among us neglect a Benefactor to his Face? Do we not rather load him with Honours, and make our Acknowledgements as profound, and as anſwerable to his Bounties, as we can? How then ſhall we put that upon God, which even among Men is not permitted without Shame? This alone, unto a generous Mind, is motive enough, and a ſufficient Spur unto *Piety*. But for others, let them take warning, leſt by Ingratitude they forfeit all Title to Fa-

vour: Let them, in time, conſider that Divine Vengeance will be as diligent to find them out, as they are now drouzy and regardleſs towards their Creator. Yet as to the manner of Worſhip, let this be a Rule to all, that we ſo adhere to God's outward and publick Service; as not to omit our inward and private Devotions, which are certainly the deareſt Part.

L. 2. c. 2. 5. We have already obſerv'd, That the internal Worſhip is a true *Imitation of God.* And this Opinion is not a little inforc'd by what the *Pythagorean* in *Hierocles*, ſays, *That we then worſhip God in the beſt manner, when we bring our Minds to a Reſemblance of him; Since what a Man loves he endeavours to Imitate.* And a little after, *That coſtly Oblations bring no Honour to God, if they are not offer'd with a Godly Mind. That the Sacrifices of the Wicked are but as Stubble to the Fire, and their Holy Donatives ſerve only but for Booty to the ſacrilegious.* And as for a Temple, he adds this ſhort Deſcription thereof, *That there is not on Earth a fitter place for God, than is a puriſi'd Soul.* And to this Senſe, he brings *Apollo* himſelf, pronouncing the Similitude between Heaven and a Holy Mind.

Æquè Animis ſanctis, atq; ipſo Ego lætor Olympo.

I do not greater pleaſure find
In Heav'n, than in a holy Mind.

III. But

III. But, having quoted thus much, let us not omit what the ſame Author more elegantly and at large, ſets forth: to wit, *That the wiſe Man is the only Prieſt; He only is acceptable to God, and He only knows how to pray unto him. For he only knows how to Worſhip God aright, who is arrived to Divine Knowledge: He, I ſay, that offers himſelf for a Sacrifice; that converts his Soul into a Divine Monument; and whoſe Mind is prepar'd as a Temple, for the reception of Heavenly Light.* Here 'tis to be obſerv'd that the Man whom *Hierocles* calls *Wiſe*, *Ariſtotle* calls *Prudent.* But both are in reality the ſame, as being endow'd with Virtue: For Virtue, which is true and rais'd up to Perfection, and which becomes thereby the Image of God, is certainly God's beſt Worſhip. Yet this Inward Gift never contends againſt thoſe Rites and Forms in Religion, that are decent and eſtabliſht by Law.

IV. As to the other Branch of *Juſtice*, which is *Probity*; and commonly call'd by the Name of *Juſtice*, in a ſtricter Senſe: This ought to be much in the care of all pious Men, as 'tis a Branch of that Piety, which is a principal part of Virtue; and which hath been demonſtrated (in our *Second Book*) to be the beſt way of God's Worſhip. For *Probity* is the Bond of Society, and of all Human Concerns; and the whole World is in a manner ſo ty'd together and ſupported by it, that if this Pillar were ſhaken, the ruin of all muſt follow. Wherefore all Men are bound *Lib. 2. Cap. 5.*

to defend it, and to regard it even as an hallowed Thing.

V. But if any Man who for barely containing himſelf within the bounds of Human Law, ſhall thereupon pretend unto the Character of *Juſt*; we ſhall venture to call this rather *Dexterity* or Artifice, than true *Juſtice*. For ſuch a one feels no Concern as the Publick Good; his thoughts are all about himſelf; and *Juſtice* (which conſults the good of others) has no part in his Meditations; ſince they are bounded and limited by Self-love. So that if a man of this frame ſhould but live to ſee the Laws laid by, he would ſtart immediately into another ſhape. He, who but yeſterday was according to the letter of the Law, a very preciſe Elder, turns either *Libertine*, or as ravenous as an Evening Wolf. Wherefore let him, who deſires to be truly Juſt, not believe that he is already ſo; unleſs he finds that, if there were no Laws, he could contain himſelf, and ſtill be Maſter of the ſame Deſires.

VI. As to *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, we may here repeat what before we offer'd concerning *Patience*. *Hierocles* calls them all, *The Adamantine keepers of the Soul*: If you diſcharge them, ſhe preſently is betray'd to all Temptations and Calamity. But how neceſſary *Fortitude* is, will appear by that Excellent ſaying of *Andronicus*: Namely, *That ſome things are ſo Diſhoneſt, as not to afford the Ill doer the leaſt ſhadow or pretence of Excuſe.*

In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.

Lib. 3. *Cap.* 1.

And

And therefore that a Man muſt vigorouſly withſtand theſe things, and not only indure Torment on ſuch account, but even immediate Death.

Wherefore there is no Argument that more helps a Man to ſtudy *Fortitude*, and how to acquire it; than to conſider how miſerable we are without it; 'tis elſe in the power of every inſolent ſuperior, either by Threats or by Oppreſſion, to make the timorous Man as vile and as obſequious as he pleaſes. And what greater torment or ſervitude can there happen to an ingenuous Mind, than (with Guilt and Confuſion) to own, that, as ſoon as the terror of any great miſchief looks towards him; he ſhall not only ſhrink from Truth and Virtue, but even contribute to betray them both.

VII. As for *Intemperance*, the very Diſcredit of that Pleaſure were enough to deter us from it. He that conſiders the Dignity of Man, and the great things he is born to, muſt be aſtoniſh'd to ſee, at how mean a rate he often ſells them all. The poor Fly is not more eaſily taken in the Cobweb, or the Fiſh deluded by the Bait, or any other Beaſt fetter'd in a Toil, than is poor Man, whom luſts and paſſions have ſubdu'd. Every *Libertine* calls him away, and every impure Raſcal leads him about; till at laſt he grows abject and more contemptible than a Beaſt. For Pleaſure, which feeds upon and vitiates the Senſe, does alſo by degrees prey upon the

Mind: It puts out the Light, and breaks the force it had. Nay, when at laſt nothing but *Fortitude* is left him (that Sentinel, or Out-guard, without whoſe vigour and fidelity no Virtue can be ſafe) even here Pleaſure attacks him, and like a raging Strumpet that has had ſucceſs, comes on with Impudence, and will not quit her Hold, till ſhe drives him into utter deſtruction. So that what *Cicero* ſaid, is no leſs true than common, *That, in the Region of Pleaſure, it was impoſſible for Men to hold any Commerce with Virtue.*

De Senectute.

VIII. NOR does *Intemperance* only benumb and bewitch the Mind; but the Body alſo is miſerably ſhaken and obnoxious to many cruel Diſeaſes by it: So that *Abſtinence*, even on Health's account, deſerves our higheſt Care. 'Tis not that here we ſhould aſſign the Weights and Meaſures of *Temperance*, but only ſpeak of what is relative to Health, and to the good ſtate of the Body and the Mind; Since we know that in robuſt Bodies, which are over-fed, the faculties of the Mind are very often incumbred, and oppreſt.

L. 2. c. 2. §. 3.

IX. WHEREFORE *Temperance* is ſo to be cultivated, as more to intend the plenty and purity of the Animal Spirits, than the extenſion of the Body. Thus that Oracle of *Zoroaſter* adviſ'd, *Let not the Spirit be defiled, nor the ſuperficies be made groſs.* Which refers to that of *Hierocles*, who calls this Spirit, by the name of a *Thin-Vehicle*, and a *Body Immaterial.* Adding alſo this, *That we take a vigilant Care of our* Organ,

In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.

Organ, *and Skilfully fit it to Philoſophical purpoſes.*

X. THIS then is true and *Philoſophical Temperance*, if we ſo far ſubdue the bulk and powers of the Body, as that they may not be able to ſtifle or extenuate the Senſe of excellent Things. And above all, *That the Internal Spirit be not pamper'd and incraſſated*, which is what *Hierocles* calls the *Spiritual Vehicle*. His Opinion being, *That our Internal Man is compos'd, and made up as well of this Vehicle as of the Soul.* Wherefore the *Pythagoreans* made great work about the *purifying of the Spirit*, or *Vehicle*, as by the following words of *Hierocles* appears: *We muſt* (ſays he) *by the excerciſe of Virtue, and the recovery of Truth and Purity, take care of thoſe things, which appertain to the Luciform Body; which is, what the Oracles declare to be the Tender or Aerial Vehicle of the Soul. But the care of this Purification muſt extend even to Meats and Drinks, and whatever elſe concerns theſe our Mortal Bodies. For the Luciform Spirit reſides therein; it was that which gave Life to this, when it was inanimate, and is the Conſervator of its preſent Frame. This indeed is that Immaterial Body, which is Life it ſelf, and which gives and ingenerates material Life; 'Tis by this that our Mortal Bodies, which conſiſt of Life Irrational and Body Material, are made up: And thus an Image is compos'd of the Internal Man, who is built out of Rational Subſtance, and Body Immaterial.* *In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina.*

XI. IN

XI. In all which High Words, he intimates, that in our care concerning the *External Man*, which is our *Corporeal Frame* or *Bulk*, we muſt be ſure to bring no Detriment or Contagion to the Internal: But that the regulation and meaſures of our Diet as to meat and drink, and what elſe concerns this Mortal Body, muſt refer to the health or ſafety of the Inward Man. The End being, that this Thin and Lucid covering of the Soul, which muſt ſurely be ſome Aerial or Etherial Veſtment, be kept free from all ſervile Commixtures with our polluted Carcaſs. And hereto the ſame *Hierocles* adds, *That foraſmuch as to this our Luciform Body, there is another Mortal Body congenerate and affix'd; We are to preſerve the former in all Purity, and to diſcharge it (as much as is poſſible) from all Intercommuning or Combinations with the Latter.*

XII. The truth is, that all this Doctrine about Cleanſing and Purgation even of the Soul it ſelf (and ſo the whole Buſineſs and Import of Virtue) points but at this, that there be Cleanlineſs in the Inward Man, and that the vigor of it be ſuſtain'd. For ſo the ſame great Interpreter of the *Pythagorean* Wiſdom does a while after explain the Matter, ſaying, *That the purification of the rational Soul, was done with concern, and had reference to the Luciform Vehicle; Meaning that the Vehicle was thereby to be render'd more Lightſom and Elaſtic, ſo as it might not afterwards retard the ſuperiour flight of the Soul. That the ſaid Purification*

was

was beſt effected, by divorcing our Thoughts and Meditations from Terrene Objects, and lifting them by degrees unto things Immaterial. That all Turpitude was to be ſuppreſs'd; and that we ſhould prohibite all ſordid Intercourſe of the Body Material, for fear the Luciform Body ſhould be Tarniſh'd and contaminated by it. That if there were a Vigilance in theſe Particulars, then might this Spiritual Vehicle acquire new Life and Vigour; it might be endow'd with Celeſtial Vivacity; and at length enter into a Conjugation with the Intellectual Perfections of the Soul.

All this can Purification do, when but ſteer'd and conducted by Virtue; It can Recollect, Reſuſcitate, and even inſpire with heavenly Energy, that ſubtil and attenuated Chariot of our Mind; that inward Organ, which will afterwards remain its Habitacle, and a Conſort inſeparable to all Eternity.

XIII. I confeſs, theſe things ſound as lofty Flights, and yet they are the Documents of the famous *Hierocles*; by which we are taught, that the greateſt pitch of Philoſophical *Temperance*, is, *To preſerve this Vehicle* in a congruous temper to the purity of the Soul; that the *Inward Man* be not defil'd by the Senſe of Groſs Contentments; Not impotently hurry'd on to concur with Fleſh and Blood; nor anxious for Joys that have no manner of Foundation. We are rather admoniſh'd by ſuch *Temperance*, how this Luciform Vehicle, this inhabitable Lightning, which is alſo a Body diſtinct; may be preſerved Free, Vigorous, and Immaculate.

XIV. This

XIV. THIS is the very Doctrine, which the ſame Author mentions from that Golden Verſe of *Pythagoras*,

——— ——— ——Tum ſingula penſa
Aurigam mentem ſtatuens ex parte ſuperna.

Which he thus explains, That *Pythagoras* ſpeaks here firſt of the Mind as being a Rational Power; Next he calls it *the Driver of the Chariot*, as it directs and governs, not only the Corporeal Body but the Luciform. That this *Driver* which is indeed the Soul, does not only with a ſharp Eye look out, to diſtinguiſh the way, and keep within the paths of Virtue: but it holds the Reins with ſteddineſs, both to embrace and to reſtrain her dear and Luciform Companion; and all, with Intention to direct its Proſpect wholly towards Heaven, and to make it thereby grow into a Similitude of the Deity. This is an apt and cloſe Alluſion to the moſt perfect and Philoſophical *Temperance* or *Continence*, which allows not that any Corporeal Pleaſures ſhould pierce into the Inward Man. For it repreſents the Soul, as holding a ſtrict Rein againſt all Commerce that might obſtruct the Diviner Joys which ariſe from a Senſe of God and Virtue. And this doubtleſs is the perfect Scope, the trueſt Meaſure, and the higheſt Improvement of *Temperance*.

XV. BUT

XV. But how far diſtant from this Perfection ſuch Men are, who wallow in Gluttony, Drunkenneſs, and the impurities of Luſt? Let them conſider, and compare their Caſes, who are accountable herein. Let this be their ſad *Memento*, that while it was in their power to reſemble the Gods, they rather choſe baſely to degenerate into Beaſts. How much Happier had they been under any Severity of Life (even that ancient Diſcipline, that afforded Nature but a bare Reſcue or Suport) than by delicious Hours, in Chambering and Luxury to blunt the Senſe of all Sublimer Things! How will they Mourn at laſt, that, by the treachery of Vice, they have undermin'd the very Platform of their Souls, and betray'd that faithful Out-guard, I mean, *Fortitude*! Which, in all Events, ſhould have been the bold Champion and Conſervator of all their Virtues.

Let thus much ſerve in Brief, as to the acquiſition of the Primitive Virtues; and thoſe alſo which are the Principal of the *Derivative*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of Acquiring the Reductive Virtues; And first of those, which refer to Justice.

I. AMong the Virtues call'd *Reductive*; those more especially shine out, which have reference to

Justice: As { *Liberality, Magnificence, Veracity, Gratitude, Candor, Urbanity, Fidelity, Modesty, Humanity, Hospitality, Friendship, Civility, Affability, Officiousness.*

Liberality is not to be neglected: Since, on the one Hand, we shew thereby, that our Souls are not contracted to the bare admiration of Wealth; Nor our Minds, on the other hand, so stupid, as not to understand the true Use and Ends thereof.

Magnificence is prais'd by its own works; since these bring Benefit to the Publick, Ornament to the World, and Variety to the Histories of the Time.

II. VERACITY must be our constant Inmate and Companion: For 'tis the worst of Characters to be a noted Lyar. There is no Quicksand, or infected Air more frightful to the Traveller, nor any Wizzard more dangerous to be met withal, than an accomplish'd Lyar,

Lyar. He will lead you, like a Ghoſt, into dangerous Paths; and, when you are wandring quite out of your Way, he will be ſure to leave you in the Dark.

However, 'tis ſtrange to ſee how the Maſters in this Talent, will yet ſet up for Men of *Prudence.* They are indeed wiſe enough to know that every Vice muſt bear a virtuous Name; and that Fraud and Cunning, will never ſtand alone. 'Tis as with Strumpets, who affect to be ſeen at Church among the Matrons: but as they are the more abhorr'd herein for their Impudence, as well as Vice; ſo ought it to be with theſe plauſible Circumventors. There is even a Sect of theſe, who alſo ſet up for Wits; they think there can be no greater Excellency than in the way call'd *Bantering*: Surely the Man muſt be very dull, that cannot Deceive, if he but reſolve to Lye. Yet as he that will deceive when he can, ſhews a Mind that is vile and abject: So the truly prudent and generous Man, is he that will be Honeſt in the dark: He that will be as juſt, when 'tis in his power to be otherwiſe, as if it were not. But whoever notes the Events of things ſhall ſee, that Knaves and Hypocrites are expos'd to ſhame, and end their Lives obſcurely; whereas the juſt and virtuous ſort endure, and their Reputation ſtill ſhines forth as at the Noon-day. Every counterfeit thing muſt be ſhort liv'd.

Fidelity is much to be cultivated; and how could Human Society conſiſt without it: ſince

to

to keep Promiſes, and to reſtore what is depoſited with us, are the Top-branches and conſpicuous parts of *Juſtice*.

Hence alſo we may be convinc'd how much it imports us to conſider well of *Gratitude*. For every good turn done us is as it were a Pledg depoſited in our truſt and keeping: And ſurely he that repays it not back, as ſoon as he can, is guilty of *Infidelity*. Nay, *Gratitude* is ſo remarkable a part of *Juſtice*, that whoever has the heart to violate this Bond, is thought capable (might he do it with Impunity) of trampling on all the Laws of the World. Now who would incur this Character, or draw himſelf under ſo diſmal a Guilt? There is certainly no Monſter that a Man ſhould more abhor, than this Monſter of *Ingratitude*.

III. As to the ſhew and expreſſion of *Candor* in our Converſe with Men, there are great Motives for it. Firſt, becauſe the Errors of moſt Men are Errors of Ignorance: and yet, even among theſe Errors, their Minds often labour to bring forth Truth and good Works; a Birth which indeed we ought kindly to aſſiſt, by interpreting favourably all their Actions, and affording them the very beſt appearances we can. For we do, by this ſoft Temper, help on Peace, and the cementing of Men's Minds towards a bond of Unity: which is ſo worthy a part, that all Men ought to endeavour it.

IV.

IV. For *Urbanity*, we muſt not be ſo Moroſe, as not to hear and bear the Jeſts of others (and ſometimes tart ones too) altho we are not good at Jeſting our ſelves. In truth, he that is dexterous in Raillery, has found a Remedy to laugh away his Labour, and a very good Sauce againſt the fatigues of Life. For tho it was not Nature's Intention, to fit us only for Sport and Paſtime; Yet theſe, doubtleſs, are lawful in their ſeaſons, juſt as ſleep, and other Refreſhments, to the Body and the Mind: provided always that things of Moment are not obſtructed by them. 'Tis to this ſenſe that *Cicero* ſpeaks in his *Offices*, *That the ways of Jeſting are very different: the one, Sawcy, Ruſtic, Impious, and Obſcene; the other, Elegant, Candid, Ingenuous, and Pleaſant.* And ſurely, 'tis this laſt which is recommended to us. However, if ſomething herein ſhould drop, ſo quick and pleaſing to the Company as to cauſe Laughter for the ſmart which it reflects; he that feels it (being a good Man) will not ſo much vex to ſee, that ſmall defects are inſulted over, as have cauſe to rejoice, that his greater Virtues are at the ſame time applauded: For he hears the worſt that can be ſaid of him, ſince Adverſaries are ſtill known to ſhoot their longeſt and ſharpeſt Arrows. And here we refer to what (in our *Firſt Book*) was ſaid of the *Interpretation of Paſſions*; which may farther illuſtrate this Point. But if ſome rude and ill-natur'd Man ſhall perhaps bear over-hard upon us, and both jeſt

L. 1. *c.* 11. § 2. 3.

and ſting together; We muſt then do what we can, to cure the ſubject matter, and draw out that Core, in which his Darts are fix'd.

V. MODESTY muſt attend all our Actions; 'tis the Flower, the Beauty of *Juſtice*, and even its chief Perfection: This we have already ſet forth, and it needs not be repeated. *L.* 2. *c.* 8. § 11.

But *Humanity* does challenge a moſt principal regard among all the other Virtues. We are all, as it were, linked in one common chain of Equality; nor is one man to think himſelf ſo very preferable to another; when, in things of Paſſion and of Reaſon, in Death and Immortality, we ſeem all to ſhare alike. He therefore that contemns another, and forgets that way of Treatment, which *Candor* and *Humanity* demands, he ſeems to give Sentence againſt himſelf. For 'twill be as lawful at another time, and when Circumſtances are alike, to refuſe to him thoſe common Perquiſites of Human Nature; ſeeing in his turn he refuſed them to others. So that whoever arrogates to himſelf a great Preheminence above his Fellow-Creatures, does but expoſe his Vanity, and takes pains to be Ridiculous. Let no man, of how mean a Condition ſoever, if he be a good Man, and has not by his Follies loſt all Title to the Rights of Human Nature, be treated with Contumely. 'Tis the ſaying of *Heraclitus*, *Enter, Gentlemen, even here the Gods inhabit:* Which may truly be ſaid of the pooreſt Man living, ſo that his

his Heart be but ſound and Juſt. For (beſides that Prerogative, which is common to Mankind) ſuch a one ſhould be regarded with Love and Tenderneſs, and as it were ſome Creature that were even Holy and Divine.

VI. For *Hoſpitality*, it will ſtand leſs in need of Recommendation, as 'tis a manifeſt part of *Humanity*. It ſeems to be moſt needful there, where Strangers are liable to be ill us'd by the Natives, and where they want the things of Accommodation they were us'd to find at Home. Theſe therefore we ſhould ſtrive to Help and Succor, in all they can need at our Hands: Not forgetting that even Holy Angels are thus employ'd, whom we ought to imitate. For they, during this Earthly pilgrimage of our Souls, do ſeaſonably ſtep in, both to relieve and ſuccour us, when we are moſt diſtreſs'd.

VII. For what concerns *Friendſhip* and *Friends*, theſe are carefully to be Acquir'd; and not barely as Ornaments, but as Bulwarks in Human Life. If you light on ſuch as deſerve your fervent Love, place it rather on their Virtues, than their Perſons, which are both mutable and mortal. Let not your *Friendſhip* conſiſt in ſoft and unprofitable ſtrains; nor in vehemency of Paſſion, which would bring many a ſtorm and diſorder to your Mind. But let the Character of it be *Sincere* and *Conſtant*, and ſuch as fulfils all the Duties appertaining thereto, with a chearful and officious Benignity.

VIII. Lastly, As to *Civility*, *Affability*, and *Officiouſneſs*; theſe are all to be regarded, not only as Credentials, which procure us Fame and Good-Will: but they very often become the very Eſſential Knots of that Peace and Friendſhip which we enjoy. Therefore let no Man neglect, and much leſs deſpiſe theſe ſmaller Virtues; which often, as ſmaller Wires, ſuſtain much weight. We do by them live more pleaſantly among our Neighbours; our ſecurity becomes the greater, and our Favour and Credit with Men is thereby increas'd. And who wou'd not wear ſuch things about him, as make him welcom where-e'er he comes, and coſt him nothing the Carriage?

Chap. VII.

Of Acquiring thoſe Virtues, which are referable to Fortitude.

I. THESE are the Virtues, which appertain to

Fortitude: { *Magnanimity*, *Generoſity*, *Lenity*, *Conſtancy*, *Diligence*, *Vivacity*, *Preſence of Mind*, *Stoutneſs*, *Virility or Manhood.*

'Tis

'Tis the praiſe of *Magnanimity*, that it does not diſquiet the Mind with minute or numerous Cares; but rather lifts it up to the Ambition of doing great and excellent things, whereof the number can be but ſmall. They that know the Dignity of Humane Nature, and what it is capable of, think it loſs and derogation to be ingag'd in Trifles. So that as nothing is higher or greater than God and Virtue, 'tis in the Veneration of theſe Objects, our Minds and Wills are by this Virtue confirm'd and underprop'd; And by it we are alſo reclaim'd, from wandring into things which are but mean and vulgar.

Moreover, what we did before attribute unto *Magnificence*, is equally applicable to this Virtue: namely, that the great Acts and Atchievements hereof, redound to the ſervice of the Publick; and adorn both the World and the Chronicles of the Age.

II. The benefit and perfection of *Generoſity*, appears in this, that a Man is not govern'd herein by popular Applauſe, or the Itch of common Glory; but acting ſincerely and with Conſcience, towards Virtue and true Beatitude, his Mind is ſatisfi'd and corroborated in his Work. Nay, altho the Malice and Clamour of all Mankind were broke looſe againſt him, yet he will ſtand firm to Virtue, and maintain Truth with an unſhaken Courage.

'Tis very true that often, in the purſuit of Virtue; as well the deſire of Fame and Glory, as the fear of Shame and Reproach, have their benefit and Effects. But when Virtue is once attain'd, and that we are in the actual poſſeſſion thereof, then thoſe things are but as meer Scaffolding, to be remov'd or burnt.

III. This Virtue is therefore of the more high Account, as it is the true Guardian and Sentinel upon all the reſt. It ſhould eſpecially be cultivated by young Men, whom either Nature, or an honeſt Ambition, has excited to excel their Fellows. For the blundering Men, and the Vicious, make a ſtrong Party in the World, and they conſpire how to ſcoff the Induſtrious out of Countenance. And it comes to paſs that many a Good-Natur'd Man is by ſhame run down, and laugh'd into a compliance with thoſe things, which yet he does inwardly deteſt. But let ſuch honeſt Candidates remember, that if this Trick could have prevail'd on all that went before them, never had any Man been Eminent, or attain'd to Glory: That as it is ſtout both to bear, and even ſcorn at, Reproach for Virtue's ſake; ſo it is mean and cowardly, to humour thoſe, who either craftily tempt, or haughtily expect, that you make up part of their Train in their unlawful ways. There want not, in the World, Companions and Aſſociates of a better ſtamp, tho not ſo numerous, or ſo eaſily met with in the Streets: but

but they are worth the ſearching for. And as to the other ſort of Men, who are ſo Impudent, as to become meer Advocates for things that are Vile: Remember, in ſhort, the better advice of *Pythagoras*,

——— *Summè reverere Teipſum.*

IV. LENITY, or a Calmneſs of Mind, is even in this Regard extremely valuable, that it is a ſort of Buckler againſt the Scoffs and Injuries of all Men. This was noted by *Marcus Antoninus*, in that Famous Saying, *That Lenity was an Invincible Thing, provided it were Genuin, and not Counterfeit, as ſome grave Scorners make it.* No Shield is ſo availing to the Mind's Tranquillity, as is this Calmneſs, and true Lenity: Nor does any thing require it, or ſupport it more, than to reflect that few Men ever offend us either in word or deed, but it ariſes from their Ignorance. Wherefore the *Stoicks*, and followers of *Socrates*, were wont of ſuch men to ſay, *Sic ille opinatur*; ſuch is his Opinion. And *omnis improbus ignorat*, A wicked man knows not what he does. *Lib.* 1. § 18.

V. CONSTANCY we muſt have; or elſe we ſhall ſeem to act at hazard; and to have neither Reaſon nor Virtue for our Guide.

——— *Semper, qui bonus eſt, bonus eſt.*

He who is truly Good, is always Good.

But he that is now Good, and then Bad, is not govern'd by ſteady Principles, but the laſt Impreſſion governs him.

VI. Lastly, *Diligence* is a certain chearful Servant or Solicitor, that attends upon all the other Virtues, and muſt therefore be careſs'd. We may call it even the Maſter and Moderator of all our External Actions; Inaſmuch as it knows how to excite our Bodies, and all the parts thereof, to ſuch Activity, as the duty and buſineſs of our Life requires.

VII. The Reſidue of thoſe Virtues, which refer to *Fortitude*, have ſo cloſe an Affinity with theſe, which we here explain, that it were needleſs to ſet them off with any new Teſtimonial. For they are as the very Offſpring of *Diligence*, *Conſtancy*, or *Magnanimity*.

Chap.

Chap. VIII.

Of Acquiring thoſe Virtues, which refer to Temperance; *And about exciting the Divine Love.*

I. THERE are Referable unto

Temperance, { *Frugality, Humility, Auſterity, Modeſty.* *Andronicus* alſo adds *Slender and uncompounded Diet, Unblameable Geſture*; and, *A Contented Mind.*

Of which that about *Slender-Diet* and *Contentment*, are as it were the Sorts and Methods of *Frugality*: even as that of *Geſture* is of *Modeſty*.

II. FRUGALITY has this Commendation, that 'tis the Parent, or at leaſt the Companion of Sobriety; As alſo a Cure againſt Diſeaſes and Poverty. 'Tis attended by Conſideration and Prudence; leſt that, ſpending profuſely and living beyond our Stocks, we be diſabled not only from entertaining our Friends in a frugal way, but driven to live wholly upon them: which of all Conditions were the moſt miſerable. So that, in Contemplation hereof, we may affirm, that true *Frugality* has an Eye to Generoſity it ſelf; and that there is an Honeſt Greatneſs of the Soul, concern'd in the true Conduct of this Virtue.

III. THE

III. The ſame Reflection is fortifi'd by what *Andronicus* ſays of thoſe bordering Virtues that refer to this. For he, who can content himſelf with eaſie Food, and has no deſires of Sauce or Cookery, is much out of Fortune's reach, ond does not eaſily fall within the Injuries of Men. This Virtue ſets him as in a Tower above others, and he is ſeldom captivated by any: For as it is God alone, that needeth nothing; ſo he that is contented with feweſt things, approaches neareſt to him.

IV. In the next place, *Auſterity* or *Gravity*, together with *Modeſty* and the Virtues ally'd thereto, are to be had in much Regard: For they do not only adorn our Life and *External Behaviour*, but really preſerve the Mind both chaſt and unblemiſh'd. The firſt glimmerings of Vice, and that very ſhadow that begins to play in the Imagination, is by thoſe Virtues not only reprehended, but immediately ſmother'd and ſuppreſs'd.

V. Yet is there no ſort of Virtue more to be purſu'd than *Humility*: Since there are no two Plagues ſo deſtructive in Human Affairs, as are thoſe of *Ambition* and *Avarice*. Hence ariſe Treachery to Friends and Country, the Maſſacre of Princes, Deſertion of Truth and Religion, Frauds (not to be nam'd) both againſt God and Virtue; In ſhort, All, that can ſpawn from Injuſtice, hath its Original from this Scource. Wherefore it may well be doubted, Whether the fear

fear of torment on a Rack, or of Death it ſelf, have ſo much power to drive Men into Impiety, as that inordinate Thirſt, which ſome diſcover in the purſuit of Riches, Honour, and Domination? Conſequently, whether even *Fortitude* it ſelf be ſo ſtrong a Bulwark as Humility proves? By which we retreat, as into a Harbor, where the noiſe and ſtorms of the World fly over us; and where we are neither tempted, nor diſtracted with the dazling vanities thereof.

VI. The word *Humility* ſounds low, and may ſeem deſpicable among the Virtues: Yet is it ſo conſpicuous a branch of true and ſubſtantial Wiſdom, that even *Lucretius* (who did not much trouble himſelf in ſuch matters) was not barely acquainted with it, but has very Elegantly painted it out, in the Verſes following:

De rerum Naturâ lib. 2.

Sed nil dulcius eſt, bene quàm munita tenere
Edita doctrinâ ſapientûm templa ſerena;
Deſpicere unde queas alios, paſſimque videre
Errare atque viam palantes quærere vitæ,
Certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
Noctes atque dies niti præſtante labore
Ad ſummas emergere opes rerumque potiri.
O miſeras hominum mentes! O pectora cæca!
Qualibus in tenebris vitæ, quantiſq; periclis,
Degitur hoc ævi quodcunque eſt! &c.

Which

Which are thus Tranſlated by Mr. *Creech.*

But above all, 'tis pleaſanteſt, to get
The Top of high Philoſophy, and ſit
On the Calm-peaceful-flour'ſhing Head of it:
Whence we may view Deep, wondrous Deep, (below
How poor miſtaken Mortals wandring go,
Seeking the Path to Happineſs: Some aim
At Learning, Wit, Nobility, or Fame;
Others with Cares and Dangers vex each Hour, (Pow'r.
To reach the top of Wealth, and Sovereign
Blind, wretched Man! in what dark paths of (ſtrife
We walk this little Journey of our Life, &c.

But I am not ignorant, how Men of this Perſwaſion, and whoſe Minds are thus elevated, are not only ſlighted, but even laugh'd at, by moſt others: They are counted a ſort of *Virtuoſo's*, that live upon Air, and do not comprehend Subſtantial things.

VII. YET, under the Correction of theſe Grandees, I would fain know, What is it that the High and Mighty do more enjoy than others: who having Fortune enough, yet chuſe to employ but what alone is uſeful and of Neceſſity. Do the Rich or Powerful eat or drink with better Reliſh, than even that Man that labours the whole Day, and mixes

Temperance

Temperance with his Sweat? Is their Sleep more ſound, or Health of Mind or Body more robuſt? If this commonly be otherwiſe, why may we not ſuſpect, that ſuch Potentates, and Men of Wealth, are alſo as much troubled with vain Imaginations, as Men that are devoted to Virtue, and the Sciences? If theſe muſt be accus'd for catching at the Air, and feeding on refin'd things; What get thoſe others, from their Heaps and Luxuries, but even Fogs or Vapors that infeſt them? But whether a thick Air, or a thin, do moſt conduce to Health, is a Queſtion we may put off for the preſent. In the mean time, take what *Horace* ſings, in ſhort,

Si ventri bene, ſi lateri eſt pedibuſq; tuis, nil
Divitiæ poſſunt Regales addere majus.

Horace's Epiſt. l. 1. Epiſt. 12.

Is your body ſound and clean
From the Colick, Gout and Spleen?
You may be happy tho you're poor,
Greateſt Wealth can give no more.

Now if the Rich who abound, and the Poor who have no want, are hitherto equal in what concerns the Functions of the Body; 'Tis plain, they only differ in things of Fancy and Conceit. Wherefore if the Diſpute ſhall be, which of the two Fancies or Conceits are beſt, Whether of thoſe who gape after Wealth and Honours (which are ſuperfluous) or of thoſe who adhere to Virtue and true

true Wiſdom; let the By-ſtanders determine and give the Prize.

VIII. Lastly, That this Exhortation may not be defective in any part, let us, above all things, recommend the Divine and *Intellectual Love*, as being the Rule or Meaſure of all other Virtues. Let us, as we hope to copy aright, and to keep proportion in our Ways and Actions, never fail to have this Divine Original before our Eyes.

L. 2. c. 9. § 14.

And as *Humility* and *Temperance* are the two Powers of our Soul, that moſt contribute to procure and preſerve this heavenly Perfection; So, on the other ſide, 'tis bodily Pleaſures, and an unbridled Paſſion for Wealth and Honour, that extinguiſhes the Senſe and Appetition thereof. For the Soul, in her own native Conſtitution, would reſemble a bright and Celeſtial Flame; but theſe terrene and ſordid Ardors do utterly contract and ſuffocate her Light. So that, while ſhe ruſhes forwards, in paths of Darkneſs and of wordly Temptations; 'tis not poſſible but Offences will come, and that ſhe muſt have much to anſwer for, both in reference to Honour and to Juſtice.

He therefore that will keep alive this *Veſtal Fire* of the Divine Love, in the Temple of his Heart; let him be Humble and Temperate.

IX. As for thoſe, who with Sorrow bewail, that as yet they cannot feel any thing of this Ethereal Heat; let them addreſs to God

God with Prayers and Ardor, for that he is the Giver of all things. However, as bare words and wiſhes have but cold Effect unleſs we teſtifie by Life and Converſation the dignity of that *Internal Life* which we pant after and aſpire to; So, the better to accompliſh our Wiſhes herein, let us obſerve the following Helps.

Let us be watchful, to fly from all the Traps and temptations of Pleaſure.

Never to hurt any Man out of Hatred or Malice.

That we help, and adminiſter to the Poor, as we are able.

To ſuppreſs our Anger, when Men either injure or revile us.

To deſpiſe no Man for being of low Fortune or Degree; but where Honeſty and Poverty meet, there even to ſhew Reſpect.

To requite Evil with Good, and to turn off ſharp and bitter Sayings with others that are more Benign.

To take no Revenge of our Enemies, even then when we may ſecurely do it.

That no Mans Friendſhip be ſo rated by us, as to forſake Truth and Virtue for it; or to prefer it to the Publick Good. That is, That we be not drawn to that which may pleaſe our ſelves or the deareſt Friends whatever, on any ſenſual Account; but to conſult our Conſcience, Whether the matter in Queſtion be laudable and juſt, and then to purſue it with Faith and Perſeverance.

X. Thus you have, what we judg'd neceſſary for acquiring of Virtue, as well in particular as in the general. Wherefore let us cloſe all with that ſhort Document of *Pythagoras*: who adviſes thus, *That we fervently embrace and wed theſe Things; That we frequently meditate upon them; That we diligently put them into practice; For theſe will at length ſo eſtabliſh our Feet in the paths of Divine Virtue, as never to ſlide or ſtumble, and never to deviate, or be ejected from them.* And ſurely to attain this Perfection in Virtue, is to attain the moſt perfect Happineſs, that Man's Nature is capable of.

It now only remains, that we ſpeak of Acquiring that Part, which conſiſteth in *External Good.*

Chap. IX.

Of the Acquiſition of External Good.

1. We have already explain'd, how very ſmall a proportion of *External Bleſſings*, are abſolutely needful to *Man's Happineſs*. It now remains to inquire, If *Happineſs* can (in any ſort) appear more perfect and exalted, by the addition of all that we have ſtyled *External Bleſſings*: Inaſmuch as Moral Virtues may

may not a little contribute to the Acquiſition of them all.

II. We ſhall firſt repeat the chief of them; and then ſhew how ſome Virtues, if not all, do help to compaſs either the very *Bleſſings themſelves*, or at leaſt *Things Equivalent* to them, and ſuch as perhaps we ought juſtly to value beyond them. *Lib.* 1. *Cap.* 1. *Sect.* 3.

III. As for the firſt two great Branches herein; namely, the advantages of the *Soul*, and of the *Body*, 'Tis manifeſt that Virtue bids fair even to their particular Acquiſition, or at leaſt to their augmenting and conſervation. This appears firſt in reference to the Soul, as in the *Subtilty* and *Dexterity* of Wit, Fidelity and Vaſtneſs of the Memory: Alſo in *Science*, *Art*, and *Sapience*.

For is there any thing in Nature can more contribute to theſe Bleſſings, than that Philoſophical Temperance, we have already deſcrib'd? When, on the other ſide, 'tis as plain, that the ſharpeſt Wit in the World, grows blunt, and is made even ſtupid, by Luxury and Exceſs.

IV. Look upon *Memory*, and obſerve how ſtrangely 'tis fortify'd by *Sobriety*, and *Temperance*! How 'tis extended by Exerciſe, which is the fruit of *Diligence!* But by *Drunkenneſs*, or by *Luſt*, or *Drowſineſs*, or *Neglect*, it withers, and comes to nothing.

V. 'Tis true, that neither Virtue, nor Morals do promote us in Mechanical Arts, or indeed in Natural Philoſophy, or the Mathematicks. But conſider, I pray, how far theſe

contribute towards *Wit* and *Memory!* How great the Power of *Diligence* is towards every Attempt! And 'tis manifeſt, that for getting the Mathematicks, there muſt be a certain *Gentleneſs* and *Patience* of the *Mind*, to adapt a Man to that Study.

VI. But the Higheſt Gift of all Moral Philoſophy, muſt ever be allow'd to be that *Prudence*, which has been ſo accurately deſcrib'd already; and which has certainly a marvellous influence, as well upon all Intellectual Habits, as for the acquiring of *True Wiſdom.* And her inſeparable Conſort is that *Philoſophical Temperance*, we have ſpoken of before.

Let no Man hope, without theſe two Virtues, ever to attain the knowledge of *Things Divine*, which is the only *Sapience* or *True Wiſdom.* For, as *Plato* has it in his *Phædo*, *What pretence can the Impure man have to the things that are pure?* And whereas the Philoſopher was there contending, as if no Man could obtain pure and ſincere Virtue, that had not firſt laid by his Body; What ſhall we ſay of thoſe, who think much to ſhake off, but the very Filth and Vices of their Bodies? Men, that think a little Induſtry, and obſtinate perſeverance of the Mind, will find out Truth, without any neceſſity of parting with their darling Crimes? But whether this be the Voice of a Fool, or of a mad Man, is not hard to determine.

VII. Whoever can be Faulty in this kind, appears to me, as a Bleer-Ey'd Man; whom nothing will content, but to be gazing at things

things distant, and to see them both clearly and distinctly. He refuses all Remedy for his Eyes, but resolves by obstinate and peremptory staring to find out the Mark. Thus he goes on, till, instead of seeing better, he every Day grows more blind: Whereas, if he consulted the Rules of *Prudence* and of *Temperance*, he would know both the Necessity, and the way, of first curing his Sight.

VIII. Is there any Man living has Self sufficiency enough to Contemplate God, the Soul's Immortality, and Divine Providence? Or to consider of these things solidly and sedately, without some sort of Separation or Abstraction of the Soul from the Body? That is to say, in *Plato*'s Style, *Without such a Meditation of Death, as seems to divorce us from Corporeal Affections?* Or, can any Man, without some such Translation, be (as it were) rapt up into that State of *Divine Love*, which can only fit him for Truth, and expound the Oracles and Mysteries of things, which are otherwise Inscrutable? For by how much all Sensual and Corporeal Impressions are extinguish'd in us, by the application of that *Prudence*, and of that *Philosophical Temperance* we have mention'd; by so much do we grow Citizens of that Intellectual World, and ascend into the Regions of Heavenly Light.

Wherefore, *Sapience*, or the knowledge of Divine Mysteries, is the true Off-spring of that Virtue, which is entire, absolute, and consummated.

IX. As

IX. As to thoſe Bleſſings which refer *to the Body*, ſuch as *Strength*, *Agility*, *Health*, and *Comelineſs*; 'Tis true that *Strength* is not ſo much the Gift of Virtue as of Nature; tho 'tis as true, that the preſervation of it is owing to Virtue. Nay, 'tis not improbable, but that a Body, in declination of Health, may, by hardſhips, exerciſe, and ſome Fatigue, become more vigorous and robuſt.

For *Agility:* This may not only be as the Pupil, but even the Child of Virtue: Since *Temperance* and *Diligence*, do commonly wear down the bulk and excreſcence of the Body, and rather furniſh a Stock of Spirits, than of Fleſh. In which caſe, *Agility* muſt ſucceed of courſe.

X. But the moſt high and conſpicuous gift of Virtue, is that of *Bodily Health*; which as it may be owing in part to every Virtue: ſo more eſpecially to *Temperance* and *Piety*. I think it was the *Chaldean* Oracle did thus pronounce;

Ad Pietatis Opus vegetum ſi extenderis Ignem
Mentis, & hos fluxos ſanabis corporis Artus.
Would you the beſt Phyſician find
For a craz'd Body, or afflicted Mind?
Try what the power of Piety can do,
It heals the Mind, and cures the Body too.

For a purifi'd Mind goes a great way to the purging and purifying of the Body: it darts upon it ſome Rays, which have great effect, and which corroborate the powers thereof. Whereas, if the Soul be taken up by conſuming Cares and Cupidities; If Hatred and Malice make all things ghaſtly and ſour within: How can

can it be, but that the Body muſt alſo droop, the Health wither, and the Force decline?

If therefore ſuch Dilapidations can ariſe from the remote impreſſions of the Mind; What will not thoſe more immediate ſtrokes accompliſh; I mean, Eating long, and Drinking deep and daily, and the inſolence of an ungovernable Luſt?

XI. The Diſeaſes of the Body are, for the moſt part, from the Vices of the Mind; and even the Off-ſpring of ſinful Parents do often inherit their Infirmities, as well as their Acres. But there is no Remedy ſo powerful, for ſuch an Incumbrance, as a ſevere application to Virtue and Piety. For as Juſtice had a Being before all the Vices of the Mind; ſo was Health more ancient than all the Sickneſſes of the Body. Thus is one brought in, by *Maximus Tyrius*, to pray, *O Health, the moſt Ancient of all the other Goddeſſes; What wou'd I give to enjoy thee, but the little remainder of my days!* Certainly, no Man can better pretend to ſuch a Wiſh, than he who is ſincerely Vertuous and Devout.

XII. And as bodily Health is thus gotten and ſuſtaind by Virtue; ſo does Virtue confer Comlineſs and *Decorum* to all the Parts. For *Beauty* is but as the Fruit, or flower of Health, nay, 'tis very health it ſelf; juſt as Virtue is the very health and beauty of the *Soul*. For where this preſides, the inward motion of the Spirits throws joy into the Countenance; and ſuch ſparkling through the Eyes, that the Beholders are drawn into love and admiration

by it: Even the whole Body, when actuated by a beautiful Soul, is pleaſing in all its Geſtures. *Antoninus* ſaid, *That a good Man could not conceal himſelf, if he did but open his Eyes; For his Benignity and Probity broke out, and reveal'd him to all Beholders.*

Lib. 10. *Sect.* 15.

XII. On the contrary, we may eaſily obſerve the Criſis when a man is falling from his native Innocence or acquir'd Virtue, and is warping towards Vice and Immorality; He carries a ſort of Traytor in his Countenance, who reveals all he is about. For tho the ſhape and colour of his Face may look the ſame to vulgar Eyes, yet a ſharper ſight will find a fading and declination in all the Finer Parts: that which once was freſh and florid, is now withering; that which ſparkled, is hardly bright: the Air it ſelf of the countenance, made up of quick and congruous motions reſulting from every part, and as it were darting Life, is now ſtupid and irregular. Alas, thoſe inward Spirits, that ſupported all, are ſick, and their activity is but counterfeit! So that, as now the whole contrivance of the Mien and Geſture is grown Artificial, it will in a ſhort time, become alſo Impudent. But this is not the Face of Virtue, or the Image of that *Moral Beauty*, we have hitherto ſet forth.

XIV. For we alſo affirm, that thoſe, who are contending for Virtue, and who ſeriouſly aſpire to the purifi'd ſtate of the Mind; One may even in their Eyes and Aſpects behold a Light and Comlineſs growing on, as a Prelibation of what they ſeek. Nay, where the

Face

Face is pale, and waſted by (perhaps) too fervent a purſuit of Virtue and true Wiſdom; Yet, even in ſuch paleneſs and Conſumption, the Beholders ſee a certain Complacency and good Nature, which is venerated by them. Wherefore, we conclude, no Man wants bodily Decoration, where that of the Soul is not firſt wanting: for 'tis the Soul that governs thoſe Inward Spirits, on whoſe ſupply and regularity, all that is exterior depends.

XV. Thus far we have ſhewn, how much Virtue contributes to the getting of ſuch benefits, as make either for the Mind, or for the Body. It now remains, to find what help ſhe gives in acquiring the good things that relate to Man, as he is compos'd of both: I mean, thoſe Accommodations of *Liberty*, *Riches*, *Nobility*, *Friendſhip*, and ſuch like. Now theſe being Things of that ſort, which are commonly call'd *the Gifts of Fortune*; we are not to expect, that they hold ſo cloſe and neceſſary a Conjunction with Virtue, as what we have already mention'd. However that even theſe things alſo are by Virtue moſt eaſily acquirable, is no hard task to demonſtrate.

XVI. First, As to *Liberty*, 'tis plain how every Nation ows to their Virtue and *Fortitude*, that they are not over-run, but preſerv'd from the ſlavery of Invaders. And, even in the ſtate of Priſoners and Captives by War, how many Inſtances have we in the *Roman* Comedies, that, for the *Fidelity*, *Diligence*, or *Prudence*, found in ſuch Captives, their Lords have afterwards made them Free. How much our *Li-*

berty is preſerv'd, by the obſervation of Laws and *Juſtice*, need no otherwiſe be expounded, than to obſerve, how Traytors to their King and Country, Thieves and Murderers, are put in Chains, Condemn'd, and Diſpatch'd.

XVII. But ſhould a worthy Man, and for Virtue's ſake, be thrown into a Dungeon (which yet rarely happens) he muſt not be thought as totally depriv'd of *Liberty*. 'Tis true, if there were Power enough, to ſequeſter him from God and Virtue, this were ſufficient to make any Man tremble, and to make every Jail look horrid. But of this ſort none are capable but men of Impiety, and the Profligate. How vainly therefore do the Oppreſſors menace the Virtuous, with a ſolitary, or even a naſty Jail? Can any Man, that is comforted and aſſiſted by the *Divine Preſence*, think of his Ill Accommodation? Or he that has the Feaſt of a *good Conſcience*, and the Miniſtration of all the Virtues attending him, think himſelf ſuch alone?

XVIII. After all, ſeeing *Liberty* is nothing but the power of Doing as you pleaſe: 'Tis plain, a good Man can be *Free*, whether in Priſon, or in Chains. For we affirm, that he evermore acts according to his own Will and Pleaſure, who has reſign'd both to the Divine Providence, and never wiſhes any other thing may happen to him, but even that which happens. This conformity of the Mind, is highly expreſs'd by the Philoſopher *Antoninus*, *O thow vaſt and Beautiful Univerſe, created and ſupported by God, let every thing*

Lib. 4. *Cap.* 23.

be

be delightful to me, that is pleasing and congruous to thy self.

XIX. As to the bearing of Honour: Who can imagine any one more qualifi'd for Publick Trust, than the Honest Man? Are there not a whole train of Virtues, that both adorn and support him? As, namely, *Justice, Magnanimity, Faith, Constancy, Munificence, Prudence, Fortitude, Vigilance*: And the like.

And is there any part of the World, where Men are chosen to Publick Office, but under these Characters? At least under the pretence and Notion of such: So as all the Salalaries, the Praises, and the Prostrations, that are pay'd them, come in on this Account. Now where (in truth) the Men are even quite otherwise: yet you may reckon them as the Statues and Images of good Men, and as adorn'd with their Names and Inscriptions. And while Worship and Veneration is thus pay'd them, we may suppose, that those good Men, whom they personate, receive it, as it happens in the case of absent and invisible Gods. So that no Man has more a Title to Honours, than the Man of *Probity*: For either he, or his Representative, is universally Honour'd by all Men.

XX. As to the gathering of *Riches*, you will say that a Man of *Probity* is out of his way. For that *Fraud, Rapine*, and *Treachery, Adulation*, or *Breach of Trust*, and the like, do chiefly contribute to the *Heaping* of *Wealth*, and are the most compendious ways of procuring it. But we are of Opinion, 'tis a very foolish Bargain,

Bargain, to pay for any thing ten times more than 'tis worth: And we cannot but think, this is the Caſe, when a Man ſhall barter away his Virtue (even the ſmalleſt grains thereof) either for *Wealth*, or for *High Place*. There are, as we think, Certain Gifts confer'd by Virtue, which (doubtleſs) have power enough, to bring in *Honeſt Plenty*, and ſufficient *Wealth*: I mean, *Diligence*, *Fidelity*, *Frugality*, *Temperance*, and the like. It was *Cicero*'s Exclamation, *O wretched Man, that knows not what an Inheritance it is to be Frugal!*

XXI. As for the Attainment of *Nobility*: Who ever call'd in doubt, that there was any other Source thereof than Virtue? Or that *Nobility*, and Virtue, were not evermore the ſame? But of this, we have ſpoken more largely before.

XXII. In the laſt Place, as to all *Friendſhips*; 'Tis viſible, how much they depend on Virtue: Since no Genuine *Love*, or ſincere *Friendſhip*, can be Cemented without it. The reſt is all Spurious; Whether it be a Combination, in order to ſordid Gain, or Companions of Joy, that amuſe themſelves with light and tranſitory things.

'Tis Virtue alone that attracts and retains true *Friendſhip*: *For* (as *Lælius* ſpeaks Elegantly in *Tully*) *She, when ſhe Exalts her ſelf, when ſhe expoſes her Light, when ſhe beholds and approves the ſame quality in others, ſhe moves preſently towards it; and, by a ſort of Coalition, joins to her ſelf that which was before in another: And that this is the true Generation*

of

of Love and Friendſhip. He farther adds, *That Friendſhip is nothing elſe, but to Love without Intereſt or Deſign.* And (in his Book *de Naturâ Deorum*) he does a little adorn this Senſe, by theſe further words: *If we turn our Friendſhip to our own Profit, and not to his, whom we pretend to love; this will not be Friendſhip, but meerly Traffick on our own Accounts.*

Hence 'tis plain, that there is not, in this Mortal State, a greater Bulwark than Virtue: for ſhe carries a Charm with her; drawing Men on to Love and Good-Will: And then 'tis impoſſible, but all their Aſſiſtance, and good Offices, muſt attend us.

XXIII. YET here let us obſerve what comes to paſs about *Truth*: Which tho it certainly makes one in Virtue's Quire; yet 'tis reputed a ſort of Foe to *Friendſhip*, and as producing rather Hatred and Ill Will. But to me it has ever been a ſort of Riddle in Human Affairs, and deſerving laughter; to ſee how the generality of Men hate the Voice of that very *Judge*, unto whom however they perpetually ſeem willing to appeal.

Certainly no firm and durable *Friendſhip*, can ſubſiſt any more without *Truth*, than without *Faith* and *Simplicity*, which are the Pillars of all true *Friendſhip*. *Cicero* ſays, *Neither the Double-minded, nor the Changeable Intriguer muſt be rely'd on for Fidelity.* And let us add to theſe, the Men of Darkneſs and great Reſerve. He that does even moleſt his Friend with *Truth*, has leſs to anſwer for; than a flattering Paraſite, who is ſo obſequious to every Vice,

Vice, and can indulge, or abet his Friend to his utter deſtruction.

To Men of ſincere Virtue, this *Truth* never comes amiſs: for every prudent Admonition, that is not attended with Scoffs or Contumely, is a Sermon they hearken to with Wonder and Delight. For, as they grow better by it; ſo they have teſtimony of what is very Rare, namely, perfect *Virtue*, and perfect *Friendſhip*, together.

XXIV. It were eaſie for me, I confeſs, to be more copious, and dwell longer upon ſuch Particulars: But theſe Hints will be enough to inculcate, How much Virtue imports to the Acquiſition of all *External Goods*: And that, againſt the Changes and Chances of this Human Life, there is no other true Sanctuary but Virtue.

CHAP. X.

Of that Good, which is External, Supreme, and Eternal; according to the Mind of the Philoſophers.

I. THERE now only remains one *External Good*, which alſo is *Eternal*. To Heaven it is that we all *Aſpire*, and to the Society of Bleſſed Spirits: And there is no other Path, or Stratagem, can lead hereto, but Virtue. This is ſet forth in that of the Oracle, touching the Ghoſt of *Plotinus*, and its paſſing to the Happy State.

Ad

——— Ad Cœtum jam venis almum
Heroum blandis ſpirantem leniter auris;
Heîc ubi amicitia eſt, ubi molli fronte cupido
Lætitiâ replens, liquidâ pariterque repletus
Semper ab Ambroſiis fœcundo è numine rivis.
Unde ſerena quies caſtrorum & dulcis amorum
Illecebra, ac placidi ſuaviſſima flamina venti.

Which may be Engliſhed thus:

And now you're come to th' Happy Quire
Of Heroes, where their bleſſed Souls retire,
Where ſofteſt Winds, do as ſoft Joys inſpire:
Here dwells chaſt Friendſhip, with ſo pure a flame,
That Love knows no ſatiety, or ſhame,
But gives and takes new Joys, and yet is ſtill the ſame,
Th' Ambroſian Fountains with freſh Pleaſures ſpring,
And gentle *Zeph'rus* does new Odours bring.
Theſe gifts for Inoffenſive Eaſe are lent,
And both conſpire to make *Love* Innocent.

II. That holy Vow and Profeſſion, which was made by *Cato* (in *Tully*'s Book *de Senectute*) has reſemblance with this very Deſcription. For he ſays, *I repent me not of having Liv'd, becauſe I have lived ſo, as never to have thought I was born in vain; and I depart this Life, not as from my Houſe, but as from an Inn. For Nature has not here afforded us an Habitation, but barely a baiting Place. O glorious Day, when I ſhall haſten to the great Aſſembly of*

Cicero de Senectute.

of bleſſed Souls, and be delivered from this Croud, and from this Dungeon, wherein I live!

De Conſolatione.

III. THIS Opinion *Cicero* (in his Treatiſe *de Conſolatione*) repeats as his own, ſaying, *I am none of thoſe, who believe the Soul can die with the Body; and that ſo great a Light, kindled by Divine Nature in the Mind, can be extinguiſh'd: but rather, that after ſome certain ſpace of time, it will return to Immortality.* Now this by him is ſo expreſs'd, as if our preſent life were a ſort of a death to the Soul.

De ſomnio Scipionis.

And the ſame (in his *Somnio Scipionis*) is elegantly affirm'd by *Africanus*, when *Cornelius* ask'd him, *If his dead Friends ſhould live? Yes* (ſays he) *they truly live, who are extricated from the Chains of the Body, as from a Priſon: For your Life, as you ſo call it, is Death.* Many are the paſſages of this Force, up and down, in *Cicero*: Not to ſpeak of what might be found in *Plotinus* and *Plato*.

IV. Now inaſmuch as the hope of Immortality, was ſo plain and conſpicuous of old, even to meer *Pagans*: How could we (poſſibly) exclude it from *Moral Philoſophy*? For by this it appears, that whatever external vexations innocent Virtue ſhall, in this Life, ſuffer (whether by hidden Fate, or by the Violence, Envy, or Imbrobity of wicked Men) there will be a juſt and moſt infallible compenſation for it. Wherefore the Good and the Magnanimous, being exalted by this Hope, look on the World with contempt: They trample upon inferiour things; and cannot regard any human Accidents as culpable

ſince,

ſince nothing has regard to them, but what is of Virtue and Immortality. 'Tis to this very Senſe, that *Cicero* does elſewhere magnifie the power of Virtue.

V. SOCRATES is memorable for this ſame Confidence and Hope; ſince in the ſtrength thereof, he was enabled to undervalue both his Enemies and his Death. He, whom the Oracle of *Apollo* pronounced the *wiſeſt Man*, would memorably in this deſerve that Character. For, while he doubted of all other things, as to the Soul's Immortality he was ever fix'd. So *Lælius* teſtifies of him (in *Tully*) *That he was now of one Sentiment, and then of another, in moſt other things; Yet as to the Point of Immortality, he always affirm'd, That the Minds of Men were Divine; and that, as ſoon as they departed the Body, there was a moſt expeditious return of every juſt and vertuous Soul into Heaven.*

VI. ON this Contemplation, let every Man therefore reſolve, that altho Virtue may (in ſome Caſes) appear to be againſt our Intereſt, in reference to worldly things; yet are we to ſtand by it with an unſhaken Mind: eſpecially ſince, after this ſpan of Life is paſt, there will redound a vaſt reward and gratification to the Juſt. Nay, let us rather count, that what we ſuffer in Externals (as, ſuppoſe in Fortune or in Health) is rather to our Advantage: Since, if we make a wiſe uſe of our misfortunes, and underſtand them for kind Admonitions (as indeed they are) by how much we are diſappointed, or deſpoil'd, in outward Things; by ſo much, and more alſo will

will the Mind be ſanctifi'd and enrich'd.

'Tis worth obſerving, that all Good, which is *External*, muſt fade and corrupt even as the Body it ſelf: while yet the *Internal Things* are as laſting as the Soul. So that to think, what we ſuffer in Body or in Goods, to be a Detriment or Curſe, when we are likely to gain by it a more ample and perpetual Recompence; it a ſtrange Error in Accounts.

VII. NAY farther yet. If a Man had bought a thing at ten times leſs than the Value; Would it not ſound odd, to hear him complain, that the bargain had undone him? Even ſo is it with the loſs of *outward Things*: Men murmure at Divine Providence, while yet they acquire ſuch improvement to the Soul thereby, as does not only govern the Happineſs of this Life, but guide us to a better, for all Eternity to come. Wherefore let no Man be too froward, when the croſſes and vexations of this World come thick upon him; they are the Gifts and Bleſſings of a wiſe God, who beſt knows what Phyſick we need for the Health and Conduct of our Souls.

By theſe Trials it is, that we can only find out the ſtrength and authority of Virtue: Theſe gratings rub off the ruſt and tarniſh of Vice: they ingender *Prudence*, *Fortitude*, *Sincerity*, and all other Virtues: at leaſt they detect our hypocrital and ridiculous Pretences unto them. So that we will conclude, altho theſe Viſitations may ſeem rude and bitter to the taſte, yet in operation they are wholeſom, and produce Saluriferous effects.

VIII. BUT

VIII. But now as to ſuch *External Evils*, which can no otherwiſe afflict the Mind, than by Imagination: or elſe, as *Epictetus* has it, *That things themſelves did not diſquiet Men, but their own falſe Opinions of things.* I muſt needs aver, that Men thus afflicted meerly by their *Fancies*, ſo as to make things intolerable, are but poor Proficients in Virtue: It deſerves not the name of Virtue, which is not able of it ſelf, to lay flat all imaginary Paſſions. 'Tis true, it may reaſonably be thought that there are ſome Sufferings above the force of Human Nature; ſuch as bodily Pains, which come by Sickneſs, that neither can be ſmother'd, nor diſſembled; And that ſome Tortures are ſo exquiſite, as to be beyond any conſtancy of the Mind to ſupport. *Enchiridion, c.* 10. *L.* 2. *c.* 10. §. 18. *L.* 3. *c.* 10. §. 16.

However, *Cicero* ſpeaks Excellently hereof (as indeed of every thing elſe) He ſays, *That Pain is a ſharp Adverſary to Virtue; It menaces with burning Torches; It inſults over Fortitude and Magnanimity; and ventures to ſubdue even Patience it ſelf. But thus it would not ſo frequently happen, if the fault were not our own: For Nature her ſelf, if rightly tutor'd and habituated, would prove a ſort of invincible Thing. But we alas (the more is our ſhame) have infected our Minds with Sloth, with Shadows, and Intemperance: Nay, we have ſo ſcribled over our Souls with Notions, and odd Opinions, that no room is left, for inſerting one ſound, or ſubſtantial Truth.* *Tuſculan. Quæſt. l.* 5.

IX. However we may obſerve, that 'tis not above the compaſs of Human Nature, to bear exceſſive Pains, when they are willing-

ly undertaken. We have ſtrange Examples what has been ſuffer'd for Glory, or by Cuſtom or Superſtition: Of which the very true Relations are almoſt incredible. As

Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 2. X. That of the *Spartan* Boys (which *Tully* mentions in his *Tuſculans*) who being brought to the Altars could bear beating, not only, till the blood guſh'd from their Bowels, but till they actually dy'd: And all this without Crying or without a Groan.

That of the *Indian Wives*, who (being many to every *Husband*) have contended, even to the tearing off Hair, which of them ſhould go into the Fire alive, and burn with the dead Man.

Tuſculan. Quæſt. l. 5. That of the *Egyptians*, who would rather be executed themſelves, than kill a Stork, an Aſp, a Dog, or a Cat.

There are alſo, among the *Turks* and *Americans*, amazing Inſtances of ſpontaneous Suffering; Some on ſuperſtitious Accounts, and others for Oſtentation. And almoſt all Hiſtories do ſwarm with Examples of this kind.

XI. Now, I ſay, if Nature, thus Rude, thus Illiterate, thus Barbarous and unprovided, thus inſenſible of true Virtue or of Excellent Things, could in patience and firmneſs of the Mind, ſo highly excel; What ſhould not true Virtue do? That Divine Thing, I mean, which holds Conjunction with God above; that is fortify'd with the ſplendid expectation of a bleſſed Immortality. Can, I ſay, this Champion ever give ground? Shall Virtue crouch, where even the barbarous have ſcorn'd to ſtoop; God forbid! And of Virtue, that is perfect and ſincere,

ſincere, let it never be ſaid! 'Tis true, there is a Nice Generation of pretenders to Virtue; ſuch as keep up a general Acquaintance, and fain would be valu'd on the ſcore of ſome Familiarity with her: But if a Storm ariſe, or any Battels to be fought on her account, they are preſently Men of another Climate, and their trueſt Religion is about Riches, Honour, and ſenſual Delights.

XII. Now ſince we could prove by infinite Examples (if brevity were not in our Care) that 'tis not beyond the reach of a conſiderate Man, to overcome the greateſt difficulties: Let us bend our Souls to the Acquiring this true and perfect *Patience*. This is the Virtue, that ſubdues, and will enable us even to deſpiſe, as well the pleaſures of the Body, as all the ſorrows that can attend it. And let no Man fancy to himſelf, or pretend to others, that he is poſſeſs'd of any Virtue at all, till he has attain'd that *Patience*, which we here ſet forth. For as bare Virtue is a high Reward, and Happy Immortality one of the certain Fruits thereof; So let us retain it immoveably, and let us never imagine that we have it at all, unleſs we can hold it faſt.

XIII. Here ſome may contemptuouſly ask, Whether or no this our Philoſophy be the ſhorteſt way to be Happy? And whether theſe Rules are the method to enrich a Man's Family, or to make him a Magiſtrate? And whether this celebrated Virtue and good Conſcience, do not rather conduct a Man to the Faggot, or to the Gallows; even as Examples, with-

out Number, do teſtifie, in all Ages, and in every Climate?

To this we muſt take leave to Demur, by laying open the true Nature of Virtue. Which is not a thing calculated for peculiar Places and particular Seaſons; but has a general reference to all Times, and to every Place, to procure us Felicity in both. It doth alſo, on the other hand, enable us either to reſiſt Evils; Or, if they prevail, to bear them with Equality, and reſignation.

L. 1. *c.* 1. *Sect.* 3. *L.* 3. *c.* 9. *Sect.* 2. How far Virtue contributes to the getting of *Wealth*, *Honours*, and the like, has been already ſhewn. I will only add, that *Honeſt Poverty* is preferable to ill-gotten *Riches*: And ſuch (I take it) are manifeſtly ill-gotten and ill-kept, wherever Virtue has ſuffered for it, either in the whole, or in its ſmaller part. Wherefore let Virtue be your Children's Inheritance: if they have this, they will never ſtand in need of ſuperfluous Wealth; and if they have it not, you ought not to break your Heart to make them Rich.

XIV. As to the Objection, For fear of Burning or the Gallows: take this for granted, that if you want the Armor of *Patience* againſt all Tribulations and Temptations whatever that may happen, you then carry in your Boſom that Serpent *Cowardiſe*, which will urge you to betray your Prince, your Country, your Friends, your Religion, and even all together, if it fairly comes in your way. Whereas if *Patience* do but fortifie and corroborate your Mind; it will embolden you to ſtand in defiance

ance againſt thoſe mighty Bugbears. You may, in ſcorn of them, declare, that the Soul of Man is not to be ſcorch'd by Fire, nor choak'd by Water; nor can the Butchers chop it into parcels: That Virtue cannot, even by Violence, be torn from it, or God himſelf be ſeparated from Virtue and the Soul.

XV. BESIDES, this alſo may be reflected on, that our *Life* is but as a Thing depoſited with us by *God*. Now if *God* ſhall call for his own Pledge, How can we, with Senſe or Honeſty, refuſe ſo juſt and potent a Benefactor, or be unwilling to reſtore back what he lent? But this Pledge is always called for, as often as any Conditions for Life are made us, which cannot conſiſt with that Obſervance, which we owe to God and to Virtue.

XVI. LASTLY, Let us take Comfort in this, That God is not uſually wanting to his Children, in their Extremities; that, if the Mind ſhall retain its Integrity and perſevere to the laſt, 'tis ſcarce in the power of Torment to interrupt our Happineſs. For the Soul is then as it were abſorp'd with God, and in full proſpect of a bleſſed Immortality. She knows the Flames and Scourges of this World cannot diſfigure her; For when their worſt is done, 'tis She finally ſhall Conquer; That ſhe as a long Exile, is now ſolemnly recall'd to her Native Country: that She is remounting to the Region of bleſſed Souls; and even ſees them, as gazing upon her with joy, and as ſhouting with Acclamations at her approach.

L. 2. *c.* 10, §. 18.
L. 2. *c.* 10. §. 8.
L. 2. *c.* 10. §. 19.
L. 3. *c.* 3. §. 10.

XVII. O the Joys! O the Triumphs! O what

what Embraces from that Illuſtrious Aſſembly! What Words, and Welcome, and Elogies, will they beſtow, for what ſhe ſo direfully ſuffer'd, and ſo bravely overcame, in the defence of Virtue and of Truth! How will the Manſions above Eccho and Rebound, with Hallelujah's of that Heavenly Quire! Or how rather, will this victorious Soul, enter with Triumph into thoſe Manſions, where Felicity is never to end! 'Tis in this Happy Station, where Love and Friendſhip are always Young, ſtill Unblemiſh'd, and evermore Sincere. Here Holy Angels, and all thoſe Reſplendent Beings, which are above, do not only behold the Beauties of each other, but Communicate, and even Diſcourſe, by ſome unſpeakable Way: But this is ſure, that Truth ſhines out in its utmoſt Purity, and Virtue is bright and manifeſt in all they ſay. Beſides, here are no Viciſſitudes, all is Peace, all Security, and all things are Stationary and fix'd. In ſhort, here is a Conſummation of the Soul's bleſs'd Eſtate; And it were impoſſible to find it elſewhere.

XVIII. And how could this otherwiſe be, ſince the Mind of Man is as the Image of God, drawn and deſcending from him? And being drawn from God; it covets Heaven, as deſirous to return from whence it came. All Inclinations towards the Earth ſavour of the Body; But as to the Soul, her Habitation is above, and her true Country is Heaven. For as *Cicero* Diſcourſes wiſely of this Matter, *There can no Origination of the Soul be found upon Earth.*

De Conſolatione.

XIX. Wherefore let us admire that Quickning

Quickning Life; which, when freed from our Earthly Tabernacle, will touch and penetrate our Souls with Joy! O that happy State of victorious Virtue, attend and ſurrounded with Triumphs and Content! And ever Happy be that Death and Torment, which ſhall conduct the firm and unſhaken Soul, to Pleaſures that are Ineffable.

XX. HERE, we confeſs, are great things ſpoken; and ſo perhaps through this whole Work: Yet we ſuppoſe they are not greater, than what belongs to the true and genuine Deſcription of *Moral Philoſophy*. They are not beyond the Compaſs and Meaning of *Right Reaſon*; nor exceed the Profeſſions and Memorials of the moſt Excellent of the *Heathens*.

XXI. HOWEVER, That Religion may not be defrauded of her due Honour, I do here alſo profeſs, teſtifie, and declare, that I think nothing is found in the Writings of the Philoſophers, or commemorated as the Deeds and Sayings of Renowned *Heathens*; But all their Flights and Raptures (whether about *God*, or the *Soul*, or *Virtue*) are owing, either to the very Doctrin, or to the Ancient *Cabala* or Tradition of the moſt Primitive Church of God; Or elſe to the *Eternal* Son, that *Logos*, or WORD *of God*; Who has, in all Ages paſt, endow'd every Man with ſome Senſe of *Honeſty*; Tho ſome Men have always been more *Burning*, and more *Shining Lights*, than the reſt.

For this WORD is that *True Light*, which *Enlightneth all Men that come into this World*: even as the *Scripture* has it. Now that *Pythagoras* drew

drew his Knowledg from the *Hebrew* Fountains, is what all Writers, Sacred and Prophane, do teſtifie and aver. That *Plato* took from him the principal part of that Knowledg, touching *God*, the *Soul's Immortality*, and *the Conduct of Life and good Manners*, has been doubted by no Man: And that it went from him, into the Schools of *Ariſtotle*, and ſo deriv'd and diffuſ'd almoſt into the whole World, is in like manner atteſted by all.

XXII. WHEREFORE, as the Virtue, and Wiſdom, and Excellency, of ſo many of the Old *Heathens*, does not a little Illuſtrate the Power and Benignity of the Divine Providence, and the extent of its Gifts: So can theſe Men, in no degree, either obſcure, or derogate from, the Glory of the *Church*. For they, as we ſaid, did but borrow their precious Things, either from the *Church* of God, or from the *Divine Logos* or *WORD*. That *Word* which the old Church (I mean that of the *Jews*) did worſhip when it ſhined from the Tabernacle: and which the New Church (I mean that of the *Chriſtians*) ſtill adores in the Human Nature of the *Meſſias*, as in the glorious Temple of its Reſidence. *And may it be Worſhipped and Adored for ever and ever.* Amen.

FINIS.